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Summary 
The thesis deals with the problems of nonlinearity and state-dependency of the monetary 
transmission model and asymmetric impulse responses in the Greenspan era. The main aim of 
the thesis is to verify whether the standard assumption of linearity and state-independency of 
the monetary transmission model holds in practice when a small three-equation model of 
monetary transmission is confronted with a broad set of data. The issue of asymmetric 
monetary transmission is of utmost importance from the perspective of strategic dilemmas 
regarding optimal scheduling of monetary policy actions. The literature overview leaves very 
little doubt that there are many theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that monetary 
transmission exhibits significant sign, size and state asymmetries no matter whether we make 
some general considerations or whether we focus solely on the Greenspan era. The 
econometric analysis performed here, based on the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 framework, delivers statistically 
significant sign and size asymmetries, but the obtained patterns are not robust among the 
estimated models. On the other hand, the adopted framework is successful at identifying 
sources of state-dependency of the estimated equations and state asymmetry of monetary 
transmission. Variables from all but one of the defined groups are found to deliver significant 
patterns of state asymmetry and, at the same time, the obtained patterns of state asymmetries 
are explicable from the theoretical point of view. We find the results to be useful from the 
perspective of conducting the monetary policy in practice. 
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Introduction 
Any economic or econometric model is a great simplification of a complex economic reality 
and necessarily requires some simplifying (sometimes ad hoc and implicit) assumptions. The 
question to be asked is not whether the model omits some aspects of the reality but rather 
whether it emphasises everything that is crucial and important from the perspective of the 
problem being investigated and puts aside all the disturbing noise in order to see the crux of 
the matter. This issue is of utmost importance when models are something more than just 
purely theoretical exercises and when they serve as some kind of justification or rationale 
behind economic policies which may influence wealth or its distribution in society. 
This is also the case for monetary policy and its modelling. It seems that there is a wide 
consensus regarding the advantages of reasonably low and stable inflation and neutrality or 
near-neutrality of money in the long run. At the same time, however, there is still an ongoing 
debate as to how exactly the monetary transmission mechanism operates over the short- and 
medium-term horizon and what its exact channels and their relative importance are. In some 
respects the situation may even be worse than we thought it was before Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995) wrote that the monetary transmission mechanism was like a black box – we knew the 
ins (impulses) and outs (effects) but we did not know what was inside (the channels of the 
monetary policy and their importance). The recent crisis again brought some doubts about 
whether we are fully aware of the effects of the monetary policy, to say nothing of whether 
we have an in-depth understanding of various channels of the monetary transmission 
mechanism and their interactions. 
Probably the most self-evident shortcomings of monetary transmission models prior to the 
crisis era come from neglecting the financial sector and issues related to financial and 
macroeconomic stability. In particular, some economists (e.g. Taylor 2009) argue that the 
monetary policy may play an important role in co-creating boom-bust cycles in which losses 
from the bust period may surpass gains from the boom period. At the same time, a quite 
popular if not predominant, at least until the recent crisis, position on this issue which was 
taken by central bankers held that the monetary policy should wait and mop up after bubble 
bursts by cutting interest rates rather than preventively hiking rates in order to prick or deflate 
the bubble. Nevertheless, nonstandard measures adopted by many central banks after the 
Lehman Brothers collapse show that e.g. a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates should 
be taken into consideration. 
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The above-mentioned concerns shed some light on just a few of the nontrivial effects and 
conditions of the monetary policy as revealed by the recent crisis. In this paper we move 
backwards even further and ask whether the black box of the monetary transmission 
mechanism hides more peculiarities which are not covered in regular textbooks on the 
monetary policy but, in contrast to many recent papers, we do not want to focus on issues 
directly and exclusively regarding the recent crisis and financial or macroeconomic stability. 
Specifically, we are interested in nonlinearity and state-dependency of the monetary 
transmission mechanism resulting in asymmetric impulse responses on a more frequent basis 
than once or twice in a century. 
In other words, we question one of the most popular but very often implicit assumptions of 
the linearity of equations describing the monetary transmission mechanism and constancy of 
the estimated parameters. We acknowledge that these assumptions may fail when it comes to 
extremely turbulent periods, such as the pre-World War II recessions (in particular the Great 
Depression) or the recent Great Recession, but we want to verify whether the linearity and 
constancy assumptions hold true in quieter times and during milder crises or recessions, such 
as those preceding the recent one. Moreover, we are interested whether asymmetric impulse 
responses are only an occasional exception or, perhaps, the rule? 
In section 2 we survey the existing literature on general concepts and rationales standing 
behind potential nonlinearity and state-dependency of the monetary transmission mechanism. 
We show that there are quite many theoretical reasons for a nonlinear and state-dependent 
reaction of the economy to interest rates and vice versa – a nonlinear and state-dependent 
reaction of interest rates to changes in the economy. Empirical studies confirm, by and large, 
such predictions, however, it is usually difficult to pinpoint and separate the exact theoretical 
sources of the observed nonlinearities and state-dependencies due to the many interactions 
and interrelations among them. Similarly, there are some papers evidencing asymmetric 
impulse responses of the economy to monetary policy shocks. 
In this paper we address the question of nonlinearity and state-dependency of the monetary 
transmission mechanism and asymmetric impulse responses by analysing the Greenspan era. 
Naturally, choosing the U.S economy and this period may seem subjective (and to some 
extent it surely is) but we have quite many reasons to focus exclusively on this era and to 
leave out other economies and Federal Reserve chairmen. We justify such a decision in 
greater detail in subsection 1.8, while later in section 3 we also present some grounds for 
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nonlinearity and state-dependency in the monetary transmission mechanism which are 
specific to the Greenspan era. The literature, both theoretical and empirical, is extensive and 
sometimes covers very disparate aspects of Greenspan’s Federal Reserve presidency which 
could have potentially influenced the shape of the monetary transmission mechanism during 
that period. Broadly speaking, evidence on some potential sources of nonlinearity and state-
dependency is mixed, while in others it seems to be unequivocal. 
The empirical part of this study begins in section 4, where we estimate a baseline linear model 
of the monetary transmission mechanism. In section 5 we employ the estimated model and 
develop a conservative testing procedure to show that the linearity and state-independency of 
the monetary transmission mechanism is a questionable assumption. 
This justifies the next step we take in section 6, in which we exploit the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 framework 
(Teräsvirta 1994) to specify, estimate, select and evaluate nonlinear and state-dependent 
models of the monetary transmission mechanism. 
Finally, in section 7 we analyse generalised impulse responses based on the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models that 
were estimated in section 6, which allows us to verify the existence of sign, size and state 
asymmetries of the monetary transmission. 
The analysis performed here detects statistically significant sign and size asymmetries, 
however, the obtained patterns of sign and size asymmetries are not robust among the 
estimated models. Therefore, in that respect we form methodological rather than empirical 
conclusions – we argue that a trustworthy analysis of sign and size asymmetries requires a 
framework which will identify both monetary policy shocks and their propagation mechanism 
at the same time. Developing such a framework in a nonlinear or state-dependent setting 
seems to be an interesting challenge for future research. 
As far as state asymmetry is concerned, the econometric method employed here successfully 
identified the sources of state-dependency of the estimated equations and state asymmetry of 
the monetary transmission. The obtained results are justifiable from the theoretical 
perspective and useful in the context of conducting the monetary policy and scheduling 
monetary policy actions, though the Lucas critique should always be taken into consideration. 
Traditionally, in the conclusions we once again sum up all of the findings and suggest some 
possible extensions or directions for future research in the area. 
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1. Defining basic concepts 
1.1 Introduction 
It is always good practice to clarify the terms which appear in the title of a study and may be, 
to some extent, ambiguous. Firstly we provide a basic intuition behind the concepts of 
nonlinearity, state-dependency and asymmetry, while later we explicitly define the concepts 
of nonlinearity, state-dependency and asymmetry, and thus introduce clear-cut distinction 
among them. Such a formalisation is motivated by very imprecise usage of these terms in the 
literature which, in our opinion, may potentially cause some misconceptions about the scope 
of this study. Since we are not interested in nonlinearity, state-dependency and asymmetry as 
independent and self-contained concepts, we want to refer to them in the context of the 
monetary transmission mechanism and impulse responses, thus we also define the latter two 
notions more precisely. Finally, we justify why we find the problem of nonlinearity and state-
dependency of the monetary transmission mechanism which results in asymmetric impulse 
responses important and why we have chosen the Greenspan era as the period we want to 
analyse. 
 
1.2 Preliminary considerations 
As a preliminary intuition, nonlinearity, state-dependency and asymmetry of the monetary 
transmission may be perceived as a departure from the paradigm of modelling the monetary 
transmission with the use of linear and closed-system models which give rather mechanistic 
assessment of what the effects of the monetary policy shocks are. 
Intuitively and nontechnically, a nonlinear relationship between two variables is ‘a relation 
(...) that, when plotted on a graph, does not form a straight line’ (Vogt and Johnson 2011) but 
– implicitly and most commonly – a curve. In other words, a nonlinear relationship is not 
directly proportional to the inputs, and unit effects of changing the input variable may vary 
along with the level of that variable. 
By analogy, a state-dependent relationship between two variables may be depicted as a 
relation that, when plotted on a graph, forms a set of lines for different values of another 
variable rather than a single line. Put differently, the exact characteristics of a state-dependent 
10 
 
relationship between two variables depend on the value of yet another variable. A model with 
interaction terms is a classic example of such a relationship. 
An asymmetric relationship between two variables is a relationship that, when plotted on a 
graph, violates geometric symmetry i.e. a property of being invariant to a determined set of 
transforms (isometries) such as reflections, rotations or translations. Since there are many 
types of symmetries and corresponding transforms, one should specify exactly what types of 
asymmetry are taken into consideration, which we will do later in subsection 1.6. 
Sometimes the concepts of nonlinearity, state-dependency and asymmetry are jointly labelled 
as the ‘non-linear’ approach1 and since all the terms are used rather loosely (and confusingly) 
in the literature we find it very important to explicitly and precisely define them. Before doing 
so in the following subsections, however, we present an intuitive justification for why our 
considerations are not only of academic origin but also have practical policy oriented 
consequences.  
According to the paradigm of modelling the monetary transmission with the use of linear and 
closed-system models the expected effects of monetary policy are always directly 
proportional to the magnitude of the monetary shock and invariant with respect to any other 
variables. In contrast, the ‘non-linear’ approach implies that the effects of monetary policy are 
sensitive to factors which are not usually taken into account by the standard models. In 
particular, raising the interest rate by e.g. 50 basis points is not necessarily equivalent to two 
hikes by 25 basis points and may have different absolute impact on the economy than cutting 
the interest rate by the same amount. Similarly, the effects of such a decision may vary along 
the business and financial cycle, or with the structural characteristics of the economy (e.g. 
labour share or trade openness) which evolve over time. In consequence, the central bankers 
face many strategic dilemmas regarding optimal scheduling of monetary policy actions. 
Intuitively, such a setting is much closer to the statement that ‘central banking is as much art 
as science’ (Blinder 1997) than the mechanistic perspective offered by the standard approach. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Using the analogy of set theory (or logic), the ‘non-linear’ approach is the absolute (or logical) complement of 
the aforementioned paradigm of modelling monetary transmission with the use of linear and closed-system 
models. 
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1.3 Model of the monetary transmission mechanism 
In this study we follow a general and very popular assumption that the model of the monetary 
transmission mechanism consists of three equations representing three endogenous variables: 
inflation (𝜋𝑡), output gap (𝑥𝑡), and short-term nominal interest rate (𝑖𝑡). Conceptually, the 
equations correspond to the aggregate supply (Phillips curve) and aggregate demand (IS 
curve) sides of the economy and to the interest rate rule (Taylor rule), respectively. The 
endogenous variables depend on explanatory vectors (𝒛𝑡
𝝅, 𝒛𝑡
𝒙 and 𝒛𝑡
𝒊 ), which may include 
lagged, current and expected values of endogenous variables and some additional exogenous 
regressors. In particular, the basic New Keynesian model of monetary transmission fits into 
this definition as a special case. 
Although the exchange rate equation is not included in our baseline model, we do not make a 
clear distinction between modelling a closed and open economy. As was shown in many 
papers (see e.g. Clarida, Galí and Gertler 2001, 2002; McCallum and Nelson 2000), explicit 
New Keynesian models of small open economy are usually isomorphic to the closed economy 
version of the model or can be reduced to such a form under some simplifying assumptions. 
Moreover, even if the model isomorphism may be questioned on theoretical grounds
2
, both 
open- and closed- economy frameworks yield very similar responses of economic activity and 
inflation to domestic shocks not only for a relatively closed economy such as the U.S. (e.g. 
Erceg, Gust and López-Salido 2010) but also for a relatively open economy such as Canada 
(e.g. Dib 2011). 
If we comply with the presented framework, nonlinearity and state-dependency of the 
monetary transmission mechanism may originate from every single equation constituting the 
model. Thus, after defining some fundamental concepts we firstly overview the existing 
literature on the general sources of nonlinearity and state-dependency at the equation levels 
and only then do we look at the monetary transmission mechanism as a system. 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 see e.g. Barnett and Eryilmaz (2013) for a bifurcation analysis of the model developed by Clarida, Galí and 
Gertler (2002) or Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2010) for a unified analytical framework systematising the 
literature on optimal monetary policy in open economies. 
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1.4 Nonlinearity and state-dependency 
As was suggested by Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim, and Granger (2010, Ch. 1.1), when writing about 
nonlinearity it might be a good idea to provide a precise definition of nonlinearity. Since 
finding the universal definition of nonlinearity is a more complex exercise than one could 
expect, we propose to follow a definition of nonlinearity in the conditional mean, which we 
find the most useful and adequate from the perspective of the investigated problem.
3
 
In fact, it is more convenient to define linearity first and then to classify anything else as 
nonlinearity. The following definition is based on the one proposed by Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim, 
and Granger (2010, Ch. 1.1), and Lee, White and Granger (1993). 
 
Definition 1 
The model of the monetary transmission mechanism is said to be linear in the conditional 
mean if for any endogenous variable 𝑦 ∈ {𝜋, 𝑥, 𝑖} depending on vector 𝒛𝑡
𝒚
 the conditional 
mean satisfies the following condition: 
𝐸{𝑦𝑡|𝒛𝑡
𝒚
} = 𝜶′𝒛𝑡
𝒚
+ 𝑔(𝒛𝑡
𝒚
) and 𝑔(𝒛𝑡
𝒚
) ≡ 0 
Then, if the above-mentioned condition is not satisfied it may be said that the model of the 
monetary transmission mechanism is nonlinear (in the conditional mean). 
 
Intuitively, the given definition of nonlinearity implies that the conditional mean of at least 
one endogenous variable requires a nonlinear component, i.e. the conditional mean is 
something more than purely a linear combination of explanatory variables.  
To make a clear distinction between linearity and nonlinearity in the conditional mean, let us 
imagine the four following models: 
1. 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑧1,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑧2,𝑡 + 𝜀1,𝑡 
2. 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑧1,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑧2,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑧1,𝑡𝑧2,𝑡 + 𝜀2,𝑡 
3. 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑧1,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑧2,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑧1,𝑡
2 + 𝜀3,𝑡 
4. 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑧1,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑧2,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑧1,𝑡
− + 𝛽6𝑧1,𝑡
+ + 𝜀4,𝑡 
where 𝛽5 ≠ 𝛽6,  𝑧1,𝑡
− = {
𝑧1,𝑡 𝑧1,𝑡 ≤ 𝑧1̅
0 𝑧1,𝑡 > 𝑧1̅
 and 𝑧1,𝑡
+ = {
𝑧1,𝑡 𝑧1,𝑡 > 𝑧1̅
0 𝑧1,𝑡 ≤ 𝑧1̅
  
                                                          
3
 See, e.g. Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim, and Granger (2010, Ch. 1.1) for some discussion on defining nonlinearity. 
13 
 
 
Although all of the models are linear in the estimated parameters, only the first model is linear 
in the conditional mean, i.e. all the others are nonlinear (in the conditional mean). 
 
Similarly, it is also desirable to define the concept of state-dependency. To be coherent, we 
propose an analogous negative definition of state-dependency in the conditional mean. 
 
Definition 2 
The model of the monetary transmission mechanism is said to be state-independent in the 
conditional mean if for any endogenous variable 𝑦 ∈ {𝜋, 𝑥, 𝑖} depending on vector 𝒛𝑡
𝒚
 and any 
variable 𝑠𝑡 ∉ {𝜋, 𝑥, 𝑖, 𝒛𝑡
𝒚
, 𝑡}, the conditional mean satisfies the following condition: 
𝐸{𝑦𝑡|𝒛𝑡
𝒚
} ≡ 𝐸{𝑦𝑡|𝒛𝑡
𝒚
, 𝑠𝑡} 
Then, if the above-mentioned condition is not satisfied it may be said that the model of the 
monetary transmission mechanism is said to be state-dependent (in the conditional mean) 
with respect to variable 𝑠𝑡. 
 
The proposed definition reflects the basic intuition behind state-independency. If a model is 
state-independent then any additional variable beyond the variables already included in the 
model provides no extra information on the conditional mean of the endogenous variable or 
variables. In particular, it is convenient to think of state-independency as a situation when no 
estimated parameter (including constant
4
) is a function of any variable which is not included 
in the model (either as a dependent or independent variable). To make a clear-cut distinction 
between state-independency and time-independency, we also assume that 𝑠𝑡 should not be a 
time variable (𝑡), however, one may relax this assumption and claim that time-independency 
is just a particular case of state-independency. It would be convenient to name 𝑠𝑡 as a ‘state 
variable’, but this could be misleading due to its meaning in the theory of dynamical systems 
and optimal control (as opposed to ‘control variable’). Therefore, we avoid labelling the 
variable 𝑠𝑡 or enclose the term ‘state’ in quotation marks.
5
 Finally, it is also worth 
emphasising that the concept of state-independency is broader than the concept of structural 
invariance, and this does not necessarily imply that the estimated parameters are literally 
                                                          
4
 If a constant is the only parameter being the function of variable 𝑠𝑡, the problem of state-dependency with 
respect to 𝑠𝑡 is reduced to a simple omitted variable problem. 
5
 In specific econometric applications it could be labelled as, e.g. a switch(ing), transition or threshold variable. 
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constant in time since the definition allows for purely random fluctuations of the estimated 
parameters. 
 
1.5 Impulse responses 
Definitions of nonlinearity and state-dependency based on the concept of the conditional 
mean bring us directly to the problem of defining the impulse response function, which in this 
case becomes history- or state-dependent. 
The standard impulse response function, known, e.g. from VAR models, can be expressed as 
the difference between the two conditional expected values: 
 
𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡+ℎ(𝑦𝑡, 𝛿) = 𝐸{𝑦𝑡+ℎ|𝜀𝑡
𝑧 = 𝛿, 𝜀𝑡+ℎ
𝑧 = 0} −  𝐸{𝑦𝑡+ℎ|𝜀𝑡
𝑧 = 0, 𝜀𝑡+ℎ
𝑧 = 0}, ℎ ∈ ℕ+ 
 
Such an expression denotes the response of 𝑦𝑡 to an impulse 𝜀𝑡
𝑧 = 𝛿 in a variable 𝑧𝑡, in time 
𝑡 + ℎ, i.e. ℎ periods later after the one-off impulse has been initialised. 
The concept works very well when we are dealing with models which are linear and state-
independent in the conditional mean. In such a case the impulse response is always 
proportional to the size of the initial shock, and independent of the history prior to when the 
shock was initialised and to the ‘external’ circumstances in which propagation of the shock 
takes place. In other words, even if the impulse response function were formally conditioned 
on the historical or actual values of some variables, these terms would be analytically zeroed 
out. In consequence, all we need to calculate the impulse response function is to know the 
estimated model. Once the model is estimated, we no longer need any data because the 
impulse response functions becomes an analytical property of the estimated model itself.  
A problem arises when we analyse models which are nonlinear or state-dependent in the 
conditional mean. Bearing in mind definitions 1 and 2, the impulse response now becomes a 
function of the historical or actual values of some variables and it is no longer necessarily 
proportional to the size of the initial shock. 
It might be appealing that we should extend the formal definition of the impulse response 
function, so the expected values are additionally conditioned on the historical or actual values 
of relevant variables (the term denoted as 𝜔𝑡): 
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𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡+ℎ(𝑦𝑡, 𝛿, 𝜔𝑡) = 𝐸{𝑦𝑡+ℎ|𝜀𝑡
𝑧 = 𝛿, 𝜀𝑡+ℎ
𝑧 = 0,𝜔𝑡} − 𝐸{𝑦𝑡+ℎ|𝜀𝑡
𝑧 = 0, 𝜀𝑡+ℎ
𝑧 = 0,𝜔𝑡}, ℎ ∈ ℕ
+ 
 
However, as was shown by Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim, and Granger (2010, Ch. 15.1), such an 
amendment is insufficient since it leads to a bias in the impulse response function due to the 
assumption that all future shocks are equal to zero (𝜀𝑡+ℎ
𝑧 = 0 for ℎ ∈ ℕ+).6 
That is why Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996) developed the generalised impulse response 
function allowing for both non-zero future shocks and conditioning on the historical or actual 
values of relevant variables. The generalised and bias-corrected version of the impulse 
response function may thus be expressed as: 
 
𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡+ℎ(𝑦𝑡, 𝛿, 𝜔𝑡) = 𝐸{𝑦𝑡+ℎ|𝜀𝑡
𝑧 = 𝛿,𝜔𝑡} −  𝐸{𝑦𝑡+ℎ|𝜔𝑡},    ℎ ∈ ℕ
+ 
 
Since 𝜀𝑡
𝑧 = 𝛿 is a single preset value of an innovation to 𝑧𝑡, and 𝜔𝑡 is a single path of the 
values of some relevant variables, the obtained generalised impulse response should be treated 
as just a single realisation of a random variable. Therefore, if we want to capture some 
universal properties of the impulse response we should rather look at the densities of 
generalised impulse response functions: 
 
𝑮𝑰𝑹𝑭𝑡+ℎ(𝑦𝑡, 𝜀𝑡
𝑧 , Ω𝑡) = 𝐸{𝑦𝑡+ℎ|𝜀𝑡
𝑧 , Ω𝑡} −  𝐸{𝑦𝑡+ℎ|Ω𝑡},     ℎ ∈ ℕ
+ 
 
In such a notation 𝜀𝑡
𝑧 represents shocks of a certain type, while Ω𝑡 refers to the set of all the 
possible (or applicable) historical or actual values of relevant variables (usually Ω𝑡 =
{𝜔𝑡−𝑗: 𝑗 ∈ ℕ
0}). Because both 𝜀𝑡
𝑧 and Ω𝑡 are random, obtaining densities of general impulse 
response functions requires appropriate sampling techniques. 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 In the case of nonlinear function 𝐸{𝑓(𝜀𝑡+ℎ)} ≠ 𝑓(𝐸{𝜀𝑡+ℎ}), so even if it is true that 𝐸{𝜀𝑡+ℎ} = 0, conditioning 
the expected value of 𝑦𝑡+ℎ on 𝜀𝑡+ℎ = 0 for ℎ ∈ ℕ
+ creates a bias in both the minuend and subtrahend of the 
impulse response function. Since the model is nonlinear, the errors generally do not equalise, which results in a 
biased specification of the impulse response function. Analogously, it is not necessarily true that 
𝐸{𝑓(𝑦𝑡+ℎ)|𝑠𝑡} = 𝑓(𝐸{𝑦𝑡+ℎ|𝑠𝑡}), and a similar bias may arise as a result of the model’s state-dependency.  
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1.6 Asymmetry of the monetary transmission 
Even though there is a number of various concepts and definitions of asymmetry (see e.g. 
Verbrugge 1997; Ramsey and Rothman 1996), they usually refer to single time series or 
univariate models. If asymmetry in the macroeconomic-type model is investigated, the idea of 
asymmetry is usually expressed in terms of a model functional form and inequalities of some 
model parameters (single equation models), or less precisely in a verbal form (single and 
multi-equation models). The latter typically states that the standardised reaction of an 
endogenous variable to changes in the explanatory variables may vary (i.e. be asymmetric) 
with respect to the sign and size of this change and the value of some other variables. 
In our opinion this may lead to some misunderstandings, since it is not perfectly clear whether 
asymmetry should be perceived as an analytical property of the estimated functional form of 
the model or rather as some patterns observed in the empirical densities of impulse response 
functions. We argue that this dilemma is not trifling and that the latter approach is much more 
favourable, at least in the case of our research. 
First, the term ‘asymmetric function’ may be misleading and equivocal. In mathematics, 
symmetric function is a multivariable function which is invariant to any permutation of its 
variables. On the other hand, the econometric concept of asymmetry is intuitively related to 
functions which are not: odd or even (sign asymmetry), homogeneous of degree one (size 
asymmetry) or additively separable (state asymmetry). This, however, may again create some 
ambiguities and requires that one specify whether one means properties of the functional form 
of: the conditional mean, the marginal effect or the partial effect.
7
 
Second, bearing in mind the risk of misspecification and overfitting, it is desirable to look at a 
discrete space of values which took place in reality rather than in a hypothetical and 
continuous domain as suggested by the functional form of the model. 
Finally, in the context of multi-equation models, where due to interactions among all the 
endogenous variables different sources of asymmetry may amplify or restrain one another, it 
can be difficult to describe the asymmetry in terms of the analytical properties of the 
functional form of the estimated system. This would require knowing closed-form solutions 
                                                          
7
 Imagine a function 𝐸{𝑦|𝑥} = 𝑥2 which is even but not homogeneous of degree one. The marginal effect 
𝜕𝐸{𝑦|𝑥}
𝜕𝑥
= 2𝑥 is odd and homogeneous of degree one, while the partial effect (for Δ𝑥 = 𝜀) 
Δ𝐸{𝑦|𝑥}
Δ𝑥
= 2𝑥 + 𝜀 is 
neither odd/even nor homogeneous of degree one. 
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for all the endogenous variables although in some cases only numerical solutions may exist or 
be obtainable in practice. 
Taking the above negative motivation into consideration we propose to make a clear 
distinction that although nonlinearity and state-dependency of the monetary transmission are 
properties of a model functional form, asymmetry of the monetary transmission is a property 
of generalised impulse response functions.
8
 Such an approach allows us to avoid the presented 
ambiguities and simplifies not only the definition of asymmetry of the monetary transmission 
but also its operational usage. Thus, we define asymmetry of the monetary transmission in 
terms of densities of generalised impulse response functions, which is – as far as we know – 
the first time such a definition of various types of asymmetry has formally and explicitly been 
put forward. 
 
Definition 3 
The monetary transmission is said to be symmetric if for any endogenous variable 𝑦 ∈
{𝜋, 𝑥, 𝑖} and for any variable 𝑧𝑡 being an element of vector 𝒚𝒕 = [𝜋𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑖𝑡]
′, 𝒛𝑡
𝝅, 𝒛𝑡
𝒙 or 𝒛𝑡
𝒊  
densities of the generalised impulse response functions satisfy the following conditions: 
1. |𝑮𝑰𝑹𝑭𝑡+ℎ(𝑦𝑡, 𝜀𝑡
𝑧 > 0,Ω𝑡)| = |𝑮𝑰𝑹𝑭𝑡+ℎ(𝑦𝑡, −𝜀𝑡
𝑧 < 0,Ω𝑡)|,  ℎ ∈ ℕ
+ 
2. 𝑮𝑰𝑹𝑭𝑡+ℎ(𝑦𝑡, 𝜀𝑡
𝑧 , Ω𝑡) =
1
𝜅
𝑮𝑰𝑹𝑭𝑡+ℎ(𝑦𝑡, 𝜅𝜀𝑡
𝑧 , Ω𝑡),   ℎ ∈ ℕ
+, 𝜅 ∈ ℝ+ 
3. 𝑮𝑰𝑹𝑭𝑡+ℎ(𝑦𝑡, 𝜀𝑡
𝑧 , Ω𝑡
1) = ⋯ = 𝑮𝑰𝑹𝑭𝑡+ℎ(𝑦𝑡, 𝜀𝑡
𝑧 , Ω𝑡
𝐼),     
where 𝛺𝑡
𝑖 ∈ {𝛺𝑡
𝑖 ⊂ 𝛺𝑡: 𝐷𝑅(𝜔𝑡−𝑗), ⋃ 𝛺𝑡
𝑖𝐼
𝑖=1 = 𝛺𝑡 , ⋂ 𝛺𝑡
𝑖𝐼
𝑖=1 = ∅,𝛺𝑡
𝑖 ≠ ∅};  
𝐷𝑅(𝜔𝑡−𝑗) stands for a division rule being a function that associates a single path 𝜔𝑡−𝑗 to 
a corresponding subset 𝛺𝑡
𝑖  according to some logical conditions; 𝐼 ∈ {2,… , |𝛺𝑡|}; and 
ℎ, 𝑗 ∈ ℕ+  
Then, if any of the above-mentioned conditions is not satisfied it may be said that the 
monetary transmission is asymmetric. In particular, violating the respective conditions 
corresponds to: 
1. sign asymmetry 
2. size asymmetry 
                                                          
8
 It is important to emphasise that the chosen conceptualisation of asymmetry at the level of the monetary 
transmission mechanism as a system of equations does not exclude a ‘traditional definition’ of asymmetry at the 
level of individual equations constituting the monetary transmission mechanism. 
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3. state asymmetry (with respect to the applied division rule). 
 
The presented definition is very general but at the same time distinguishes three different 
types of asymmetries. 
Sign asymmetry implies that densities of generalised impulse responses vary for positive and 
negative shocks. In the context of the monetary transmission we are particularly interested in 
comparing the effects of expansionary and restrictive monetary policy impulses.  
Size asymmetry means that standardised densities of generalised impulse responses depend on 
the size of the shock. In this paper we focus our attention on comparing the unit effects of 
small and big monetary policy impulses.  
State asymmetry entails that densities of generalised impulse responses are neither history nor 
state invariant. In the proposed definition a set of all possible histories (Ω𝑡) is divided into a 
declared number of collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive non-empty subsets in 
accordance with some division rule
9
. If the densities of generalised impulse responses are 
equal to one another for all of the identified subsets then the model is (state) symmetric. 
Otherwise, there is state asymmetry with respect to the applied division rule. Exceptionally, 
one could also compare densities of generalised impulse response functions for all single 
paths of 𝜔𝑡−𝑗 – on the one hand, this does not require specifying any division rule, but on the 
other it does not allow to identify potential sources of state asymmetry. As far as the monetary 
transmission is concerned, we would like to know whether e.g. the effects of monetary 
impulses vary along different phases of the monetary policy and business cycles and whether 
they depend on some structural characteristics of the economy. 
 
1.7 Why is it important? 
One may wonder whether nonlinearity and state-dependency of the monetary transmission 
mechanism resulting in asymmetric impulse responses are something more than academic 
                                                          
9
 One could also imagine the most extreme version of the proposed definition in which it is required that 
densities of generalised impulse response functions are equal to one another for all partitions of a set Ω𝑡. This 
would, however, involve comparing the Bell number of densities of generalised impulse response functions, 
which quickly goes beyond any reasonable threshold (e.g. there are 115975 and 1382958545 partitions of a set of 
10 and 15 elements, respectively; see more in the On-Line Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences OEIS, sequence 
A000110: http://oeis.org/A000110).  
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curiosities and whether research in this area may somehow be useful in the policy-making 
process. If the answer is negative, why should we care and complicate our linear or log-
linearised models of the monetary transmission mechanism? 
First, nonlinear and state-dependent models imply that uncertainty is an inherent nature of the 
monetary transmission mechanism. Even if our model were the real data generating process 
and we knew the exact numerical values of all the parameters (not only their estimates), there 
would still be room for uncertainty due to the fact that for nonlinear functions: 𝐸{𝑓(𝜀𝑡+ℎ)} ≠
𝑓(𝐸{𝜀𝑡+ℎ}) and 𝐸{𝑓(𝑦𝑡+ℎ)|𝑠𝑡} ≠ 𝑓(𝐸{𝑦𝑡+ℎ|𝑠𝑡}). In other words, central bankers would still 
have to deal with the density of generalised impulse response functions rather than a single 
and deterministic pattern of impulse response. 
Second, as was suggested in the previous subsection, in the case of a nonlinear and state-
dependent setting of the monetary transmission mechanism, a standardised (i.e. divided by the 
size and sign of a shock) response of the economy to a monetary policy impulse may exert 
asymmetries and depend on the: 
 sign of the impulse (expansionary or restrictive) 
 size of the impulse (gradualism or cold turkey) 
 phase of the monetary policy (tightening, loosening or stabilising monetary 
conditions) 
 phase of the business cycle (expansions or contraction – 2 stages; boom, slowdown, 
recession or recovery – 4 stages)  
Such a feature of the monetary transmission mechanism gives more importance to thoughtful 
scheduling of monetary policy impulses than in the linear case, because improper timing and 
dosing may create deadweight costs in terms of lower output or higher inflation. Then central 
bankers face a set of strategic and interrelated dilemmas, e.g. they: 
 act pre-emptively (to avoid larger costs in the future) or ‘wait and see’ (to avoid a 
possible mistake) if an important change in economic conditions is expected 
 smooth the interest rate path or accept contrary swings in interest rates if economic 
conditions change abruptly 
 act gradually or serve a cold turkey if it is desirable to reach some interest rate target 
 act whatever the macroeconomic conditions are or wait for a more favourable 
moment. 
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What is more, central bankers’ faulty decisions may not be as easily reversible as in the linear 
case, which provides additional incentives to conduct a reliable monetary policy. 
The two remarks justify why central banks should put much effort in forecasting and 
projecting economic outcomes under different scenarios and sets of assumptions. The more 
we know about the future, the smaller the uncertainty will be regarding the exact shape of the 
impulse response function and the easier it will be to conduct a desirable monetary policy. 
One may also perceive the above-mentioned findings as a model-based depiction of the 
aforementioned statement that ‘central banking is as much art as science’ (Blinder 1997). 
When there is inherent uncertainty in a model describing the monetary transmission 
mechanism and there are many strategic dilemmas regarding conducting a monetary policy, 
there is also much space for experts’ knowledge and intuition which go beyond simple 
quantitative relationships captured by the model’s equations. 
 
1.8 Why the Greenspan era? 
Obviously, any empirical researcher faces the choice of an adequate sample to be analysed in 
line with the research agenda. As was previously noted, the aim of this paper is to verify the 
existence of nonlinearity and state-dependency of the monetary transmission mechanism 
resulting in asymmetric impulse responses. At the same time, it was emphasised that we are 
not interested in extremely turbulent periods, such as pre-World War II recessions (in 
particular the Great Depression) or the recent Great Recession, when breaking linearity and 
state-independency assumptions would not be surprising. Additionally, there are also some 
methodological and practical limitations which should be taken into consideration when 
choosing the sample. In particular, nonlinear modelling requires possibly long but coherent 
time series which should not include additional sources of structural changes in the estimated 
relationships, apart from those captured by the employed econometric method. Bearing in 
mind these conditions, we have decided to focus our attention solely on the Greenspan era and 
to leave other economies and Federal Reserve presidencies aside. 
Choosing the U.S economy results from great availability of the modern economic literature 
on the monetary transmission in the United States. This facilitates the process of searching for 
sound premises behind nonlinearity and state-dependency of the monetary transmission 
mechanism resulting in asymmetric impulse responses. Such a property is all the more 
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important since the research departs, to some extent, from the standard assumptions of the 
mainstream economics, and papers in that field are very scarce in the case of other economies.  
The selection of one particular tenure decreases the risk of significant breakpoints between 
different Federal Reserve chairmen (e.g. as was suggested in subsection 2.4) and makes the 
analysed sample more coherent. To be more transparent we also list more precise arguments 
supporting our choice of the Greenspan era: 
 As requested, the Greenspan era did not coincide with the largest recessions in the U.S 
economic history and it ended before the outburst of the Great Recession. 
 Greenspan chairmanship lasted more than 18 years (from 11 August 1987 to 31 
January 2006), which is the second-longest tenure after Martin, who tenured 4 months 
longer (from 2 April 1951 to 1 February 1970). 
 Availability of data is greater for the Greenspan era than for previous Federal Reserve 
presidencies (especially when compared to Martin’s tenure – e.g. data on the federal 
funds rate is available from July 1954, which makes the effective ‘Martin’ sample 
shorter than the ‘Greenspan’ one). 
 As was suggested by Bernanke and Mihov (1998), throughout the whole sample of the 
Greenspan era the federal funds rate is an appropriate measure of the monetary policy 
(in contrast to 1979-1982, when non-borrowed reserves were more informative on the 
monetary policy stance due to the ‘Volcker experiment’). 
 Throughout the whole sample the U.S. dollar exchange rate was free-floating against 
main currencies (e.g. in the Bretton Woods system, 1944-1971/1973, occasional 
sudden changes in peg rates took place, which immediately affected the economy’s 
international competitiveness).  
Although the selection of a sample is always to some extent subjective, we argue that the 
choice of the Greenspan era as the period to be analysed herein is in line with our research 
agenda and provides a reasonable compromise between the longitude of time series and their 
coherency. At the same time it also gives a chance to investigate sources of nonlinearity and 
state-dependency of the monetary transmission mechanism which may be seen as very 
specific or even endemic to the Greenspan era. 
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1.9 The aim and scope of this study 
The main aim of this study is to verify the existence of nonlinearity and state-dependency of 
the monetary transmission mechanism in the Greenspan era. We expect that the standard 
assumption of linearity and state-independency of the monetary transmission mechanism will 
be broadly rejected by the adopted procedure of econometric modelling and testing. Since 
nonlinearity and state-dependency of the monetary transmission mechanism both result in 
various types of asymmetry of impulse responses, we are also interested in verifying the 
existence of sign, size and state asymmetries of the monetary transmission. Similarly, we 
expect to obtain statistically significant and robust patterns of asymmetry of the monetary 
transmission, which would question the convention of treating impulse responses as 
symmetric ones.  
The scope of the study is quite general and empirical. We use a possibly broad set of data 
against which we test the assumptions of linearity and state-independency of the monetary 
transmission mechanism and the symmetry of impulse responses. The analysed theoretical 
concepts serve as a background for both the selection of potential sources of nonlinearity, 
state-dependency and asymmetry, and for interpretation of the obtained results. Nevertheless, 
it is worth emphasising that we do not aim to empirically examine specific theoretical 
concepts which predict nonlinearity or state-dependency of the monetary transmission 
mechanism. The idea is rather to employ a unified econometric framework as to obtain 
comparable assessment of the importance of many heterogeneous sources of nonlinearity, 
state-dependency and asymmetry. Such results may later be employed to designate the most 
promising areas of future research.   
 
1.10 Summary 
In this section we defined the concepts of nonlinearity and state-dependency of the monetary 
transmission mechanism and various types of asymmetry of impulse responses. We will base 
our discussion on these definitions throughout the rest of the text. Moreover, we also justified 
why we find the problem important and why we have chosen the Greenspan era as the period 
we want to analyse. Finally, we specified precisely the main aim and scope of the study. In 
the following section we discuss the general premises behind nonlinearity and state-
23 
 
dependency of the monetary transmission mechanism resulting in asymmetric impulse 
responses.  
24 
 
2. General premises behind nonlinearity and state-dependency of 
the monetary transmission mechanism 
2.1 Introduction 
In this section we discuss the general premises justifying nonlinearity and state-dependency of 
the monetary transmission mechanism. We start by considering both the theoretical and 
empirical aspects, at the level of every single equation constituting the monetary transmission 
mechanism (i.e. the Phillips curve, the IS curve and the Taylor rule), and only later shall we 
tackle both the monetary transmission mechanism as a system and the issue of asymmetric 
impulse responses. The premises considered here are general in the sense that they do not 
refer to any particular timespan or economy but have a more universal application. This 
contrasts with the next section, in which we analyse premises which are specific to the 
Greenspan era and may have much more limited relevance for other periods or economies. 
 
2.2 Aggregate supply side – the Phillips curve 
2.2.1 Introduction to the nonlinear and state-dependent Phillips curve 
The original work by Phillips (1958) and some Keynesian follow-ups (e.g. Lipsey 1960; 
Hansen 1970) presented the Phillips curve in a nonlinear form. Also, in influential papers by 
Phelps (1967, 1968) the Phillips curve was expressed in at least potentially nonlinear terms. It 
was probably the simplified textbook version of the Phillips curve which gave rise to drawing 
the Phillips curve as a straight line without explicitly mentioning that originally it was indeed 
a curve. Later the development of New Keynesian economics and a dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium framework legitimated a linear form of the Phillips curve via log-
linearising models around the steady-state. Undoubtedly, practical and technical reasons 
played a crucial role in the process. 
Without loss of generality most of the analysed and estimated forms of the Phillips curves can 
be nested in the following model
10
: 
                                                          
10
 We follow the convention of treating the Phillips curve as a relation between the output gap and inflation, not 
between unemployment and the rate of change of nominal wages or inflation. However, a short historical note 
should do justice: 
It was Fisher (1928, 1973), not Phillips (1958), who carried out the first known empirical study on the 
relationship between unemployment and inflation. Moreover, since the original paper by Phillips (1958) 
presented the relationship between unemployment and the rate of change of nominal wages it was not until 
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𝜋𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽0𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡  + 𝛽1𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1  +  ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝜋𝑡−𝑖  +  ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑥𝑡−𝑖  +  𝜽𝒛𝒕  +  𝜀𝑡   (1.1) 
where: 
𝜋𝑡  – inflation rate 
𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡 – inflation rate at time 𝑡 expected at time 𝑡 (backward-looking expectations) 
𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1  – inflation rate at time 𝑡 + 1 expected at time 𝑡 (forward-looking expectations) 
𝑥𝑡  – output gap 
𝒛𝒕  – additional regressors. 
 
In particular, imposing appropriate restrictions on the parameters in (1.1) delivers the 
aforementioned New Keynesian Phillips Curve (1.2) and Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips 
curve (1.3), as known from the influential paper by Galí and Gertler (1999): 
 
𝜋𝑡 =  𝛽𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1  +  𝛿𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡        (1.2) 
𝜋𝑡 = (1 − 𝛾)𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1  +  𝛾𝜋𝑡−1  + 𝛿𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡     (1.3) 
 
A common feature of all linear and state-independent forms of the Phillips curve nested in 
(1.1) is that they imply constant short-run trade-off between the output gap and inflation. This 
means that disinflation costs are invariable and equal to the potential gains from equivalent 
increasing inflation. As a result, the monetary policy is not able to influence the average level 
of economic activity but only its variance, and there is no obviously preferable way of 
conducting disinflation. 
Such a suggestion is at odds with empirical findings, which show that the sacrifice ratio is not 
necessarily constant in time and may vary along with the economic conditions. Clark and 
McCracken (2006) showed that estimates of the coefficients on the output gap are instable, 
while Ball (1994) and Jordan (1997) found that the sacrifice ratio is smaller when disinflation 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Samuelson and Solow (1960) reformulated the Phillips curve into a relationship between unemployment and 
inflation as was initially proposed by Fisher (1928). Later, dissemination of ‘Okun’s law’ (Okun, 1962) and 
groundbreaking papers by Phelps (1967, 1968), Friedman (1968) and Lucas (1972, 1973) popularised the 
expectations-augmented (short-term) Phillips curve expressed as a relation between the output gap and inflation. 
Finally, a combination of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium modelling as was introduced by Kydland and 
Prescott (1982), microfounded macroeconomic models with monopolistic competition (e.g. Blanchard and 
Kiyotaki 1987; Ball and Romer 1990) and nominal rigidities (e.g. Taylor 1979, 1980; Rotenberg 1982 and 
especially Calvo 1983), topped with a seminal paper by Galí and Gertler (1999), gave birth to New Keynesian 
and hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curves (NKPC and HNKPC, respectively) in which expectations are 
forward-looking. 
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is done quickly and to some extent when the initial level of inflation is high. Both results put 
together mean that the Phillips curve is probably nonlinear or state-dependent and there is a 
strong need for both micro-based concepts which are able to bear the non-constant sacrifice 
ratio and empirical evidence on the exact shape of the Phillips curve. 
 
2.2.2 Micro-based concepts behind nonlinearity and state-dependency of the Phillips 
curve 
There are quite a few theoretical concepts which lead to the nonlinear or state-dependent 
Phillips curve and the sacrifice (or gain) ratio as being a function of some (macro)economic 
conditions. For simplicity we group these ideas into eight main categories, describe some 
important models which belong to those categories and shortly discuss their fundamental 
properties
11
. In some cases we also analyse their implications for the monetary policy. It 
should be noted, however, that the distinguished categories are very often closely interrelated 
and that some models or concepts fit into more than one category. The aim of the survey is to 
point to some distinctive strands in the literature rather than to rigorously classify all of the 
concepts and models according to some explicit rules.  
 
(1) In the capacity constraint model (see e.g. Mackleem 1997), enterprises are unable or find 
it costly to increase their production capacity in the short run. If they face a positive aggregate 
demand shock they are more willing to increase production rather than prices when capacity 
utilisation is low. On the other hand, when the capacity constraint becomes binding, 
enterprises are not able to increase production to satisfy demand at a given price level, so the 
optimising behaviour involves increasing prices. In consequence, the model implies that the 
Phillips curve is convex, which is consistent with the empirical findings presented originally 
by Phillips (1958).
12
 
Convexity of the Phillips curve means that disinflation costs are smaller when the economy is 
overheated, while gains from increasing inflation are larger when the economy is far below its 
capacity constraint. Furthermore, convexity of the Phillips curve justifies why central banks 
                                                          
11
 The survey of concepts is a very extended, generalised and updated version of the one presented by 
Dupasquier and Ricketts (1998), who distinguished only five models: the capacity constraint model, 
misperception or signal extraction model, costly adjustment model, downward nominal wage rigidity model and 
the monopolistically competitive model. 
12
 Hansen and Prescott (2005) showed that in their RBC model with occasionally binding capacity constraints 
the business cycle is asymmetric – the peaks are smaller than the troughs. 
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should smooth business cycles – the smaller the variance of output, the greater its average 
level. As was pointed out by Mackleem (1997) and Dupasquier and Ricketts (1998), by taking 
lags in the monetary transmission mechanism into consideration, the model also gives some 
incentives for conducting a pre-emptive monetary policy to prevent overheating of the 
economy because then the inflation becomes highly reactive to demand shocks and may be 
explosive. This intuition is also supported by Clark, Laxton and Rose (2001), who found 
forward-looking policy rules superior to myopic ones in the presence of a capacity constraint.  
 
(2) As was previously mentioned, misperception or signal extraction models (e.g. Lucas 
1972, 1973) result in a Phillips curve, the slope of which depends positively on the variance 
of inflation. Since relative and absolute price shocks are not directly observable, an enterprise 
needs to assess to which extent the change in the market price of its good is due to the shift in 
real and nominal demand. In the first extreme case the optimising behaviour implies 
increasing production, while in the second one – increasing prices. However, the more 
volatile inflation is, the more difficult the signal extraction problem is to be solved and the 
larger part of a single price shock is assigned to the change in nominal demand, which results 
in increasing prices rather than increasing production. 
The model predicts that disinflation costs are smaller when the inflation is volatile, while 
gains from increasing inflation are larger when it is stable. Moreover, the model implies a 
trade-off between stabilising nominal and real variables, thus smoothing the business cycle 
comes at the expense of allowing for more volatile inflation. 
Rational inattention models (e.g. Maćkowiak and Wiederholt 2009, 2011) extend the problem 
of signal extraction on the limited information-processing abilities of agents who allocate 
their attention among idiosyncratic and aggregate conditions according to the information 
flow constraint. Optimising behaviour implies that firms pay relatively more attention to more 
volatile shocks, which means that increasing volatility of nominal shocks makes real output 
less responsive to a particular nominal shock. However, the effect of increasing the average 
size of a shock is large enough to raise the volatility of real output. Thus, although 
implications for the shape of the Phillips curve, disinflation costs and gains from raising 
inflation are the same as in the case of the Lucas model, the two models differ markedly with 
respect to the relation between volatilities of nominal and real variables. In particular, rational 
inattention models imply that stabilising nominal variables helps to smooth the business 
cycle, which is at odds with the Lucas model. 
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(3) Costly adjustment models assume that changing prices or wages creates some costs which 
prevent enterprises from adjusting prices or wages if the distance between the actual and 
optimal level is not large enough to make such a move profitable. 
In the presence of menu costs, both the frequency and size of such adjustments depend 
positively on the level of inflation (see e.g. Ball, Mankiw and Romer 1988; Ball and Mankiw 
1994). Thus the higher the inflation is, the more responsive it is to demand shocks.  
Dupasquier and Ricketts (1998) argued that a similar relationship arises when negotiating 
wage contracts is costly. Then it might be reasonable to condition the duration of wage 
contracts on the expected level of inflation – the higher it is, the shorter are the contracts and 
the more frequently they are renegotiated. In both cases the slope of the Phillips curve is 
positively related to the average level of inflation and inflation expectations. Moreover, the 
Phillips curve might be convex in the presence of trend inflation. 
According to Dupasquier and Ricketts (1998), the two models provide some incentives to 
follow the ‘wait and see’ strategy. Since disinflation is more costly when the average level of 
inflation is already low and it takes more time for a demand shock to transform into inflation 
than otherwise, central bankers have incentives to act cautiously and unhurriedly, which 
should allow them to gather more information about the state of the inflationary pressure. 
Burstein (2006) extended the problem of menu costs (sticky prices) on dynamic pricing plans 
(sticky pricing plans) by allowing firms to choose an entire sequence of future prices rather 
than a single price. Similarly, in such an environment the Phillips curve is convex – 
disinflation is less costly when the initial level of inflation is high while the actual (i.e. at a 
single point of the Phillips curve) sacrifice ratio is greater than the gain ratio. The monetary 
authorities, however, have even more time to react to inflationary pressure than in a standard 
menu cost model because a firm is not forced to ‘front-load’, i.e. to raise its actual price 
before the expected change in the economic conditions materialises. 
 
(4) Downward wage rigidity models propose that, due to some institutional conditions and 
behavioural factors, wages are more rigid downward than upward. In consequence, when 
output gap or inflation expectations are low the Phillips curve may be less steep (and possibly 
convex) than otherwise. 
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(4a) Downward wage rigidity usually refers to downward nominal wage rigidity. Then wages 
are not only more rigid downward than upward but it is also easier to lower wages via 
increasing inflation than via cutting real wages. In such an environment, central bankers have 
strong incentives to avoid not only very high but also very low levels of inflation since then, 
as was shown by Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996), significant welfare loss may occur even 
in the long run. If there is an economic downturn and real wages are inefficiently high, raising 
inflation (though very unwelcome by public opinion) could be the only way to quickly regain 
the competitiveness of the economy. This justifies why the inflation target should be above 
zero and why temporary high inflation (i.e. above the targeted level) may sometimes be 
desirable. 
The most popular explanation as to why nominal but not real wages might be rigid downward 
is some form of money illusion which ‘seems to be widespread among economic agents and 
can be systemically studied and modelled’ (Shafir, Diamond and Tversky 1997). Apart from 
the most extreme and most controversial form of money illusion, i.e. when agents do not 
distinguish between nominal and real terms, it also includes fairness attitudes, according to 
which cuts in nominal wages are seen by employees as more unfair than equivalent cuts in 
real wages.  
(4b) The above-mentioned fairness attitudes may be seen as an abutment where theories of 
downward nominal wage rigidity meet the theories of downward real wage rigidity. Implicit 
contract theories of employment (see e.g. Stiglitz 1984b or Snowdon and Vane 2005, Ch. 
7.7.2) treat an employment agreement as some form of wage and employment insurance – 
since employers are usually less risk averse and have better access to capital markets than 
employees, so downward wage rigidity is offered to the latter at the expense of lower average 
wage. However, since this theory fails to explain lay-offs during economic downturns and 
says nothing about why employees are not underbid by the unemployed, it is not perceived as 
a complete theory of real wage rigidity. Efficiency wage theories
13
 fill this gap by proposing 
that ‘the (net) productivity of workers is a function on the wage paid’ (see e.g. Stiglitz 1984b). 
Then it might be counterproductive for a firm to cut wages unless this is absolutely necessary. 
Finally, insider-outsider models (Lindbeck and Snower 1986, 1988) focus on the insiders’ 
(employees’) power to gain some rent resulting from the various turnover costs and risks 
associated with hiring outsiders (the unemployed). Since many of these costs directly depend 
                                                          
13
 Snowdon and Vane (2005, Ch. 7.7.2) described four such theories: the adverse selection model, the labour 
turnover model, the shirking model and the fairness model. 
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on the attitude and behaviour of the insiders, they possess a true bargaining power which 
prevents the employer from cutting wages and/or hiring new employees with lower wage 
expectations. All three theories are capable of delivering wages which might be rigid 
downward in both real and nominal terms
14
, while the last two also justify the phenomenon of 
involuntary unemployment. 
The consequences of downward real wage rigidity are much more profound for the monetary 
policy than in the case of nominal rigidity. In extreme circumstances (full-upward and null-
downward indexation of wages), at every point of time central bankers face the vertical and 
horizontal ‘Phillips curve’ for expansionary and restrictive actions respectively, which 
virtually means that no action should be taken at all because it will always be wealth-
deteriorating. In a more moderate world the Phillips curve is steeper upward than downward 
while the difference between the two might be a decreasing function of the inflation level, 
which should induce the monetary authorities to act responsively and swiftly rather than pre-
emptively or gradually. However, real wage rigidity calls into question whether the monetary 
policy is truly able to promote both price stability and full employment at the same time. This 
is all the more doubtful because – according to theories of real wage rigidities – involuntary 
unemployment seems to be the rule rather than the exception. 
 
(5) Models of firms’ strategic behaviour in an imperfectly competitive environment show how 
prices could be instruments and information signals in market games among competing and/or 
cooperating firms. In this case the exact shape of the Phillips curve depends on the market 
structure and relative incentives to cut or raise prices in response to demand and cost shocks. 
(5a) Dupasquier and Ricketts (1998) argued that in the monopolistically competitive model 
firms may have strong incentives to avoid being undercut by competitors since they then lose 
consumers. Thus, whenever possible they are eager to be the first to lower prices and the last 
to raise them. In such an environment the Phillips curve is concave, which means that 
smoothing the business cycle deteriorates wealth, while central bankers may push an economy 
to the limit of capacity constraints without creating too much additional inflationary pressure. 
                                                          
14
 Although all three theories are usually categorised as theories of real wage rigidity (see e.g. Snowdon and 
Vane 2005, Ch. 7.7.2), they result in a mix of downward nominal and real wage rigidity. The exact proportions 
depend on whether implicit contracts are ‘expressed’ in real or nominal (or both) terms, productivity of workers 
is a function of real or nominal (or both) wages, and insiders have enough bargaining power to acquire at least 
partial indexation of wages. 
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On the other hand, when an economy is overheated, deflationary actions come at a larger cost 
than otherwise. 
(5b) Stiglitz (1984a) delivered a model in which limit pricing may serve as an efficient entry 
deterrent. Since during expansions the threat of new entry is more pronounced than during 
recessions, incumbents might be inclined to apply the policy of countercyclical markups. 
Certainly the shape of the Phillips curve also depends on the cyclical properties of marginal 
costs, but under some plausible assumptions the Phillips curve might be concave, as in the 
model described by Dupasquier and Ricketts (1998). 
(5c) In the same paper Stiglitz (1984a) provided some anecdotal evidence on markets with 
asymmetric information, where the price level serves as an instrument coordinating collusive 
behaviour. Because firms do not observe each other’s demand curves, they are not able to 
judge whether lowering a price below a cooperative level is fair or not. Thus, any 
undercutting of a cooperative price is treated as breaking the agreement. If there is no cap on 
raising prices they are more rigid downward than upward, and the Phillips curve may have 
similar properties as in the case of downward real wage rigidity. 
(5d) Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) argued that markets may exhibit procyclical 
competitiveness. As the economy grows there is enough room for more competitors on the 
market, and thus any oligopolistic or implicit collusions from the recession period are more 
difficult to maintain. In consequence, the Phillips curve may be steeper during expansions 
than during recessions and possibly convex.     
 
(6) Imperfect credibility models (see e.g. Alichi et al. 2009) assume that some parameters of 
the Phillips curve might be endogenous from the perspective of the central bank. In particular, 
the credibility of the central bank, which is at least partially manageable by its authorities, 
may influence the extent to which expectations are backward- and forward-looking. Thus the 
shape of the Phillips curve may depend on variables influencing the central bank’s credibility. 
Although it might be difficult to specify an exhaustive set of such variables, one should 
expect the average level and variance of inflation (or deviation from the inflation target if 
applicable) and economic activity to be among them.  
Moreover, in the presence of imperfect credibility, central bankers may face having the 
sacrifice ratio be larger than the gain ratio at every single point of time and the Phillips curve 
be convex upward but concave downward. In such an environment central bankers should act 
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pre-emptively in order not to lose ‘the stock of credibility’, since any delay and deterioration 
of credibility may raise the sacrifice ratio and lower the gain ratio. Isard, Laxton and Eliasson 
(2001) proved that in the presence of endogenous credibility, forward-looking monetary 
policy rules are superior to backward-looking ones. 
 
(7) Models of consumers’ behaviour and strategic interactions between consumers and firms 
focus on typical imperfections on the consumers’ side of the market and their implications for 
consumer-firm relations. Commonly, emphasis is put on the limited information that is 
available to consumers and/or on information asymmetries between consumers and firms. In 
some cases, however, it is proposed to enrich the otherwise standard economic model with 
some behavioural aspects of human behaviour. Thus, implications for the shape of the Phillips 
curve (and monetary policy) are model-sensitive. 
(7a) Customer markets are described as markets where the frequency of purchase is much 
larger than the frequency of search due to significant costs of the latter resulting in limited 
information on the lowest prices in the marketplace (Snowdon and Vane 2005, Ch. 7.7.1). 
Such a description typically suits markets of fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) or 
retailers offering a wide assortment of various goods (e.g. supermarkets), where firms may 
have some monopolistic power despite there being many other companies offering similar 
products or services. Since shopping is usually done quite frequently and regularly, firms have 
strong incentives to discourage consumers from exploring the market in search of lower 
prices. Thus, they avoid raising prices or at least being the first to do so. On the other hand, 
even though lowering prices attracts new customers, firms are less eager to do so than in the 
monopolistically competitive model as was described by Dupasquier and Ricketts (1998), 
because significant costs of the search delay the consumers’ response. Therefore, in such an 
environment the Phillips curve may be concave, but less concave than in the above-mentioned 
monopolistically competitive model. 
(7b) Stiglitz (1984a) put forward a generalisation of the above-mentioned model with costly 
search. He argued that in many situations it is not obvious whether the discouraging effect is 
bigger than the encouraging effect. A costly search creates a kink in the demand curve as 
faced by firms, but the location of this kink is crucial to the direction of relative price rigidity. 
In some cases, the costs of the search might be large enough in relation to the frequency of the 
purchase to create downward price rigidity, and then the Phillips curve is convex. 
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(7c) It is a well-known phenomenon that in the presence of imperfect information consumers 
may use the heuristic judging quality by price (e.g. Stiglitz 1984a, 1987; Allen 1988). Then, 
intuitively, firms have additional incentives to avoid price cuts and may be inclined to win 
both higher markup and reputation by raising prices. In consequence, prices may be rigid 
downward and possibly explosive upward while the Phillips curve should be convex. 
(7d) Snir et al. (2012) presented some evidence on the importance of pricing points (Kashyap 
1995) with respect to 9-ending prices, which may serve imperfectly informed consumers as 
signals for low prices. Strategically responsive retailers tend to disguise a price increase by 
setting a 9-ending price. At the same time, experiments show that setting a 9-ending price 
does not help consumers to notice a price cut, probably because retailers have many more 
effective instruments to signal price cuts. Therefore, in the presence of low inflation the 
Phillips curve may be steeper downward than upward and possibly concave. 
(7e) Chen et al. (2008) argued that the aforementioned rational inattention may lead to a 
asymmetric price adjustment in the small. Since consumers rationally decide not to pay 
attention to small price movements, retailers have stronger incentives to slightly raise rather 
than to slightly cut prices. By analysing a large price dataset, Chen et al. (2008) found that 
‘small price increases occur more frequently than small price decreases’, even if various 
measures of inflation are taken into account. In consequence, the Phillips curve may be 
steeper upward than downward and possibly convex for low levels of inflation. 
(7f) Rotemberg (2002) proposed a model in which customers’ anger at price increases creates 
upward rigidity of prices. The result is obtained by applying the ‘psychological utility 
function’, which includes not only individual payoffs but also fairness of prices. If a price is 
considered to be unfair, a customer stops purchasing to ‘punish’ the firm. Although the 
presented model predicts concavity of the Phillips curve, it should be noted that the outcomes 
are highly sensitive to the fairness definition and distribution of information among customers 
and firms. In particular, the shape of the Phillips curve may be state-dependent and 
determined by macroeconomic variables as observed by consumers, since fairness of prices 
may be judged with respect to actual economic conditions. 
(7g) Similarly, as in the case of downward wage rigidity, asymmetric price adjustment may be 
the result of implicit contracts between enterprises and customers. The combination of 
customers’ dislike for frequent price changes (see e.g. Okun 1981; Kahneman, Knetsch and 
Taler 1986) and the aforementioned costly search may induce a firm to offer an implicit 
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contract in which it promises to, for example, keep the price constant for a given period of 
time or until some trigger will allow the firm to renegotiate the contract or offer a new one. In 
practice, the contract works as insurance against undesirable price increases while a higher 
markup is a risk premium. Asymmetric price adjustment arises because the firm is punished 
twice for a price increase, while the positive effect of a price cut may offset the negative 
effect of a price change. Thus the Phillips curve should be steeper downward than upward. 
However, such a situation is likely to happen only when inflation is stable at a low level. 
Otherwise, either customers or enterprises would probably not be interested in such a contract. 
In consequence, the difference between the upward and the downward slope should 
eventually disappear as inflation rises. 
(7h) Bils (1989) built a model delivering procyclical elasticity of demand (for durable goods). 
The procyclicality arises because low-income customers who exhibit more elastic demand 
than high-income customers drop out of the market in recessions and re-enter it as the 
economy grows. Blinder (1994) stated that procyclicality of demand elasticity may also be 
justified by a segmentation of customers with respect to their loyalty. During recessions a firm 
maintains its most loyal customers but loses the least loyal ones, who eventually come back 
when the economy recovers. As a result, the elasticity of demand is procyclical which, 
similarly as in the case of procyclical competitiveness
15
, makes the Phillips curve steeper 
during expansions than during recessions and possibly convex.  
 
(8) Macroeconomic externalities and coordination failures play a fundamental role in the 
New Keynesian theory of the business cycle and are widely exploited in analyses of price 
stickiness and macroeconomic stability (Snowdon and Vane 2005, Ch. 7.7).  
In a typical New Keynesian model of the business cycle, aggregate demand externalities and 
coordination failure arise from a combination of an imperfectly competitive market and either 
adjustment costs (e.g. Blanchard and Kiyotaki 1987, Ball and Romer 1991) or, less 
commonly, ‘near rationality’ of economic agents (e.g. Akerlof and Yellen 1985a, 1985b). In 
such an environment an individual decision to change (or not) the level of prices influences 
the optimal decisions of other firms due to strategic complementarity, i.e. an effect which is 
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 The concepts of procyclical competitiveness and procyclical elasticity of demand were developed to fit into 
the observed pattern of countercyclical markups over marginal cost, thus both may be perceived as theories of 
countercyclical markups. 
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not internalised by individual firms. Thus, prices are sticky because each firm has no 
individual incentive to change the price first and waits for other firms to do so first. 
Interestingly, if real rigidities are great enough, the coordination failure may lead to multiple 
equilibria in the degree of price rigidity and multiple short-run equilibria of the economy, 
some of which are superior to others (Ball and Romer 1991).
16
 This intuitively gives welfare-
based justification for policies aimed at pushing the economy towards the Pareto better 
equilibrium. However, the main problem associated with multiple equilibria models is that 
one cannot assess the effects of the monetary (or any economic) policy unless one particular 
equilibrium is chosen, and usually there is no justification for any specific selection 
(Rotemberg 1987). Moreover, since the outcome in multiple equilibria models is not fully 
determined by fundamental variables and crucially depends on the agents’ expectations, it is 
very sensitive to any animal spirits, self-fulfilling prophecies and sunspots (Romer 2012, Ch. 
6.8). Thus, either the Phillips curve is non-existent or its shape is not only state- but also 
‘sunspot-dependent’. 
Even if the coordination failure is not strong enough to create a multi-equilibrium 
environment, it can make the equilibrium fragile (Summers 1988). Then the equilibrium is 
unique, but any factor that even slightly shifts the reaction function greatly affects the 
economy via the multiplier effect. Thus the shape of the Phillips curve may still be state-
dependent. 
Parallel results arise in models with a costly search if the search cost is a decreasing function 
of economic activity or size of the market. In his seminal paper, Diamond (1982) showed that, 
under this plausible assumption, strategic complementarity creates thick market externalities, 
because the positive effects of a bigger market (lower cost search) are not fully internalised by 
individual firms. Similarly, as in the case of aggregate demand externalities, coordination 
failure may lead to multiple equilibria prone to animal spirits, self-fulfilling prophecies and 
sunspots, or a unique but fragile equilibrium. 
It should be noted that the above-mentioned models of coordination failure in demand and 
trade should be treated simply as examples of this phenomenon. Romer (2012, Ch. 6.8) writes 
that since coordination failure is very closely related to real rigidities, and there are many 
potential sources of real rigidity, then there are also many potential coordination failures that 
are consistent with a general framework as was presented by Cooper and John (1988). Indeed, 
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 The second outcome holds even if prices are perfectly flexible (Cooper and John 1988). 
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some other models of coordination failure include externalities in, for example, employment 
(e.g. Kaplan and Menzio 2013) or investment (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny 1988). 
 
The literature overview presented here shows that there are many micro-based premises 
suggesting a nonlinear and state-dependent reaction between economic activity and inflation. 
Although most of the aforementioned papers present, or at least redirect to, some empirical 
evidence in favour of the proposed theoretical concepts, it is difficult to assess the relative 
importance of all of them. According to the survey conducted by Blinder (1994)
17
, probably 
many theories are at play at the same time. Some of them tend to be more frequently accepted 
by the enterprises as relevant (see Table 1), but, as far as we know, there is no comprehensive 
study gathering all concepts in one place. 
 
Table 1.1 Percentage of enterprises accepting various theories of price stickiness 
Coordination failure – each firm waiting for others to change price first 60.6 
Implicit contracts – fairness to customers necessitates stable prices 50.4 
Costly price adjustment – menu cost 30.0 
Procyclical elasticity – demand curves become more inelastic as they shift to the left 29.7 
Psychological significance of pricing points 24.0 
Judging quality by price – fear that customers will interpret a reduction in price as a reduction in quality 10.0 
Source: Adapted from Snowdon and Vane (2005, Ch. 7), and Blinder (1994)  
 
The findings of the survey do not even allow to sketch the general shape of the Phillips curve 
since the most popular theories among enterprises have different predictions in that respect 
(see Table A.1.1 in Appendix A.1 for a short summary). That is why it is worth reviewing the 
results of empirical studies with a more aggregate perspective. 
 
2.2.3 Empirical evidence on nonlinearity and state-dependency of the Phillips curve 
Since empirical literature on the shape of the Phillips curve is extensive and there are many 
studies for various countries, herein we focus on the implications for the U.S. economy in 
accordance with our research agenda
18
. Such a choice is also justified by a presumption that 
country-specific factors (e.g. the structure of the economy, labour market regulations) may 
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 The aim of the survey was to verify the existence and to assess the relative importance of various theories of 
price stickiness, not micro-based concepts behind the nonlinearity or state-dependency of the Phillips curve. 
Thus Table 1 presents only a selection of the theories investigated by Blinder (1994). 
18
 As previously, we turn our attention only to studies treating the Phillips curve as a relation between inflation 
and the output gap. 
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play an important role in determining the shape of the Phillips curve and thus may blur the 
overall picture. A detailed  overview of studies is presented in Table A1.2 in Appendix A.1. 
At first glance, the main findings of the papers surveyed here are inconsistent. Yates (1998) 
found no evidence in favour of nonlinearities in the Phillips curve; Turner (1995), Clark, 
Laxton and Rose (1996), and Clements and Sensier (2003) suggested its convexity; Saglio 
and López-Villavicencio (2012) – concavity, while Filardo (1998) detected both convexity 
and concavity of the Phillips curve for the positive and negative output gap, respectively. 
Moreover, Saglio and López-Villavicencio (2012) disclosed the state-dependency of the 
Phillips curve with respect to trend inflation, its variance and capacity utilisation – the slope 
of the Phillips curve is very flat for low and stable inflation and steep for a high level of 
capacity utilisation. 
However, it is very important to stress that the results are very sensitive to the econometric 
approach that is applied. Estimation of a kinked or threshold piecewise linear function with 
one kink or one threshold is not potent to deliver a mixed concave-convex shape of the 
Phillips curve, and Filardo (1998) is the only author who applied the kinked piecewise linear 
function with two kinks which allowed for more complex forms of nonlinearity. On the other 
hand, state-dependency of the Phillips curve was investigated only by Saglio and López-
Villavicencio (2012) and to some extent by Yates (1998). Thus, one should be particularly 
aware that in most cases the lack of evidence in favour of some particular form of nonlinearity 
or state-dependency results from the limitations of the method that is employed
19
.  
Laxton, Rose and Tetlow (1993) emphasised the great importance of the output gap measure 
for the accuracy of nonlinearity tests. By using Monte Carlo simulations applied to a specified 
small model which incorporates nonlinearity of the relation between inflation and output they 
showed that simple detrending methods (including the HP filter) impair statistical inference 
against finding the nonlinearity of the Phillips curve. What is more, such a result occurs 
despite the assumption that the exact functional form is estimated. Bearing in mind that all but 
one of the investigated papers measured the output gap only with the HP filter, one may 
expect that the true degree of nonlinearity of the Phillips curve is underestimated. 
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 Searching for particular forms of nonlinearities and state-dependency is also very prone to the problem of 
induction – ‘absence of evidence is not evidence of absence’.  
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2.3 Aggregate demand curve – the IS curve 
2.3.1 Introduction to the nonlinear and state-dependent IS curve 
Although there are probably more papers dealing with the effects of the monetary policy on 
output than on inflation, the IS curve has likely received less attention in the economic 
literature than the Phillips curve
20
. The situation seems to be all the more surprising since this 
is the IS curve which establishes a direct link between the monetary policy instrument 
(nominal short-term interest rate) and the system of equations in a typical small model of 
monetary transmission. 
Whatever the reason for the above-mentioned state of affairs, usually estimated forms of the 
IS curve can be nested in the following general model: 
 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽0𝐸𝑡𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑡𝑥𝑡+1 + ∑𝛾𝑖𝑥𝑡−𝑖 +  
         + ∑ 𝛿𝑖(𝑖𝑡−𝑖 − 𝐸𝑡−𝑖𝜋𝑡−𝑖+1 − 𝑟𝑡−𝑖
∗ ) + 𝜽𝒛𝒕 + 𝜀𝑡     (1.4) 
where: 
𝑥𝑡  – output gap 
𝐸𝑡𝑥𝑡  – output gap at time 𝑡 expected at time 𝑡 (backward-looking expectations) 
𝐸𝑡𝑥𝑡+1  – output gap at time 𝑡 + 1 expected at time 𝑡 (forward-looking expectations) 
𝐸𝑡−𝑖𝜋𝑡−𝑖+1 – inflation rate at time 𝑡 − 𝑖 + 1 expected at time 𝑡 − 𝑖 
𝑖𝑡  – nominal short-term interest rate 
𝑟𝑡−𝑖
∗   – natural real interest rate (usually treated as a time invariant parameter) 
𝒛𝒕  – additional regressors. 
 
Similarly as in the case of the Phillips curve, imposing appropriate restrictions on the 
variables and parameters in (1.4) yields the New Keynesian IS Curve in purely forward-
looking (1.5) and hybrid (1.6) settings as known from the seminal paper by Clarida, Galí and 
Gertler (1999): 
 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡𝑥𝑡+1 + 𝛾(𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡       (1.5) 
𝑥𝑡 =  𝛽𝑥𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝛽)𝐸𝑡𝑥𝑡+1  + 𝛾(𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡    (1.6) 
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 See Table A1.6 in Appendix A.1 for the results of the simple ‘searching’ experiment. 
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As was pointed out by Stracca (2010), the New Keynesian IS curve suffers from a severe lack 
of robust empirical support and it does not seem to be a structural relationship despite its 
sound theoretical background which is based on a DSGE framework. In particular, instability 
of the estimated parameters makes the IS curve prone to nonlinearity and state-dependency. 
The issue is of utmost importance in the context of the already mentioned suggestion (see 
subsection 1.6) that the standardised response of output to monetary policy actions is not 
necessarily constant in time and may depend on certain conditions. Therefore, as in the case 
of the Phillips curve, we firstly discuss the theoretical micro-based concepts behind the 
nonlinearity or state-dependency of the IS curve and later we show some empirical results on 
the issue. 
 
2.3.2 Micro-based concepts behind nonlinearity and state-dependency of the IS curve 
Since the IS curve equation typically incorporates the inflation expectations term (see 
equation 1.4), nonlinearity and state-dependency of the Phillips curve may be perceived as 
one of the (indirect) sources of nonlinearity and state-dependency of the IS curve even if the 
IS equation is linear with respect to both the estimated parameters and the explanatory 
variables. Otherwise, the literature on the micro-based concepts behind nonlinearity and state-
dependency of the IS curve itself is scarce when compared to the Phillips curve and builds on 
five main premises: 
 
(1) As was suggested by Keynes in his breakthrough The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money (1936), in a crisis situation and/or when nominal interest rates are already 
at very low levels, any further loosening of the monetary policy may fail to boost the 
economy due to the liquidity trap. In such a situation economic agents exhibit strong liquidity 
preference which, in the original notion, lowers or completely breaks up the responsiveness of 
interest rates to changes in money stock. In a modern setting the liquidity trap is usually seen 
as a potential consequence of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate as an 
instrument of the central bank.
21
 However, the flight to liquidity seems to be more frequent 
behaviour than only when the central bank interest rate is at a near-zero level. In particular, 
Vayanos (2004) proposed a model in which the liquidity premium increases with aggregate 
                                                          
21
 The concept will be discussed later in the context of nonlinearities and state-dependency of the Taylor rule. 
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volatility, while Longstaff (2004) showed that the liquidity premium is positively correlated 
with various market sentiment measures. 
In the presence of financial distress, not only flight to liquidity but also flight to quality is 
observed on money and capital markets. The phenomenon arises when market participants 
turn their interest into very safe assets and try to disengage from riskier investments due to 
higher effective risk aversion.
22
 Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005), and Beber, Brandt and 
Kavajecz (2008) claimed that a major part of the variance of the spread among bonds 
(corporate and sovereign, respectively) is explained by default risk, but in the presence of 
market distress, investors seek liquidity rather than quality. Nevertheless, it is worth noting 
that flight to liquidity and flight to quality might be difficult to distinguish in practice. 
Moreover they may result not only from market-driven mechanisms but also from some 
institutional factors e.g. capital and liquidity requirements imposed by regulators. 
Flight to liquidity and quality induces banks to lower the supply of credit in favour of more 
liquid and safe assets and to change the composition of credit towards a short-term and less 
risky credit. In an extreme case the credit market becomes completely clogged and 
irresponsive to changes in interest rates, as depicted by the pushing a string metaphor. 
Therefore, the output might be relatively irresponsive to changes in central bank interest rates 
in periods of market distress, and the slope of the IS curve
23
 may negatively depend on a 
number of variables being the symptoms or proxies of market distress. Borio (2004) argued 
that managing liquidity crises with standard measures of the monetary policy, though usually 
helpful, is not sufficient and comes at a cost of moral hazard and risk of overreaction. Indeed, 
Krishnamurt (2010) showed that both preventing and resolving liquidity crises may require 
measures which go beyond simply easing the monetary policy. Taylor (2009) claimed that 
even measures which are usually successful in solving liquidity crises are by far insufficient 
when the counterparty risk is an underlying cause of market distress. 
 
(2) According to the credit channel theory (Bernanke and Gertler 1995), tightening the 
monetary policy and lowering economic activity have a deteriorating impact on the financial 
situation of both banks and enterprises. In the first case (bank lending sub-channel), it 
eventually lowers the supply of intermediated credit that is available to potential borrowers 
                                                          
22
 It may result from both higher objective risk aversion and higher perceived risk. 
23
 In contrast to a typical textbook IS-LM model, the IS equation is expressed as an output gap (y-axis) function 
of the interest rate (x-axis). 
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and tightens credit conditions, while in the second one (balance sheet or net worth sub-
channel) it downgrades the creditworthiness of enterprises and pushes ‘low-quality’ ones out 
of the credit market due to credit rationing.
24
 Blinder (1987) developed a model with credit 
rationing (see e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) and predicted that the monetary policy has a 
stronger impact on economic activity when credit conditions are tight, while Bernanke, 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) presented a model with a balance sheet channel in which 
restrictive monetary policy shocks are likely to have a more pronounced impact on economic 
activity than expansionary ones.  
Therefore, the existence of a credit channel suggests that the slope of the IS curve may be 
inversely related to credit conditions in the economy. Since tight credit conditions usually 
coincide with a recession rather than an expansion, one may also expect that the IS curve 
should be more steep, especially downwards, in the first case. The aforementioned 
nonlinearity and state-dependency may induce central bankers to be relatively more 
expansionary in a recession than suggested by a typical Taylor rule, since any tightening of 
the monetary policy or premature exit from an expansionary phase of the monetary policy 
may increase the risk of prolonged or double-dip recession. 
 
(3) Although technically the following considerations refer to the LM curve, an asymmetric 
and incomplete interest rate pass-through, i.e. a mechanism which drives a wedge between 
the policy rate and the market rate(s), may be perceived as a source of nonlinearity and state-
dependency of the IS curve.
25
 Interestingly, the explanations of macroeconomic asymmetries 
in interest rate pass-through usually originate either from the credit channel theory and the 
concepts which are closely related to flight to liquidity and quality or models of banks’ 
strategic behaviour in an imperfectly competitive environment and strategic interactions 
between banks and customers (see e.g. Sznajderska 2013). 
In the first case it is expected that during periods of economic downturn and market distress 
the interest rate pass-through might be impaired which should result in flattening of the IS 
curve. 
                                                          
24
 Since ‘low-quality’ enterprises usually have very limited access to money and capital markets, their exclusion 
from the credit market may actually result in the deprivation of any external financing. 
25
 This discrepancy arises because in standard models it is usually assumed that the central bank is able to control 
the market interest rate(s) with the use of the central bank’s official interest rate (the LM curve is equivalent to 
Taylor rule), while the essence of incomplete pass-through is that it allows for relaxing such an assumption. 
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In the latter case, analogously as in the matter of the Phillips curve and points (5) and (7) in 
paragraph 2.2.2, the theoretical predictions are highly sensitive to the structural characteristics 
of the market. In general, lower levels of competition (e.g. Gambacorta and Iannotti 2007; 
Gropp, Kok, and Lichtenberger 2014) and higher levels of information asymmetry between 
banks and customers (e.g. Rosen 2002) are assigned to a more impaired pass-through and a 
flatter IS curve. Since economic expansion creates positive macroeconomic externalities 
which foster competition and lower search costs (see point (8) in 2.2.2), one may expect that 
the slope of the IS curve is an increasing function of economic activity.  
Roelands (2012) showed that liquidity and capital requirements established by regulators may 
result in asymmetric interest rate pass-through. In particular, when the central bank lowers the 
official interest rate, the probability that banks become constrained rises. As a result, banks 
may decide to adjust their rates only partially and increase markups. By analogy, the opposite 
situation takes place when the monetary policy is tightened. The presented mechanism is 
consistent with the empirical findings that ‘banks tend to increase interest rates on loans at 
roughly the same speed as the reference rate, but lower their rates at a slower pace’ and ‘pass-
through often appears to be less complete during falling rate periods relative to rising rate 
periods’ (Roelands 2012). In consequence, the IS curve should be steeper upward than 
downward and possibly convex. 
 
(4) Bloom (2009) showed that uncertainty shocks not only generate a sharp decline in 
economic activity but also temporarily freeze the propagation of the monetary (and fiscal) 
policy. A stalemate arises because uncertainty makes firms extremely irresponsive to changes 
in interest rates, prices or wages. On the other hand, when uncertainty eases, impulses are 
propagated more vigorously but with some lag. Therefore, the slope of the IS curve may be 
state-dependent with respect to uncertainty – as it rises the slope becomes flatter and when the 
uncertainty goes down the IS curve steepens. The uncertainty shocks increase the risk of 
monetary policy overreaction since temporal irresponsiveness of the economy may mislead 
central bankers and induce them to act more aggressively since they see no immediate effects 
of moderate actions. At the same time, a sensible exit strategy is required to avoid swinging 
the economy.  
 
(5) Tversky and Kahneman (1992) extended the baseline prospect theory (Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979) into the cumulative prospect theory which incorporates making decisions 
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under risk and uncertainty. Bowman, Minehart and Rabin (1999) showed that in such a 
framework consumers may be relatively irresponsive to negative shocks because they want to 
avoid consuming less than their reference point if only possible. In the context of the IS curve 
this means that the slope of the IS curve may be flatter for restrictive than expansionary 
monetary shocks and, similarly, the coefficient on the expected output gap might be larger for 
positive than negative output gaps. Therefore, once consumers get used to higher 
consumption expenditures and a higher reference point is established, the monetary policy 
may be relatively ineffective in cooling down the economy. The threat of such a situation is 
particularly large during long periods of (overheated) prosperity. 
 
The survey of the literature presented here delivers a prediction of the state-dependent IS 
curve, the slope of which may depend on market sentiment, credit conditions, uncertainty, the 
stance of the monetary policy and the level of economic activity. It should be, however, noted 
that the presented concepts predict multidirectional relations between the slope of the IS curve 
and the phenomena which are closely interrelated and very often concurrent. Therefore the 
expected overall shape of the IS curve is somewhat ambiguous from theoretical perspective, 
especially if we consider complex economic and financial crises when virtually all of the 
above-mentioned phenomena take place at the same time. It is possible that standard 
monetary policy measures may come across very serious difficulties in both reviving the 
economy during recessions (as pointed out by concepts (1)-(4)) and cooling it down during 
expansions (as pointed out by concept (5)). Nevertheless the overall shape of the IS curve 
remains to be an empirical problem. The next paragraph reviews the empirical studies which 
help to balance the effects described here. 
 
2.3.3 Empirical evidence on nonlinearity and state-dependency of the IS curve 
As was already mentioned, in the literature the IS curve receives much less interest than the 
Phillips curve. Although there are many papers which explicitly aim to empirically verify the 
existence of nonlinearity and state-dependency of the latter, to our knowledge no such studies 
have yet been performed for the IS curve (neither for the U.S nor any other economy). 
Nevertheless, there are two strands in the literature which are closely related to the problem 
investigated here. 
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The first one was already preannounced and verifies whether the New Keynesian IS curve is 
truly a structural relationship and whether the estimates of its parameters are stable. Stracca 
(2010) claimed that ‘the New Keynesian IS curve, at least in its most common formulations, 
is not structural and is overwhelmingly rejected by the data’. In particular, the coefficient on 
the real interest rate is usually insignificant or wrongly signed
26
 and the estimates of the 
parameters in the IS curve tend to differ for groups of countries with different basic structural 
characteristics (size of the economy, trade openness, share of industry in GDP, ratios to GDP: 
NFA, liquid liabilities, private credit, stock market capitalisation, household debt, household 
net worth, household short-term net worth). Therefore, the results suggest that the IS curve 
may be state-dependent and its most common linear form is not structural in the sense of 
Lucas (1976). 
The second strand in the literature is focused on the shape of the impact of monetary policy 
shocks on economic activity, and its overview is presented in Table A1.3 in Appendix A.1
27
. 
Although at first glance such a research agenda may seem to be an equivalent description of 
investigating the shape of the IS curve, it is not for reasons of identification problems. In other 
words, unless a nonlinear or state-dependent version of the IS curve is estimated, any 
evidence in favour of an asymmetric reaction of economic activity to monetary policy shocks 
should be treated at most as consistent with the nonlinear or state-dependent IS curve. 
Particularly, there are at least three caveats which arise as a consequence of the usually 
adopted empirical method according to which the estimated equation has an ad hoc empirical 
form where a measure of economic activity is an endogenous variable while lags of the 
endogenous variable and measures of monetary policy shocks are regressors: 
 economic activity is usually measured with growth rates of GDP, GNP or industrial 
production (not with the output gap as predicted by the IS curve) 
 there is no inflation nor inflation expectations among explanatory variables as required 
by the IS curve 
 there is no interest rate among explanatory variables but monetary policy shocks 
which are derived from auxiliary regressions of the money stock or interest rate (two-
step regression instead of estimating a structural relationship). 
                                                          
26
 Goodhart and Hofmann (2005) argued that a significantly negative impact of the real interest rate on economic 
activity is restorable if one allows for a richer specification of the IS curve, including asset prices and monetary 
aggregates. 
27
 As previously, we focus on the U.S. economy. 
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Bearing in mind the above-mentioned remarks, the literature surveyed here shows that the 
link between monetary policy shocks and economic activity is asymmetric. A vast majority of 
the papers (Cover 1992; DeLong and Summers 1988; Kakes 1998; Karras and Stokes 1999; 
Lo and Piger 2005; Morgan 1993; Sim 2009) provided robust evidence that restrictive 
monetary policy shocks exert a larger impact on economic activity than expansionary ones, 
while some authors (Cover 1992; DeLong and Summers 1988; Karras and Stokes 1999; 
Morgan 1993; Ravn and Sola 2004) even found that expansionary monetary policy shocks are 
impotent to significantly affect the output. Moreover, Garcia and Shaller (2002) and Lo and 
Piger (2005) noticed that the effects of monetary policy shocks are stronger in a recession 
than in an expansion. When put together, the observed links between monetary policy shocks 
and economic activity suggest that standard monetary policy measures may be relatively 
ineffective in both boosting the economy in a recession and cooling the economy in an 
expansion. 
Although the results invoked here are consistent with previously presented concepts behind 
the nonlinear and state-dependent IS curve, they are also coherent with the convex and state-
dependent Phillips curve. Karras and Stokes (1999), who estimated both the output and price 
equations to verify the relative importance of the two sources, claimed that their study 
‘implies that neither of the two theories individually can fully explain both the output and 
price effects, but it suggests that both have to be operative at the same time.’ Thus, even if 
nonlinearity and state-dependency of the IS curve are not the only source of the detected links 
between monetary policy shocks and economic activity, they play an important role in 
explaining some of the patterns observed in the data.  
In conclusion, the two aforementioned strands in the literature jointly point to significant 
nonlinearity and state-dependency of the IS curve. In particular, the parameters of the IS 
curve seem to depend on both some structural characteristics of the economy and the stage of 
the business cycle. 
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2.4. The Taylor rule 
2.4.1 Introduction to the nonlinear and state-dependent Taylor rule 
In 1992, at the 39
th
 Carnegie-Rochester Conference on Public Policy, Taylor (1993) proposed 
a simple but representative interest rate rule for the monetary policy which could be rewritten 
as: 
 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟
∗ + 𝜋∗ + 0.5𝑥𝑡 + 1.5(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋
∗)      (1.7) 
where: 
𝑖𝑡  – nominal short-term interest rate 
𝑟∗  – natural real interest rate (equal to 2 according to Taylor’s proposition) 
𝜋∗  – desired inflation rate (equal to 2 according to Taylor’s proposition) 
𝑥𝑡  – output gap 
𝜋𝑡  – inflation rate 
 
Over the years, many extensions and modifications have been proposed to tackle various 
empirical and theoretical issues related to the original Taylor rule (for an extensive survey see 
e.g. Hamalainen 2004). Without loss of generality, most of the analysed and estimated forms 
of the Taylor rule can be nested in the following model: 
 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑡−𝑖 + ∑𝛾𝑖𝜋𝑡−𝑖 + ∑𝛿𝑖𝑥𝑡−𝑖 + ∑𝜗𝑖𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+𝑖 + ∑𝜇𝑖𝐸𝑡𝑥𝑡+𝑖 +  
        + 𝜽𝒛𝒕  +  𝜀𝑡          (1.8) 
where: 
𝑖𝑡  – nominal short-term interest rate 
𝜋𝑡  – inflation rate 
𝑥𝑡  – output gap 
𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+𝑖 – inflation rate at time 𝑡 + 𝑖 expected at time 𝑡 (forward-looking expectations) 
𝐸𝑡𝑥𝑡+𝑖  – output gap at time 𝑡 + 𝑖 expected at time 𝑡 (forward-looking expectations) 
𝒛𝒕  – additional regressors 
 
As previously, imposing appropriate restrictions yields purely forward-looking and 
‘smoothed’ versions of the Taylor rule as known from Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999, 2000): 
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𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜗𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝛿𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡        (1.9) 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜗𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝛿𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡       (1.10) 
 
Alternatively, even in New Keynesian models it is also very popular to present the Taylor rule 
in forms which are closer to its original version and in which inflation expectations are 
substituted with the current inflation rate. 
 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜗𝜋𝑡 + 𝛿𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡         (1.11) 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜗𝜋𝑡 + 𝛿𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡        (1.12) 
 
Although the Taylor rule was originally proposed as a simple and representative monetary 
policy rule without very formal justification, Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) showed that its 
New Keynesian versions can be derived as optimal policy rules in a broad class of models. In 
the next paragraph we discuss how relaxing some assumptions behind that exercise is potent 
to delivering significant nonlinearity and state-dependency of the (otherwise linear) Taylor 
rule. 
 
2.4.2 Micro-based concepts behind nonlinearity and state-dependency of the Taylor rule 
As was shown by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999), New Keynesian versions of the Taylor 
rule can be derived under the assumption of quadratic loss function of the central bank subject 
to constraints given by the linear and structural equations of the Phillips curve and the IS 
curve. Intuitively, the derived Taylor rule is linear because the Phillips curve and the IS curve 
are assumed to be linear. If one allows for nonlinearities or state-dependency of the curves, 
similar properties emerge in the derived Taylor rule as a result of the optimising behaviour of 
the central bank. Otherwise, there are at least five general concepts which question some of 
the assumptions made by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999), and thus justify the nonlinear or 
state-dependent Taylor rule. 
 
(1) Cukierman and Muscatelli (2008) claimed that there is both anecdotal and systematic 
evidence of non-quadratic loss function of central bankers. In particular, they distinguished 
two types of asymmetries in the policymakers’ preferences – recession and inflation 
avoidance preferences. In the first case, central bankers are more averse to negative than 
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positive output gaps, while in the second case the opposite applies for inflation gaps (i.e. the 
difference between the actual and targeted inflation rate). In consequence, the Taylor rule is 
either concave or convex in both gaps (respectively). The authors found strong empirical 
support in favour of the concept, however, ‘the dominant type of asymmetry in monetary 
policy [...] often changes with the economic environment’ and the tenures of central bankers. 
Furthermore, al-Nowaihi and Stracca (2002) called into question the other two assumptions 
underlying the typically employed loss function of monetary policymakers. Relying on the 
economic psychology literature, they suggested that agents commonly show a tendency to 
non-convex loss function and nonlinear weighing of probabilities, thus departing from the 
expected utility paradigm. In general, any of the two postulates is potent to break the principle 
of certainty equivalence, which consequently leads to the inclusion of higher than first-order 
moments of output and inflation gaps in the optimal monetary policy rule. Although its shape 
crucially depends on the nature of the shocks and the exact form of the adopted non-convex 
loss function, the predicted Taylor rule is nonlinear.  
 
(2) Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) proposed a formal model of the opportunistic approach to 
disinflation according to which policymakers wait for favourable external circumstances if the 
actual inflation moderately exceeds the long-term targeted level but act aggressively when 
inflation goes up too far. ‘Reverse engineering’ allows them to show that such behaviour is 
consistent with an otherwise typical linear-quadratic model of the economy if the central 
bankers’ intermediate inflation target is history-dependent. Then the optimal policy rule is 
state-dependent and piecewise linear with respect to inflation. Aksoy et al. (2006) 
demonstrated that such a policy achieves disinflation at a lower output cost than a 
conventional one, but it takes more time to bring down inflation to the long-term target. 
Martin and Milas (2006) provided empirical evidence in favour of the behaviour predicted by 
the concept. 
Similarly, Orphanides and Wieland (2000) derived a model in which the monetary authorities 
pursue inflation zone-targeting or inflation targeting with a thick inflation target. Then, taking 
into account the uncertainty, the optimal policymakers’ response to inflation is very mild if 
inflation is below or above the zone-target midpoint but within the zone, and more 
pronounced when inflation is out of bounds. The general idea is explicitly supported with the 
legal framework of some central banks, while Tashibana (2008) also provided some 
econometric evidence for the U.S.  
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(3) As was pointed out by Swanson (2006), when deriving the optimal policy rule it is 
typically assumed that ‘stochastic shocks and policymakers’ prior beliefs about unobserved 
variables are normally distributed’. Meyer, Swanson and Wieland (2001), and Swanson 
(2006) showed that if one allows for uncertainty about the level of economic activity, non-
normality of central bankers’ priors and Bayesian updating in an otherwise standard model of 
the economy, the optimal interest rate rule is nonlinear. In particular, the monetary authorities 
are relatively more irresponsive to small than large output gaps due to the signal extraction 
problem. Swanson (2006) claimed that the basic idea of the concept is empirically supported 
by both model-based and anecdotal evidence; for example, the problem of uncertainty about 
the natural rate of employment or potential output, and continuous updating of their estimates, 
is explicitly put forward in official statements by the monetary authorities.  
 
(4) By a similar token, Tillmann (2011) argued that the nonlinearity of the Taylor rule can be 
justified with the model’s parameters uncertainty combined with the robust control approach 
(Hansen and Sargent 2007). It is proposed that in the presence of uncertainty of parameters 
regarding the monetary transmission mechanism (herein the slope of the Phillips curve), 
‘central banks want to formulate robust policies that are to some extent immune with respect 
to model disturbances’ (herein minimising the costs of the worst-case scenario). In 
consequence, ‘the policy response to inflation becomes stronger, the higher the inflation rate 
and the larger the output gap’. Similarly as Swanson (2006), Tillmann (2011) showed that his 
predictions are in line with both model-based (econometric) and anecdotal evidence (e.g. 
Greenspan 2004). 
 
(5) Although there are some historical episodes of negative interest rates
28
, it is generally 
accepted that the short-term nominal interest rule, being the primary instrument of the 
monetary policy, should not be pushed below zero (see e.g. Bernanke, Reinhart and Stack 
2004). Intuitively, in the presence of the zero lower bound on interest rates, nonlinearity of the 
Taylor rule develops automatically as the interest rate is forbidden to adjust below zero, even 
if such an adjustment would be required by an otherwise linear rule (e.g. during recession or 
deflation). However, Adam and Billi (2007) showed that incorporating the zero lower bound 
into the optimising behaviour of economic agents has much more pronounced consequences 
and yields a highly nonlinear optimal policy rule, according to which the interest rates should 
                                                          
28
 E.g. in July 2009 Sveriges Riksbank lowered its deposit rate to -0.25%. 
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be reduced aggressively if the risk of reaching the zero lower bound is high (in response to a 
negative shock). The result arises because ‘rational agents anticipate the possibility of 
reaching the lower bound in the future and this amplifies the effects of adverse shocks well 
before the bound is reached’. 
Commonly, a situation when the zero lower bound is strictly binding is referred to as a 
liquidity trap in parallel to Keynes’ term for a situation when the expansionary monetary 
policy is impotent to boost the economy. As was noticed by Krugman (1999), and Eggertsson 
and Woodford (2003), there are two basic ways to lower the real interest rate, and even if the 
nominal interest rate is bounded at zero the real interest rate can be lowered via rising 
inflation expectations. In particular, the central bank may raise inflation expectations and thus 
stimulate aggregate demand with forward guidance, i.e. a credible promise to keep a lower 
interest rate path than suggested by the traditional policy rule despite improving economic 
conditions. Therefore, nonlinearity or state-dependency of the Taylor rule may also emerge as 
an aftermath of the central bank’s attempt to escape from the liquidity trap.   
 
Proponents of all of the above-mentioned concepts present some persuasive empirical 
evidence supporting the proposed ideas. It seems, however, that in practice many of them 
might be difficult to tell apart due to identification problems. Moreover, since these are not 
competing but rather complementary ideas, there are probably many different sources of 
nonlinearities and state-dependency of the Taylor rule at play at the same time. The next 
paragraph looks over the results of papers where a nonlinear or state-dependent version of the 
Taylor rule was estimated, which should help to capture the overall shape of the Taylor rule. 
 
2.4.3 Empirical evidence on nonlinearity and state-dependence of the Taylor rule 
Although there are quite a few papers in which the nonlinear or state-dependent version of the 
Taylor rule is estimated, its overall shape seems to be difficult to deduce. The survey 
presented in Table A1.4 in Appendix A.1 shows that the evidence for nonlinearity and state-
dependency of the Taylor rule is rather mixed and sometimes contradictory with respect to 
both periods in which nonlinearity and state-dependency were detected and to their particular 
shapes. 
Among the sixteen overviewed papers, two studies (Castro 2011; Dolado, Maria-Dolores and 
Naveira 2005) found no evidence for nonlinearities in the Taylor rule throughout all of the 
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analysed samples; another three papers (Kim, Osborn and Sensier 2005; Koo, Paya and Peel 
2010; Surico 2007) detected nonlinearities before 1979 but no later; while two other papers 
(Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Murcia 2004; Petersen 2007) quite surprisingly discovered 
nonlinearities only after 1983 or 1985 but not before. However, since nonlinear models and 
nonlinearity tests always verify only a particular class of nonlinear shapes against linearity, 
and just one contradictory example is sufficient to break the general statement, one should not 
treat no evidence of nonlinearity as evidence of linearity. Therefore, following the results of 
the other nine surveyed studies, we claim that nonlinearity and state-dependency of the Taylor 
rule find strong empirical support. 
As far as particular shapes of nonlinearity and state-dependency are concerned, it seems that 
individual findings are difficult to generalise. Apart from the aforementioned papers, also 
other studies (Cukierman and Muscatelli 2008; Lee and Son 2013; Kim and Nelson 2007) 
suggested that the estimates of the Taylor rule are not time and structural invariant and that 
the Taylor rule looks very different under different Federal Reserve presidencies. The pre-
Volcker Taylor rule tends to be classified as either linear (Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Murcia 
2004; Petersen 2007) or concave with respect to inflation or the output gap (Cukierman and 
Muscatelli 2008; Surico 2007); however, Koo, Paya and Peel (2010) found that it was convex 
with respect to inflation but concave with respect to the output gap. Evidence for the Volcker-
Greenspan era is even more mixed, probably because Volcker and Greenspan should not be 
analysed together, as was pointed out by Cukierman and Muscatelli (2008) and Kim and 
Nelson (2006). In particular, the external conditions were quite different in both periods and it 
might be difficult to compare and aggregate the period of tough disinflation during Volcker’s 
tenure and the period of keeping the inflation low under Greenspan. When treated separately, 
Volcker’s reaction function seems to be linear with respect to the output and inflation gaps, 
while Greenspan’s seems to be linear with respect to the inflation gap but concave with 
respect to the output gap (Cukierman and Muscatelli 2008). However, Florio (2006) showed 
that in both cases the reaction functions are dependent on the stance of the monetary policy, 
and Volcker was probably more cautious in lowering than raising interest rates, whereas 
Greenspan – just the opposite. 
In summary, the survey presented here allows to claim that the nonlinearity and state-
dependency of the Taylor rule are strongly supported by the data but, on the other hand, their 
particular shapes crucially depend on the analysed (sub)samples and tenures. 
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2.5 Monetary transmission mechanism as a system 
The previous subsections presented both theoretical and empirical evidence for the 
nonlinearity and state-dependency of the three equations typically constituting a small model 
of the monetary transmission mechanism. Clearly, different sources of nonlinearity and state-
dependency may interact, and thus dump or strengthen one another. The aim of this short 
subsection is to look over the results of studies in which the monetary transmission 
mechanism was estimated as a system allowing for its nonlinearity or state-dependency. 
The contemporaneous New Keynesian models are very often based on some of the ideas and 
premises described in the previous subsections. However, usually only one or two particular 
sources of nonlinearity and state-dependency are considered at once. Moreover, due to log-
linearising equations around the steady-state, it is not usually explicitly visible that the 
underlying relations are nonlinear.
29
 Since we are not interested in the consequences of one or 
two particular sources of nonlinearity or state-dependency, but rather in some general and 
empirical patterns of asymmetries in impulse responses which are visible in the data, we turn 
our attention only to empirical papers. After all, the scope of this study is rather empirical 
than theoretical.  
The survey presented in Table A1.5 in Appendix A.1 leaves no doubt that asymmetries are 
existent in the monetary transmission mechanism. Alessandrini (2003), Balke (2002) and 
Zheng (2013) found that the effects of the monetary policy are particularly pronounced when 
financial or credit conditions in the economy are stretched; while Hoppner, Melzer and 
Neumann (2005) detected a similar regularity if the economy is in a recession. Zheng (2013) 
also discovered that during financial distress the output-inflation trade-off worsens. On the 
other hand, Weise (1999) found that an unusual pattern emerges when output growth is 
already high or inflation is rising. Then the impact of the monetary policy on inflation is 
higher than otherwise, while the output effects are large but have an opposite sign. In other 
words, it seems that at economic peaks the restrictive monetary policy is potent to ‘kill two 
birds (a hawk and a dove) with one stone’, i.e. negative shocks both curb inflation and have 
positive output effects. Some other asymmetries with respect to high and low inflation 
regimes are also provided by Mandler (2010). In particular, he found a stronger reaction of the 
output growth to the federal funds rate shock and the inflation shock in the high inflation 
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 Naturally, when nonlinearities or asymmetries are points of interest, approximations of higher orders are used. 
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regime. By contrast, he also discovered stronger reactions of the inflation and federal funds 
rate to the federal funds rate shock and output growth shock in the low inflation regime. 
As far as the size and sign asymmetries are concerned, the empirical evidence is mixed. Weise 
(1999) and Zhang (2013) held that larger monetary policy shocks have a larger unit impact 
than smaller ones, while Mandler (2010) claimed that the difference is negligible. Similarly, 
Balke (2002) and Angrist, Jordà and Kuersteiner (2013) pointed to the stronger effects of 
restrictive than expansionary monetary policy shocks, while Weise (1999) found at best mild 
such evidence and only for large shocks. At the same time, Chang and Jansen (2005) 
uncovered very temporary asymmetry with respect to large negative monetary shocks which 
delivers an upside-down impulse response for a short period of time. 
Finally, Hoppner, Melzer and Neumann (2005) found that responsiveness of the economy, 
especially economic activity, to monetary policy shocks steadily decreases in time. This trend 
may be attributed to increasing efficiency of the regular component of the monetary policy 
(e.g. due to commitment and credibility) or to the changing structure of the economy (e.g. 
development of financial markets). This issue will also be discussed in the next section, which 
is devoted to the sources of asymmetries specific to the Greenspan era. 
 
2.6 Summary 
At the very beginning of this section we introduced the formal definitions of nonlinearity, 
state-dependency and asymmetry, and we presented the concept of the generalised impulse 
response function. In the following subsections we looked over the existing literature 
regarding nonlinearity and state-dependency of the Phillips curve, the IS curve, the Taylor 
rule and asymmetries in the monetary transmission mechanism as a system. The overview 
provided rich evidence that the monetary transmission mechanism exhibits significant 
nonlinearity and state-dependency at individual equation levels and asymmetries in impulse 
responses at the system level. The results were particularly sound and explicit in the case of 
the Phillips curve, the Taylor rule and the monetary transmission mechanisms as a system, 
while the evidence for the IS curve was rather indirect and speculative. The scope of this 
section was rather general, without referring to any specific individual periods in the U.S. 
economic history. In the next section, we turn our attention particularly to the Greenspan era 
and look over the literature on potential sources of nonlinearity and state-dependency of the 
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monetary transmission mechanism and asymmetries in impulse responses which are 
exceptional for this period. 
55 
 
3. Premises behind nonlinearity and state-dependency of the 
monetary transmission mechanism specific to the Greenspan era 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous section we focused on the general premises standing behind nonlinearity and 
state-dependency of the monetary transmission mechanism. As has already been mentioned, 
herein we put emphasis on potential sources of nonlinearity and state-dependency which are 
distinctive (if not endemic) of the Greenspan era. We start by discussing the phenomenon of 
the Great Moderation which accompanied Greenspan during his years as chairman of the 
Federal Reserve and which reshaped some stylised facts regarding business cycle properties 
and some basic economic relationships. In particular, we turn our attention to globalisation 
and structural changes in the U.S. economy, which are usually treated either as potential 
explanations or constituents of the Great Moderation, and their possible implications for the 
monetary transmission mechanism. Next, we also consider the financial crises and market 
distresses which were abundant in the Greenspan era and might have exerted some influence 
on the monetary transmission mechanism at that time. Finally, we focus on the ‘Greenspan 
standard’, i.e. the way Greenspan conducted the monetary policy. As previously, we try to 
uncover some peculiarities which may signal nonlinearity and state-dependency of the 
monetary transmission mechanism resulting in asymmetric impulse responses in that period. 
 
3.2 The Great Moderation 
At the turn of the century, economists were riveted by finding a large decline in the volatility 
of many macroeconomic time series. Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and Perez-
Quiros (2000) independently identified a significant drop in volatility of GDP growth in the 
middle of the 1980s, while Blanchard and Simon (2001) perceived it as a continuation of the 
post-war stabilisation trend which was only interrupted in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
Similarly, Romer (1999) and Gordon (1998) noticed that in the late 1980s and 1990s, robust 
economic growth was also accompanied by low and stable inflation, which induced Gordon to 
label the phenomenon a goldilocks economy – an economy which is neither too hot to boost 
inflation nor too cold to cause a recession but ‘just right’. Finally, an elaborate study by Stock 
and Watson (2003) confirmed a similar pattern of lowered volatility for many other U.S. 
economic time series and they coined the term the Great Moderation. 
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As was pointed out by Gordon (1998), such behaviour of the economy struck the 
macroeconomists as being a thoughtful puzzle since historical experience showed that 
increasing economic activity and lowering unemployment should cause inflation pressure. 
Thus, the Great Moderation called into question the concepts of the Phillips curve and the 
non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment or potential output which, after all, are still 
cornerstones of the monetary policy framework. Many authors suggested that the Great 
Moderation coincided with smaller and possibly less persistent, or less volatile with respect to 
the impulse response time-horizon, effects of monetary policy shocks (see e.g. Barth and 
Ramey 2002; Boivin and Giannoni 2002, 2006; Boivin, Kiley and Mishkin 2010), and 
lowered the predictive power of the federal funds rate as a leading indicator of economic 
activity (e.g. Gertler and Lown 2000). Intuitively, the monetary transmission mechanism was 
not an exception, and widespread structural instabilities in estimates and forecast 
performances were also documented with respect to many basic macroeconomic relationships 
(see Stock and Watson 1996, 1999). 
Although the Great Moderation is a well-documented phenomenon, it is difficult to date it 
precisely. The problem of setting its starting point
30
 shows, however, that the onset of the 
Great Moderation was rather a more prolonged process than just a sudden switch into a new 
regime. By the same token, although it might be very tempting, a study by Clark (2009) 
indicated that at least in 2009 it was too early to announce that ‘the Great Moderation is over’. 
If the Great Moderation is at least partially indeed a process of transition from an ‘old’ to a 
‘new’ regime, the detected structural instabilities in many basic macroeconomic relationships 
are not just one-off structural breaks but rather some structural changes evolving in time. In 
particular, this means that the monetary transmission mechanism under Greenspan was not 
only different when compared to the Volcker or pre-Volcker era, but it could also vary 
between the beginning (11 August 1987) and the end (31 January 2006) of the Greenspan era. 
Thus the Great Moderation might be a potential source of nonlinearity and state-dependency 
of the monetary transmission mechanism in the Greenspan era and it is worth discussing the 
Great Moderation in that context. 
Among many there have been five main ‘keyword’ (and partially interdependent) 
explanations of the phenomenon of the Great Moderation: 
                                                          
30
 Stock and Watson (2003) showed that estimated breakpoints in conditional variance and conditional mean 
vary for selected time series but usually occurred between the early 1980s to early 1990s.  
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 globalisation 
 structural changes in the U.S. economy 
 international crises 
 better monetary policy 
 good luck. 
In the next subsections we shortly discuss all of the presented explanations of the Great 
Moderation apart from the ‘good luck’ hypothesis, which either leaves little to discuss and 
interpret from the perspective of our research agenda or is a self-critical manifestation, that 
economists are not able to explain the Great Moderation with their models
31
. Bearing in mind 
the scope of this study, we abstract from assessing the relative importance of the proposed 
explanations but rather focus on their implications in the context of potential nonlinearities 
and state-dependency of the monetary transmission mechanism. Thus we use the proposed 
theories justifying the Great Moderation to organise our discussion on nonlinearity and state-
dependency of the monetary transmission mechanism in the Greenspan era. Such a 
disaggregated approach allows us to be more precise regarding the direct sources of 
nonlinearity and state-dependency with respect to particular equations and coefficients, 
especially in the case of ‘globalisation’ and ‘structural changes in the U.S. economy’ 
explanations. Moreover, when discussing the role of international crises we also take the 
opportunity to consider a more general and possible impact of the crises and market distresses 
which were abundant in the Greenspan era on the potential nonlinearity and state-dependency 
of the monetary transmission mechanism. Similarly, the ‘better monetary policy’ hypothesis is 
convenient to discuss the monetary policy under the Greenspan presidency and to seek 
elements of the ‘Greenspan standard’ which may suggest nonlinearity and state-dependency 
of his behaviour as a Federal Reserve chairman.  
 
3.3 Globalisation 
The Greenspan era coincided with a period of vigorous globalisation. Though it is not the aim 
of this study to create an extensive list of milestones of globalisation, it is worth considering 
just a few of the ‘big events’ from between 1987 and 2006 which give a flavour of the huge 
changes that took place during those 20 years: 
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 See Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin (2008) for an interesting discussion on how small models confuse ‘good 
luck’ with ‘ignorance’ in the context of the Great Moderation. 
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 1989 – the Fall of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe; Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation is established  
 1990 – the Shanghai Stock Exchange is re-established 
 1991 – the World Wide Web opens up to the public; the Soviet Union is dissolved 
 1994 – the North American Free Trade Agreement comes into force 
 1995 – the World Trade Organisation is formed 
 1998 – Google is founded 
 1999 – the ‘Battle of Seattle’ (‘N30’) takes place 
 2001 – September 11 
 2004 – Facebook is founded 
According to the International Monetary Fund (2000), from an economic point of view there 
are four main aspects of globalisation: trade, movement of people, capital movements, and 
spread of knowledge and technology. The literature suggests that the first three factors are 
theoretically potent to deliver significant nonlinearity and state-dependency of the Phillips 
curve, while the last two – of the IS curve. 
 
3.3.1 Impact of globalisation on the Phillips curve 
Not surprisingly, the focal point of many studies was directed at the Phillips curve and 
globalisation as a source of low and stable inflation accompanying robust economic growth. 
There are two main strands of literature: one strand is focused on the issues of openness (the 
direct effect of globalisation which needs an open economy framework), while the other 
strand is focused on increased competition (the indirect effect of globalisation which may be 
analysed in a closed economy framework). In each case two views are presented which give, 
in some manner, opposite predictions on the impact of globalisation on the slope of the 
Phillips curve. 
 
(1) Early papers by Romer (1993) and Lane (1997) suggested that an economy’s increased 
trade openness should reduce incentives for central bankers to conduct an expansionary 
monetary policy via steepening the Phillips curve and thus lowering the sacrifice (or gain) 
ratio. The explanation is quite straightforward – since a positive monetary shock leads to real 
exchange rate depreciation, it also raises import prices which have larger weights in both the 
producer and consumer price indexes if an economy is more open. Therefore, the more open 
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an economy is to trade, a positive monetary shock is translated to a larger extent into prices 
rather than output. Bearing in mind the time inconsistency problem and the inflation bias in 
the spirit of the Kydland-Prescott Barro-Gordon model (Kydland and Prescott 1977, Barro 
and Gordon 1983), it should result in a lower inflation rate than in the case of a closed 
economy.  
On the other hand, Daniels and VanHoose (2006) showed that the results crucially depend on 
market structure, and if one allows for monopolistic competition and incomplete wage rigidity 
in the New Keynesian style, larger trade openness reduces the pricing power of domestic 
firms and thus flattens the Phillips curve. A lower inflation rate arises because the reduced 
pricing power of domestic firms also restrains the responsiveness of firms to a given monetary 
shock, and despite a larger sacrifice (or gain) ratio both the output and inflation effects of 
monetary shocks decrease in trade openness. Such a relation should hamper incentives to 
conduct a discretionary monetary policy aimed at boosting output and therefore reduces 
inflation and lowers the inflation rate. 
Binyamini and Razin (2008) extended the New Keynesian model with goods and capital 
mobility as was derived by Razin and Loungani (2007) and provided a more integrated 
approach to show that increased mobility of goods, capital and labour, both individually and 
taken together, flatten the Phillips curve. The intuition behind such a result is that all channels 
of openness allow domestic households to be more independent from domestic firms and vice 
versa, which weakens the responsiveness of inflation to domestic demand shocks. They also 
found that if the monetary authorities want to conduct a welfare-based policy they should 
respond more aggressively to inflation fluctuations but less aggressively to output fluctuations 
when compared with a closed economy. Therefore, central bankers have fewer incentives to 
create an inflation bias, which should eventually result in a lower inflation rate. 
Borio and Filardo (2007) presented an anecdotal rationale for decreased sensitivity of the 
Phillips curve to the domestic output gap and increased sensitivity to the global output gap 
due to broadly defined openness. The intuition is that in a globalised world, country-specific 
demand shortages can easily be offset by global excess demand, thus firms should pay some 
attention to global slack, not only to domestic slack. In consequence, the slope of the Phillips 
curve should decrease with respect to the domestic output gap, and the global output gap 
should enter the equation as a new variable.  
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(2) Rogoff (2003, 2006) claimed that increased competition, which is one of the most 
important consequences of globalisation, steepens the Phillips curve since it creates an 
environment of more flexible prices and wages. Analogously, as in works by Romer (1993) 
and Lane (1997), a steeper Phillips curve should lead to both a lower inflation bias and 
inflation rate than in a closed economy.  
On the other hand, Sbordone (2010) focused on the impact of increased competition on the 
slope of the Phillips curve via an increased number of goods traded. She departed from a 
typical assumption of constant demand elasticity but made it dependent on the relative market 
share of differentiated goods. The final outcome was ambiguous – the analysed channel is 
potent to deliver both a steeper and flatter Phillips curve depending on the shape of the 
demand curve, however, flattening the Phillips curve seems to be a more plausible scenario. 
 
There is vast empirical evidence documenting that the U.S. Phillips curve flattened in the 
Great Moderation when compared to previous years (e.g. Roberts 2006; Boivin and Giannoni 
2006; Borio and Filardo 2007; Mishkin 2007; Tetlow and Ironside 2007), but there is little 
robust support for the global output gap hypothesis as was suggested by Borio and Filardo 
(2007). In particular, Ihrig et al. (2007) showed that estimates are usually insignificant or 
wrongly signed and are not robust with respect to the specification of global slack, while Ball 
(2006) claimed that ‘foreign gaps are at most a secondary influence on inflation’. Moreover, 
Woodford (2010) provided considerations which pointed to the fact that such an influence 
lacks a solid theoretical background. 
Therefore, the results are consistent with the predictions of Daniels and VanHoose (2006) and 
Binyamini and Razin (2008); potentially consistent with Sbordone (2010), but at odds with 
Romer (1993), Lane (1997), Borio and Filardo (2007), and Rogoff (2003, 2006).
32
 On the 
other hand, Sbordone (2010) claimed that although ‘for large enough increases in the number 
of goods traded, the slope of the Phillips curve is in general declining’, the empirical patterns 
in the U.S. trade are rather too small to create such an effect. Therefore, it seems that it is 
globalisation via its openness channel, which is at least partially responsible for the flattening 
of the Phillips curve. Indeed, when independence of the central bank is controlled for, there 
exists a significant and positive correlation between the openness and sacrifice ratio in cross-
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 Alternatively, there may be many effects at play at the same time and the openness effects described by 
Daniels and VanHoose (2006) and Binyamini and Razin (2008) turned out to be stronger than those proposed by 
Romer (1993) and Lane (1997). 
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country data (e.g. Daniels, Nourzad, VanHoose 2005; Badinger 2008). Nevertheless, Milani 
(2010) and Kuttner and Robinson (2010) found this effect to be rather small. 
It should be noted, however, that the above-mentioned findings do not imply that 
globalisation, or more precisely the openness channel, is responsible for low inflation. 
Evidence for the negative correlation between openness and the level of inflation is rather 
mixed. While there is little doubt that such a relation may hold for developing countries, it 
does not seem to be valid for developed countries (e.g. Romer 1993; Badinger 2008). One of 
the usually proposed explanations is that developed economies have already institutionally 
overcome the time-inconsistency problem, and intuition based on the Kydland-Prescott Barro-
Gordon model is no longer an appropriate one to be used in that context.
33
 As was pointed out 
by Kohn (2006), no structural changes ‘relieve central banks of their responsibility for 
maintaining price and economic stability’ and ‘in a world of separate currencies that can 
fluctuate against each other over time, each country’s central bank determines its inflation 
rate’.  
 
3.3.2 Impact of globalisation on the IS curve 
As opposed to the case of the Phillips curve, the literature on the impact of globalisation on 
the IS curve is very scarce. As far as we know, there are only two general premises as were 
suggested by Woodford (2010) which potentially allow globalisation to influence the shape of 
the IS curve and were considered in the literature. However, neither of them seems to be 
relevant in the case of the U.S. economy. 
 
(1) Woodford (2010) analysed the impact of globalisation on the link between monetary 
policy actions and the market nominal interest rate. Although technically these considerations 
refer to the LM curve, we can treat them as analysing the wedge which may arise between the 
interest rate in the Taylor rule (the central bank’s official interest rate) and the IS curve (the 
market nominal interest rate).
34
 The intuition behind this is quite straightforward – in a world 
of free capital flows and common standards the market interest rate can be driven by ‘global 
                                                          
33
 We turn back to the issue later when we discuss a ‘better monetary policy’ explanation and the ‘Greenspan 
standard’. 
34
 This discrepancy arises because in standard models it is usually assumed that the central bank is able to control 
the domestic short-term nominal rate (the Taylor rule is equivalent to the LM curve), while the essence of 
Woodford’s considerations is to try to relax this assumption. Conversely, this point may also be treated as a 
source of potential nonlinearity or state-dependency of the Taylor rule. 
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liquidity’ rather than by ‘domestic liquidity’ because a central bank may lose its monopoly 
power to supply ‘base money’. However, referring to the canonical model by Clarida, Galí 
and Gertler (2002), Woodford (2010) showed that any policy aim may be equivalently 
achieved either with the use of an interest rate or a monetary base. Although their paths in 
different countries can be interrelated, there is no special role for global liquidity. Moreover, 
such a result holds even if one allows for imperfect substitution between currencies as means 
of payments within the border. 
Similarly, Kamin (2010) claimed that despite common global factors affecting individual 
economies and increased co-movements of their interest rates, a central bank does not lose 
control over short-term market interest rates if floating of the currency is allowed. 
Nevertheless, international coordination of the monetary policy may be helpful with respect to 
liquidity provision arrangements (Kamin 2010) and global risk management (Rogoff 2006).    
 
(2) By the same token, Woodford (2010) also analysed the hypothesis of increased 
responsiveness of domestic activity (output gap) to the global interest rate rather than the 
domestic one. The result is parallel – although the IS curves in different countries can be 
interrelated and real interest rates can be tied in equilibrium, there is no special role for the 
global interest rate in the IS equations.  
In both cases, apart from the theoretical justification as was provided by Woodford (2010), 
one may obviously argue that such considerations seem to be futile for the U.S. economy. 
Bearing in mind its relative size and the predominant role of the U.S. dollar as a reserve 
currency, the U.S. economy drives, rather than is driven by, global liquidity and the global 
interest rate. Indeed, an empirical study by Milani (2010) showed that the standard version of 
the IS curve fits the data better than when its parameters are allowed to vary with trade 
openness. In the latter case the changes caused by globalisation seem to be moderate. 
 
3.3.3 Impact of globalisation on the Taylor rule 
It has already been discussed in the previous chapter that nonlinearity and state-dependency of 
the Taylor rule may arise as a result of nonlinearity and state-dependency of the model of the 
economy or relaxation of some specific assumptions underlying the derivation of the optimal 
policy function. In that respect there is no special role for globalisation as a direct source of 
nonlinearity and state-dependency of the Taylor rule. There are, however, at least three 
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channels through which globalisation may exert some influence on the shape of the Taylor 
rule. 
 
(1) When considering the impact of openness on the shape of the Phillips curve, we have 
already mentioned that according to the model by Binyamini and Razin (2008), a welfare-
based monetary policy should put greater emphasis on inflation and smaller emphasis on the 
output gap than when compared with a closed economy. By the same token, Devereux and 
Sutherland (2010) claimed that financial globalisation even strengthens price stability as the 
most important aim of central banks since it also elevates international risk-sharing. 
 
(2) Wagner (2002) noticed that globalisation increases uncertainty regarding parameters in the 
economic models and the information content of the inflation and output gap. Giannoni 
(2002) showed that allowing for uncertainty in both the Phillips curve and the IS curve should 
induce a central bank to act more aggressively in response to changes in the inflation and 
output gap, respectively. Similarly, Onatski and Stock (2002) claimed that policy rules which 
are robust to uncertainty usually predict a stronger reaction than standard rules derived under 
a linear-quadratic framework. It should be noted, however, that the results depend on the 
exact formulation of uncertainty. Finally, as predicted by the already-discussed models by 
Meyer, Swanson and Wieland (2001), Swanson (2006) and Tillmann (2011), uncertainty may 
induce the monetary authorities to conduct a policy which is relatively irresponsive to small 
deviations from the desired level but highly reactive if actual values of inflation or the output 
gap are far from their targets. 
 
(3) In most standard models, openness of the economy does not call for any special need to 
incorporate additional or different variables in the Taylor rule. As was discussed by Rogoff 
(2006), if both inflation and the output gap are taken into account in the Taylor rule the 
benefit from including either an exchange rate or the terms of trade is insignificant because 
their role is already (indirectly) captured by the two standard variables. Nevertheless, there are 
some exceptions which on theoretical grounds may require to modify the Taylor rule if the 
monetary policy rule should be optimal. Smets and Wouters (2002) showed that there is an 
independent role for exchange rate stabilisation if the exchange-rate pass-through into import 
prices is imperfect or gradual. A similar outcome arises if one allows for a home bias in 
consumption (Faia and Monacelli 2008). Rogoff (2006) noticed, however, that such models 
usually assume that the exchange rate is tightly tied to fundamentals and contains additional 
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information on the state of the economy, while in practice large volatility of the exchange rate 
may cause a severe signal extraction problem. He claimed that arguments against including 
the exchange rate in the Taylor rule are quite similar to those against including asset prices as 
put forth by Bernanke and Gertler (1999). 
On the other hand, Ball (2002) claimed that openness of the economy may require more 
serious modifications in the monetary policy strategy; for example, according to his 
proposition, greater macroeconomic stability would be ensured if the monetary authorities 
targeted long-run inflation, which would smooth out variations due to exchange rate 
fluctuations instead of the actual inflation. Conversely, Taylor (2008) assessed the standard 
policy framework as sufficient and did not see any particular need to modify it. He found that 
even gains from international coordination of interest rate policies (coordination in the narrow 
sense) are very small. 
 
3.3.4 Impact of globalisation on the monetary transmission mechanism as a system 
To some extent, a study by Boivin and Giannoni (2010) may serve as an empirical summary 
of the impact of globalisation on the monetary transmission mechanism. They found that 
international or global factors play an important role in explaining the fluctuations of the U.S. 
macroeconomic indicators, although it is difficult to notice a general pattern in that they 
became more important over the period of 1984-2005. In some cases (e.g. long-term interest 
rates, import and export prices), however, this is true. Similarly, there is little evidence that 
globalisation has left its stamp on impulse response functions in the monetary transmission 
mechanism and its impact seems to be limited to reducing persistence in the impulse 
responses. The results suggest that even if globalisation reshaped some of the equations 
constituting the monetary transmission mechanism, little has changed in the monetary 
transmission mechanism as a system due to globalisation. 
 
3.4 Structural changes in the U.S. economy 
It is widely recognised that the Greenspan era was also an era of intense structural changes in 
the U.S. economy and of rapid development of information technology and financial services 
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and innovations
35
 (see e.g. Gordon 1998, Temple 2002). Although there is vast literature 
discussing these as potential explanations of the phenomenon of the Great Moderation, much 
less is known about their precise impact on the monetary transmission mechanism and its 
equations. The problem arises probably because there are quite many channels through which 
structural changes in the U.S. economy may influence the shape of the monetary transmission 
mechanism, and their effects are often contrary. As previously, we discuss these channels 
with respect to the Phillips curve, the IS curve and the Taylor rule.  
 
3.4.1 Impact of structural changes in the U.S. economy on the Phillips curve 
Although the literature on the possible impact of structural changes in the U.S. economy on 
the Phillips curve is not very abundant, the existing studies allow to discuss as many as eight 
premises which justify the nonlinearity and state-dependency of the Phillips curve due to 
these changes. 
 
(1) It is often argued that the development of information technology lowers menu and 
managerial costs related to price changes and thus allows for more frequent price adjustments 
(e.g. Willis 2003), which should result in a steeper Phillip curve. It goes without saying that 
introducing scanner technology and online price catalogues facilitates the process of changing 
prices when compared to labelling every single item and printing paper versions of price 
catalogues. Similarly, improvements in hardware and software make gathering and processing 
of information much easier than in the ‘paper era’, and thus allows managers to make more 
frequent and adequate price adjustments. Willis (2003) provided some evidence that the Great 
Moderation indeed corresponds with more frequent price adjustments than the previous 
period. 
 
(2) By the same token, Willis (2003) noticed that information technology allows consumers to 
compare prices much more easily (e.g. printed vs online catalogues). Although he referred to 
this argument only with respect to lowering the cost of antagonising customers by changing 
prices, more transparent prices should also lead to a more competitive market and the lower 
pricing power of firms. In every case, it should result in a steepening of the Phillips curve. 
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 We purposefully avoid using the term ‘new economy’ since it seems to be very imprecisely referred to in the 
literature and may be ambiguous. 
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(3) Cecchetti (2006) held that ‘technology has been used to make production more responsive 
to changes in product demand, thereby reducing the level of inventories’. If the suggested 
causal effect is true and a reduced level of inventories to shipments is indeed an indicator of 
production being more demand elastic, there is no doubt that the slope of the Phillips curve 
should flatten. Otherwise
36
, it is worth noticing that a lower inventory-to-shipment ratio 
increases the risk of stock-outs in the presence of which firms tend to raise prices rather than 
output. Therefore, we argue that the overall effect is somewhat ambiguous, especially for 
large positive demand shocks. 
 
(4) As was pointed out by Willis (2003) and Cecchetti (2006), important structural changes 
also took place in the labour market. In particular, an increased share of temporary workers 
allows firms to adjust the level of the workforce and production more easily in periods of 
expansions and recessions, thereby smoothing out inflationary and deflationary pressures, 
respectively. In consequence, the Phillips curve should be more flat. 
 
(5) Berk (2002) pointed out that technology development gives rise to goods which can be 
represented in digital form and are subject to increased returns to scale on the supply side and 
network effects on the demand side. Such an environment clearly favours natural monopolies 
and a ‘market structure characterised by a small number of large price-setting entities’. As 
was already discussed in paragraph 1.2.2, this implies a concavity of the Phillips curve, thus 
development of information technology may be responsible for changing the curvature of the 
Phillips curve into a more concave shape.  
 
(6) Berk (2002) also claimed that the development of information technology should result in 
an easier signal extraction problem, in the spirit of Lucas (1972, 1973), due to lower costs of 
gathering and processing information. Then the Phillips curve should be steeper. We argue, 
however, that the signal extraction problem in a real-time setting under structural changes in 
the economy might be even more difficult to solve despite better ‘tools’. The latter view is 
supported by Campbell (2007), who showed that the Great Moderation was characterised by 
lower macroeconomic predictability than in previous years. Thus, the overall outcome of 
changes in the severity of the signal extraction problem on the slope of the Phillips curve 
might be opposite to that suggested by Berk (2002). 
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 A lower inventory-to-shipment ratio may be the result of, e.g. engaging computers in the process of 
inventories management independently of making production more flexible with respect to demand. 
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(7) The above-mentioned point may also be extended to the formulation of inflation 
expectations. On the one hand, easier access to information and publicly available forecasts 
should make inflation expectations more forward-looking yet, on the other hand, ongoing 
structural changes in the economy can make a forecast less accurate and more backward-
looking in reality. The outcome of the two effects is ambiguous, but the given suggestion 
justifies the possibility of a state-dependent Phillips curve in which the development of 
information technology influences the balance between the backward- and forward-looking 
components of inflation expectations. An empirical assessment of the proposed channels can 
be, however, difficult to conduct due to corresponding changes in the credibility and 
communication strategy by the Federal Reserve.  
 
(8) It is worth pointing out that structural changes in the U.S. economy also have the 
composition dimension. If the sectoral Phillips curves for manufacturing and low-tech sectors 
differ substantially from the sectoral Phillips curves for services and high-tech sectors, the 
aggregate Phillips curve may evolve in line with the evolution of the economy’s structure. A 
study by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) revealed that services and high-tech sectors tend to 
adjust prices less frequently than the manufacturing and low-tech sectors. Thus, as the share 
of the latter sectors becomes smaller (see e.g. Alcala and Sancho 2004; Moro 2012), the slope 
of the Phillips curve should decrease. 
 
The presented overview gives no clear-cut predictions of the impact of structural changes in 
the U.S. economy on the Phillips curve (see Table A2.1 in Appendix A.2 for a summary 
table). As was discussed in paragraph 2.4.1, there have been many studies documenting a 
flattening of the Phillips curve during the Great Moderation, and only partially could this be 
justified by globalisation. Thus, one may expect that the balance of the considered premises is 
directed towards a flattening of the Phillips curve rather than its steepening. 
 
3.4.2 Impact of structural changes in the U.S. economy on the IS curve 
Similarly as in the case of the Phillips curve, the number of papers analysing the impact of 
structural changes in the U.S. economy on the shape of the IS curve is scarce. Nevertheless, 
the found studies allow to distinguish as many as seven possible channels through which the 
shape of the IS curve may be affected by structural changes in the U.S. economy (see Table 
A2.2 in Appendix A.2 for a summary table). 
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(1) Berk (2002), Cecchetti (2006) and Woodford (2000) considered the consequences of the 
possible erosion of a central bank’s monopoly position as a supplier of means of payment 
(e.g. due to the development of various forms of ‘e-money’ issued by the private sector) and a 
provider of settlement and balance services (e.g. due to computer systems run by the private 
sector). They argued that although such changes require an important strategic and operational 
modification of the monetary policy framework, the central bank should not lose control over 
the short-term interest rate and the monetary policy should continue to be effective even under 
the most extreme scenarios. On the other hand, we argue that modifications in the policy 
framework are usually introduced in response to rather than before such challenges appear. 
Thus, it is possible that the development of financial innovations of this kind may at least 
temporarily impair the interest rate pass-through or make it more sluggish. Then the slope of 
the IS curve may flatten and/or the impact of the short-term interest rate may be more 
prolonged in time. 
 
(2) Berk (2002), Cecchetti (2006) and Willis (2003) argued that the development of financial 
innovations may result in dampening the credit channel of the monetary policy. In particular, 
the evolution of capital markets and various financial instruments reduces the external 
financing premium and makes enterprises and consumers less dependent on bank credit. 
Cecchetti (2006) claimed that ‘innovations in finance have helped to assure that companies 
and consumers have access to resources even when times are tough’. As was pointed out by 
Berk (2002), the effect might be strengthened by the development of information technology, 
which should reduce the problem of asymmetric information and even further lower the 
external finance premium. Therefore, the evolution of information technology combined with 
financial innovations should lead to a gradual weakening of the inverse relation between the 
slope of the IS curve and credit conditions in the economy. 
 
(3) Financial innovations and the development of hedging instruments facilitate the 
intertemporal substitution of income and cash flows which ‘should work against the 
substitution effect of monetary transmission’ (Berk 2002). Intuitively, better hedging 
instruments allow to ‘freeze’ the interest rate and separate consumption and investment 
decisions from the current interest rate and thus make them relatively more dependent on the 
expected income, net worth and cash flows. Then the IS curve should be flatter and more 
forward-looking. However, we argue that this microeconomic perspective might be somewhat 
confusing. It is worth noting that from the macroeconomic point of view the interest rate risk 
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does not magically disappear but is only transferred from economic agents with higher 
relative risk aversion or lower elasticity of intertemporal substitution to economic agents with 
lower relative risk aversion or higher elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The overall 
effect clearly depends on the distribution of consumption and investment among the 
counterparties. 
On the other hand, we agree that the IS curve might be more forward-looking, but rather due 
to increased possibilities of smoothing consumption and investment as a result of broader 
access to financing. Then the past and current income, net worth and cash flows should truly 
play a relatively smaller role in determining consumption and investment. 
 
(4) The above-mentioned effect could also be potentially strengthened by information 
technology allowing for better access to information and forecasts but, as we have already 
discussed in the case of the Phillips curve, the ongoing structural changes make forecasting 
even more difficult despite the better ‘tools’. 
 
(5) Berk (2002) noticed that financial innovation may influence the income effect of the 
monetary policy again due to increased possibility of hedging against changes in the interest 
rate. It is probable that borrowers and risk hedgers have higher propensity to consumption and 
investment than depositors/lenders and risk holders, respectively (see e.g. Vrolijk 1997). Then 
the possibility of hedging should reduce the negative income effects of the monetary policy 
and make the IS curve flatter. Nevertheless, we claim that this effect can be easily outweighed 
by the positive impact of financial development on the size of the credit and debt market. 
Jerman and Quadrini (2006) documented that outstanding debt to the GDP ratio increased 
from 63% in 1984 to 82% in 2005 and witnessed large swings during that period. Then the 
income effects of the monetary policy in 2005 should be even more profound than they were 
in 1984 and thus the IS curve should be steeper. 
 
(6) Berk (2002) used similar argument as before to justify that also the wealth effects of the 
monetary policy might be reduced due to increased possibility of hedging against changes in 
the interest rate. And again we claim that this effect might be simply outbalanced by the 
positive impact of financial development on the size of the capital and real estate market (see 
e.g. Temple 2002 and Grydaki and Bezemer 2013). Therefore, we find another argument for a 
steepening rather than a flattening of the IS curve. 
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(7) Similarly as in the case of the Phillips curve, one may expect that structural changes in the 
U.S. economy influence the aggregate IS curve also through composition effects. According 
to the credit view of the monetary policy, investment of young and risky ‘new economy’ 
companies should be more reactive to the interest rate than investment of experienced and 
stable ‘old economy’ companies. By the same token, also investment of service firms with 
typically low levels of tangible assets should be more flexible with respect to the interest rate 
than investment of manufacturing firms with relatively high levels of potential collateral. 
Bearing in mind the increasing shares of ‘new economy’ firms, the IS curve should become 
steeper. 
 
Although to our knowledge there are no studies that directly focused on the problem of the 
changing slope of the IS curve, the hypothesis of a steeper IS curve finds some empirical 
support. Simple algebra on the estimates of the DSGE model by Boivin, Kiley and Mishkin 
(2010) reveals that the slope of the IS curve for the consumption equation is indeed much 
steeper for the period 1984Q1-2008Q4 than for the period 1966Q1-1979Q3. A similar 
conclusion may be reached in Boivin and Giannoni (2006) when comparing the estimates for 
1979Q3-2002Q2 and 1959Q1-1979Q2, though the difference is much smaller. 
At the same time, our intuition that financial development leads to a steeper IS curve is 
supported by the already mentioned study by Stracca (2010). He found that the IS curve is 
steeper in countries with higher private credit to GDP, stock market capitalisation to GDP and 
households to GDP ratios. Similarly, Hahn (2003) claimed that well-developed financial 
systems magnify monetary shocks, which is also consistent with the steeper IS curve. The 
results obtained by Stracca (2010) also revealed that the slope of the IS curve is steeper in 
(OECD) countries with a lower share of industry, which is consistent with the proposed 
‘composition hypothesis’. Therefore, we claim that it is highly probable that a steepening of 
the IS curve is at least partially caused by the structural changes in the U.S. economy which 
were discussed in that section. 
  
3.4.3 Impact of structural changes in the U.S. economy on the Taylor rule 
As was already discussed, most likely the structural changes in the U.S. economy lead to a 
flattening of the Phillips curve and a steepening of the IS curve. In such an environment the 
monetary authorities may be relatively more reluctant to raise interest rates since a restrictive 
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monetary policy comes at a larger cost than before. We argue that these effects might be 
strengthened by uncertainty which – in contrast to the issues deliberated upon in paragraph 
2.4.2 – should induce central bankers to act less aggressively. The reason for this supposed 
difference lies in a specific source of uncertainty in the context of structural changes in the 
U.S. economy. 
Inoue (1998) pointed out that innovations in information technology cause cardinal 
measurement errors in economic statistics due to rapid changes in the quality of goods and 
services which are difficult to reflect in price indexes and thus may seriously distort both 
inflation and GDP statistics. The emergence of new goods and services also creates coverage 
problems. In consequence, official inflation can be overestimated while GDP growth can be 
underestimated. Moreover, Cechetti (2006) accentuated the difficulties in estimating potential 
growth when the productivity trend is changing and provided some empirical evidence for its 
consequential underestimating by professional forecasters. As he pointed out, ‘during periods 
of transition, it is extremely difficult to distinguish permanent from transitory shifts in output 
growth, and adjust policy correctly.’ Bearing in mind that the risk of overestimating inflation 
and underestimating GDP growth or the output gap is larger than for the opposite scenario, 
the monetary authorities should react less aggressively to deviations of both actual inflation 
and actual output from their targeted values. Perhaps central bankers should pay more 
attention to the first differences and variance rather than the levels of inflation and output.  
Combining the two effects as described above (structural changes and uncertainty) suggests 
therefore that an optimal monetary policy should probably be more cautious when raising 
interest rates than before, since both the probability and costs of groundless tightening of the 
monetary policy are relatively large. In such an environment the ‘wait and see’ strategy might 
be more efficient than the pre-emptive one. On the other hand, however, easier access to 
information and ICT extends the possibilities and lowers the costs of economic and 
econometric research, which may induce central bankers to act more firmly and pre-
emptively. Thus, the overall effect seems to be difficult to deduce. 
 
3.4.4 Impact of structural changes in the U.S. economy on the monetary transmission 
mechanism as a system 
The evidence presented here on the shifting slopes of the Phillips curve and the IS curve 
suggests that structural changes in the U.S. economy should lead to important changes in the 
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monetary transmission mechanism as a system. Although, as was mentioned in subsection 
2.5, such changes have indeed been detected, they, quite surprisingly in this context, point to 
smaller and less persistent or less volatile effects of monetary policy shocks with respect to 
both inflation and economic activity. Counterfactual analyses conducted by Boivin and 
Giannoni (2006), and Boivin, Kiley and Mishkin (2010), revealed that when changes in the 
monetary policy and their impact on expectations are taken into account, little room remains 
for the role of changes in the parameters governing the behaviour of the private sector. 
Clearly this does not mean that these effects are not important at all, but simply that they have 
been outweighed by shifts in the regular component of the monetary policy. Moreover, it is 
also possible that modifications in the monetary policy were partially caused by the 
development of information technology and financial innovations. 
 
3.5 Crises and market distresses  
3.5.1 International crises and the ‘global saving glut’  
Gordon (1998) referred to international crises as one of the potential explanations of the Great 
Moderation. According to this reasoning the set of international crises ‘created a flight to 
quality and the American “safe haven” in world capital markets that has appreciated the dollar 
and reduced both interest rates and import prices in the United States’. Indeed, when we take 
a look at the list of important financial crises outside the United States it covers crises of 
different source and nature, and seems to be quite long: 
 1990 – Collapse of the Japanese stock exchange initiating Japan’s Lost Decade or 
even Lost Two Decades  
 1991-1993 – Scandinavian Crisis 
 1992 – Black Wednesday 
 1994-1995 – Mexican Crisis 
 1997-1998 – Asian Crisis 
 1998 – Russian Crisis 
 1999 – Brazilian Crisis 
 2001 – Turkish Crisis 
 2001-2002 – Argentinian Crisis. 
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Although the hypothesis of international crises as an explanation for the Great Moderation has 
not received too much attention, we argue that flight to quality in an international dimension 
combined with the ‘global saving glut’37 (Bernanke 2005) is potent to at least temporarily or 
occasionally affect the shape of the monetary transmission mechanism. In particular, we claim 
that in periods of great capital inflow to the U.S., possibly caused by international flight to 
quality, the Federal Reserve may lose its leverage over long-term interest rates with the use of 
the short-term rate.  
On the one hand, Bernanke (2007) held that the Federal Reserve, even in the presence of the 
global saving glut, retains its leverage over long-term interest rates by setting a short-term 
interest rate (and shaping expectations). Conversely, Thornton (2012) claimed that the link 
between long-term rates and the Federal Reserve’s short-term interest rate has been non-
existent since the Federal Reserve adopted a short-term interest rate as its policy instrument. 
We argue that both positions seem to be too extreme. In contrast to Bernanke (2007), 
Thornton’s (2012) estimates leave very little doubt that the Federal Reserve’s impact on long-
term rates experienced structural changes from a statistically significant and meaningful 
relation in 1985 to virtually no relation at all twenty years later. But, at the same time, 
Thornton’s econometric approach focused on seeking only one, single structural break (he 
dated it as taking place in 1988), while the estimates he obtained and the tests he performed 
show that there was also at least one more structural break in 1994. Moreover, this is also 
when the estimates start to exhibit a significant trend, which questions whether the structural 
change was truly immediate or perhaps more prolonged in time. We claim that the time 
pattern of the estimates he found visually correlates with foreign flows into U.S. bonds as 
were calculated by Warnock and Warnock (2005). Apart from this, the year of the second 
possible structural break (i.e. 1994) is also the year when a series of crises began in 
developing countries. 
To our knowledge there are no studies that analysed all of the proposed links together. 
However, the ‘Greenspan conundrum’ (Greenspan 2005), when despite raising the federal 
funds rate seventeen times by 25 basis points, from 1% to 5.25% in the period 2004-2006, 
                                                          
37
 Bernanke (2005) claimed that financial crises in developing countries moved their collective current account 
deficit to the collective current account surplus. In particular, East Asian countries transformed from being net 
importers to being net exporters and quickly started building up large foreign-exchange reserves. The effect was 
strengthened by similar behaviour by China, the oil exporters and the savings propensities of mainly Germany 
and Japan. A large part of the reserves was invested in the U.S. as a result of ‘the development and adoption of 
new technologies and rising productivity in the United States together with the country's long-standing 
advantages such as low political risk, strong property rights, and a good regulatory environment’. 
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long-term rates were rather going down than up, may serve as an anecdotal example of a 
situation when the Federal Reserve seemed to have lost its leverage over long-term rates by 
using a short-term rate due to sudden foreign inflows on the bond market (Warnock and 
Warnock 2005; Craine and Martine 2009).
38
  
In conclusion, we claim that the suggested hypothesis, i.e. that in periods of sudden capital 
inflow to the U.S., possibly caused by international flight to quality, the Federal Reserve’s 
impact on long-term interest rates via the federal funds rate may be dampened, is plausible. 
Clearly, it should be treated as a working hypothesis and needs much more empirical 
investigation but at the same time it is also consistent with the general and already mentioned 
finding that the Great Moderation corresponds to smaller effects of the monetary policy. 
 
3.5.2 Domestic crises and market distresses 
Despite the coined name, the Great Moderation was not a period that was free from any 
domestic crises and market distresses. When we compare the average number of major stock-
market volatility shocks as were identified by Bloom (2009), there is no difference between 
the pre-Greenspan period and the Greenspan era – in both cases major stock-market volatility 
shocks happen once every 2.75 years, on average. Moreover, it was the Greenspan era when 
four of the largest shocks took place if we consider the years 1962-2006.
39
 Again, the list of 
domestic crises and periods of market distresses is quite long (* denotes episodes which were 
identified as major stock-market volatility shocks on the U.S. market by Bloom (2009)): 
 1987 – Black Monday 
 1989 – Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation is abolished (Savings and 
Loan crisis)  
 1990 – Gulf War I 
 1997 – Asian Crisis 
 1998 – Russian Crisis and the LTCM default 
 2000 – Collapse of dot-com bubble 
                                                          
38
 It is worth noting that although the term ‘Greenspan conundrum’ has been coined, the phenomenon might be 
easily explained on the grounds of the expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates (see e.g. Walsh 
2010, Ch. 10.3.1) – if market participants expect rapid and deep interest rate cutting in the nearest future, the 
long-term interest rates may go down despite the current tightening of the monetary policy. Indeed, in the period 
2007-2008 the federal funds rate was lowered to the range 0-0.25%. 
39
 Due to methodological issues, data before and after 1986 may not be perfectly comparable. Thus this point 
should be considered with a certain degree of care.  
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 2001 – September 11 
 2002 – Worldcom and Enron scandals 
 2003 – Gulf War II 
We claim that domestic crises and periods of market distress may be, in a broader sense, 
perceived as potential sources of nonlinearity and state-dependency of the monetary 
transmission mechanism. Actually, in section 2 we discussed many micro-based premises 
behind the nonlinearity and state-dependency of the monetary transmission mechanism which 
are closely related to crises and market distresses (e.g. animal spirits, self-fulfilling 
prophecies, sunspots, multiple equilibria, fragile equilibrium for the Phillips curve; the 
liquidity trap, flight to liquidity and quality for the IS curve; the zero lower bound on interest 
rates for the Taylor rule). However, the problem we want to address herein is somewhat 
broader and rather refers to methodological issues regarding the process of economic and 
econometric modelling.   
Usually, crises and market distresses come either unexpectedly or at an unexpected time. If 
we knew a priori the exact mechanisms of all possible crises, some of them would not have 
happened or we would have been much better prepared for them. We point out that such 
situations are beyond the models we build or perhaps even beyond the models we are able to 
build. Bearing in mind our cognitive limitations, we cannot tell apart our ignorance from pure 
randomness and what we are not able to justify within the model we attribute to stochastic 
shocks. Therefore, crisis situations may be perceived as bifurcation points beyond which 
otherwise operative models cease to work and some other more complicated mechanisms 
come into play. 
In particular, crises and market distresses may be recognised as a manifestation that the 
(log)linearity assumption underlying most of the economic and econometric models has some 
fundamental limitations. Contemporary DSGE models are usually log-linearised around 
steady-states, without broader considerations to what extent this approximation is valid. In 
many cases no proof is proposed to assure that the found steady-state is the only one or that it 
is truly a stable equilibrium. Apart from this, usually little is done to show that the first-order 
approximation is sufficient to capture the model’s fundamental properties. On the other hand, 
when a higher order approximation is applied, the pruning technique often serves as scissors 
cutting out extreme or explosive impulse responses. Finally, the log-linear approximation 
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around the steady-state is designed to work well in close vicinity of the steady-state, while 
periods of crises and market distresses are usually far away from it. 
Last but not least, very often crises situations are either followed or preceded by policy 
measures (usually regulatory and institutional ones) which change ‘the rules of the game’. It is 
very convenient to assume that the parameters estimated in econometric models are constant 
in time, but crises usually induce policymakers to introduce some structural changes and to 
make politicians conscious of the fact that the old political measures were wrong, poorly 
designed or insufficient; for example, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 were introduced in reaction to 
the Saving and Loan crisis and the WorldCom-Enron scandals, respectively. The former act 
fundamentally changed the modus operandi of the savings and loan industry and its safety and 
regulatory net, while the latter act aimed to reduce information asymmetry between company 
outsiders and insiders and some of its most harmful consequences. On the other hand, the 
Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 (e.g. introducing ‘affordable housing 
goals’ for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (e.g. 
removing barriers in joining the activities of commercial banks, investment banks and 
insurance companies) are often perceived as factors contributing to the recent financial crisis. 
To conclude, we hold that crises and market distresses may be perceived as a manifestation 
that our models are essentially and always too modest to capture all fundamentally important 
features of the real world even if we focus on its very tiny parts. 
 
3.6 The Greenspan standard 
In this subsection we analyse potential sources of nonlinearity and state-dependency of the 
monetary transmission mechanism due to the Greenspan standard, i.e. the way Alan 
Greenspan conducted the monetary policy as Federal Reserve chairman according to 
academic economists.
40
 To organise our considerations we shortly discuss some principles of 
the Greenspan standard as were proposed by Blinder and Reis (2005)
41
. As was stated 
previously, bearing in mind the scope of this study we focus solely on premises which may 
                                                          
40
 The Greenspan standard by no means should be treated as official and explicit principles according to which 
Alan Greenspan conducted his monetary policy. 
41
 The numbering of principles (in brackets) in the latter part of this subsection comes directly from Blinder and 
Rise (2005).  
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suggest that the monetary policy was conducted in a nonlinear or state-dependent way and 
thus deviated from the standard Taylor rule. 
 
3.6.1 Option value and lack of economic straitjackets 
Blinder and Reis (2005) described three principles which, taken together, suggest Greenspan’s 
dislike for pre-commitment to any particular policy rule, economic or forecasting model: 
 Keep your options open (Principle No. 1) 
 Don’t let yourself get trapped in doctrinal straitjackets (Principle No. 2) 
 Forecasts and models, though necessary, are unreliable (Principle No. 4). 
Greenspan, being a practitioner and empiricist rather than a theorist, many times expressed his 
doubts about the validity of economic and econometric models. He explicitly acknowledged 
the nonlinearity and time-variance of the real economic world, pointing out that ‘an 
assumption of linearity may be adequate for estimating average relationships, but few expect 
that an economy will respond linearly to every aberration’ and the ‘relationships underlying 
the economy’s structure change over time in ways that are difficult to anticipate’ (Greenspan 
2003). In the same set of remarks he also emphasised the role of irreducible uncertainty 
regarding the true model of the economy and conducting the monetary policy. That is why he 
believed in period-by-period discretion rather than rules and wanted to keep all options open 
(Greenspan 2004). Blinder and Reis (2005) also claimed that Greenspan ‘has been remarkably 
flexible and adaptable to changing circumstances’ and ‘has been known to change his mind – 
without, of course, saying so – on certain issues’. This suggests that the Greenspan era could 
be quite heterogeneous, although in many papers this time period is treated as one 
homogeneous period. Indeed, studies by Gorodnichenko and Shapiro (2007), and Bae, Kim 
and Kim (2012), showed that the Greenspan era actually consisted of two distinct periods with 
a breakpoint in the late 1990s. In particular, the early period was characterised by a stronger 
reaction to inflation than the second period. Gorodnichenko and Shapiro (2007) claimed that 
credibility allowed Greenspan to take a gamble by keeping interest rates low despite very 
strong output growth while the private sector believed that possible policy errors would be 
corrected. Gorodnichenko and Shapiro (2007) also held that Greenspan put more emphasis on 
price level than on inflation, which is a framework favouring correction of errors in the 
monetary policy. 
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3.6.2 Avoidance of policy reversals  
Blinder and Reis (2005) provided some evidence that Greenspan had a strong inclination to 
avoid policy reversals (Principle No. 3). Particularly, he claimed that contrary moves in the 
interest rates at short intervals impair a central bank’s credibility. Such beliefs may also 
justify why he preferred to move gradually rather than to ‘serve a cold turkey’ – it is much 
safer to move step by step since after every move the way back is temporarily blocked. This 
principle suggests that the interest rate rule under Greenspan was history-dependent, i.e. the 
path of the interest rate depended on past changes in interest rates. 
 
3.6.3 Risk management and robust pre-emptive monetary policy  
Many times Greenspan (e.g. 2003, 2004) expressed the opinion that the monetary policy 
should be robust with respect to misspecification of the models describing the economy and 
against worst-case scenarios. Blinder and Reis (2005) found his monetary policy to be 
‘satisficing’ rather than optimising and claimed that Greenspan followed a principle that ‘risk 
management works better in practice than formal optimisation procedures – especially as a 
safeguard against very adverse outcomes’ (Principle No. 6). At the same time, Greenspan is 
believed to have been an advocate of acting pre-emptively when possible (Principle No. 5), 
which justifies why some of his moves were in fact policy insurances against very low 
probable but very adverse events.
42
 For example, the easing monetary policy in 1998 served 
as insurance against the spill-over effects of the Russian crisis and the LTCM default, even 
though the economy was growing strongly. Again, these considerations show that the interest 
rate rule under Greenspan was state-dependent and possibly based on a broader set of 
variables than just inflation and the output gap. 
 
3.6.4 Recession avoidance preferences 
According to Blinder and Reis (2005), Greenspan treated the Federal Reserve’s dual mandate 
very seriously and internalised in his decisions society’s strong dislike towards recessions. In 
particular, he followed the principle that ‘recessions should be avoided and/or kept short, as 
should periods of growth below potential’ (Principle No. 7), while aspirations should be set 
high, even if it is impossible to achieve all of them (Principle No. 11). The principles, taken 
                                                          
42
 Taleb (2007) called such events ‘black swans’. 
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together, point towards Greenspan’s recession avoidance preferences, which was 
econometrically confirmed by Cukierman and Muscatelli (2008) and Kim and Nelson (2006). 
At the same time, Blinder and Reis (2005) also provided some textual evidence supporting the 
view that Greenspan was more concerned about overcooling than overheating the economy. 
Recession avoidance preferences might also have been responsible for Greenspan’s relatively 
passive behaviour in response to oil shocks (Principle No. 8). 
 
3.6.5 Adverse shocks and bubbles 
In 1998, after the Federal Reserve lowered interest rates in response to the LTCM default, 
financial markets coined the term ‘Greenspan put’. The term literally refers to the put option 
which hedges investors against large price drops. By analogy, it was believed that in the case 
of a large adverse stock-market shock, the Federal Reserve would react by cutting rates and 
thus cushioning the asset prices plummet. At the same time, Greenspan was known for being 
reluctant to deflate booms and to allow asset prices to rise. Blinder and Reis (2005) held that 
the principle ‘don’t try to burst bubbles; mop up after’ (Principle No. 9) was an important part 
of the Greenspan standard. Moreover, there are also other studies confirming the existence of 
the Greenspan put (e.g. Miller, Weller and Zhang 2002; Hall 2011). The principle may be 
perceived as another manifestation of strong recession avoidance preferences or as direct 
evidence of nonlinearity of the interest rate rule with respect to asset prices.  
 
3.7 Summary 
In this section we provided both extensive theoretical and empirical evidence supporting the 
idea of significant nonlinearities and state-dependency of the monetary transmission 
mechanism in the Greenspan era. In particular, we discussed globalisation, structural changes 
in the U.S. economy, crises and market distresses and the Greenspan standard as potential 
sources of nonlinearities and state-dependency of the monetary transmission mechanism. In 
the next section we begin the process of econometric modelling of the monetary transmission 
mechanism in the Greenspan era by estimating the baseline linear model of the monetary 
transmission mechanism and showing its empirical inadequacy. 
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4. Baseline model of the monetary transmission mechanism 
4.1 Introduction 
As was pointed out by Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim, and Granger (2010, Ch. 5.1), ‘linearity testing 
has to precede any nonlinear modelling and estimation’. It is even all the more necessary if 
the estimated model nests a linear one, which is particularly the case for the econometric 
modelling method that is applied in this study, i.e. the smooth transition autoregressive 
(𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅) modelling framework. Therefore, in this section we specify, estimate and evaluate a 
baseline linear model of the monetary transmission mechanism and only later, in the 
following sections, do we move towards a nonlinear and state-dependent framework.  
At the beginning of this section we present the applied econometric method of modelling the 
monetary transmission mechanism. Specifically, we formulate a simplified, stylised New 
Keynesian model of monetary transmission with some distinctive modifications justified by 
the characteristic features of nonlinearity and state-dependency modelling. Later, we describe 
the data we use for the estimation. Finally, we present the obtained estimates and evaluate the 
model from both the econometric and economic perspective. 
 
4.2 Econometric method 
Conceptually, we would like to follow the development of the New Keynesian framework and 
capture the dynamics described by a hybrid version of the small monetary transmission 
mechanism as given by equations 1.3, 1.6 and 1.12. However, bearing in mind the specific 
properties and limitations of nonlinear modelling, we need to introduce some modifications 
when compared to the small New Keynesian model of the monetary transmission mechanism 
in the spirit of Galí (2008, Ch. 3). 
 
4.2.1 Functional form 
As may be seen in equations 1.3 and 1.6, the intercept term is omitted in the Phillips curve 
and the IS curve equations. Typically, series are demeaned or detrended before estimation, 
and thus it is assumed that the intercept term is equal to zero. Such an action makes no 
distinction between the unconditional and conditional mean and, although very often 
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practised, may create a bias in the estimated parameters. Clearly, the problem is more severe 
in the case of nonlinear models, for which the expected value of the function of random 
variables is generally not equal to the function of the expected value of random variables. As 
was noted by Kennedy (2008, Ch. 7), including the intercept also helps to alleviate the 
omitted variables problem. The most important argument for including the intercept in the 
estimated equations is, however, that it is required to perform some diagnostic and linearity 
tests. Otherwise, some tests are infeasible or test statistics have unknown distributions. 
Therefore, we do not omit the intercept term in neither of the estimated equations. 
The standard New Keynesian model of monetary transmission incorporates expectations 
which are rational in the sense of Muth (1961). In other words, it is assumed that the 
expectations are model-consistent and thus they are the outputs rather than the inputs of the 
model (Evans and Honkapohja 2005). Solving such a model is mathematically nontrivial, 
therefore the dynamics of a system is usually only approximated around a steady-state with a 
system of linear equations. Intuitively, such a framework is hardly applicable for a study 
designed to detect nonlinearities, state-dependencies and asymmetries, i.e. phenomena which 
are excluded by linear approximation around a steady-state. The limitations listed below are 
mainly conceptual and they would not disappear even if higher orders of approximation were 
used: 
 approximation around a steady-state is meaningful if a steady-state is existent, unique 
and stable – in this study the phenomenon of multiple or unstable equilibria is 
implicitly allowed and thus the concept of approximation around a steady-state is not 
applicable; 
 impulse response functions based on the approximation around a steady-state are 
conditioned on the economy being initially in a steady-state and only later unhinged 
by a designed shock – in this study we are interested in the global rather than local 
dynamics of a system and we explicitly allow for impulse response functions which 
depend on the initial or historical conditions before the economy is hit by a shock; 
 approximation around a steady-state works well in the close neighbourhood of a 
steady-state – in this study we do not restrict ourselves to shocks which are small 
enough to be considered as keeping the economy near a steady-state but, conversely, 
we want to compare the unit effects of large and small shocks. 
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Taking the above into consideration, we substitute the rational expectations in the sense of 
Muth (1961) for the exact expectations formulated on the basis of lagged model variables. It 
is important to note, however, that such a departure does not imply that the expectations are 
no longer rational – they are rational but in a broader, or rather different, sense. As was 
pointed out by Simon (1978), the term ‘rational expectations’ in the sense of Muth (1961) is 
ill-chosen (Simon proposed the term ‘consistent expectations’ instead) and there are also other 
forms of rationality. Although we do not label our approach precisely, one may find many 
similarities with: 
 procedural rationality as opposed to substantive rationality (Simon 1978) – in the 
proposed framework the expectations may be seen as procedurally rational since they 
are effectively subjected to given cognitive and information limitations. Just as in real 
life, the economic agents do not know the true model of the economy or the data-
generating process but observe (with some lag) realisations of the stochastic process 
upon which the expectations are formed. Therefore, in contrast to model-consistent 
expectations, herein the expectations are not the outcomes but the inputs of the model 
(Evans and Honkapohja 2005); 
 exact expectations (Hansen and Sargent 1980, 1981) – conceptually, the exact 
expectations are non-stochastic functions of information possessed by the economic 
agents about the relevant state-variables governing the dynamics of the system they 
would like to control. In other words, instead of defining expectations in terms of 
model consistency, we define expectations in terms of the exact function of 
information available to the economic agents. Again, the first approach is closer to 
substantive rationality and model outcomes, while the second approach is closer to 
procedural rationality and model inputs; 
 forecast-based expectations in the spirit of Ball (2000)43 – formulating expectations 
may be seen as a forecasting exercise. The economic agents possess information on 
past realisations of some variables of interest and try to forecast their future behaviour 
with the use of given econometric tools. In the proposed framework the economic 
agents may be seen as forecasting on the basis of lagged values of model variables 
with the use of simple linear regression. 
                                                          
43
 Ball (2000) called his approach ‘near-rational’. It should be noted, however, that this term is even more 
ambiguous than ‘rational’ since for every single definition of rationality there are many potential definitions of 
near-rationality. See Woodford (2010a) for a more general definition of ‘near-rational expectations’. 
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 robust expectations (Evans and Honkapohja 2005, Hansen and Sargent 2007) – the 
economic agents share the experience of an econometrician and thus they want to form 
expectations which are robust to model misspecification. In the proposed framework, 
no special assumption is made with respect to the underlying model of the economy 
according to which the economic agents should form their expectations. Thus the 
expectations are robust with respect to many models which are based on the same set 
of endogenous variables, and no particular model is favoured.  
Bearing in mind the finding that the coefficient on the real interest rate is very often wrongly 
signed in the IS curve (e.g. Stracca 2010), and confirmation of this finding for the data we 
analyse here, we substitute the current value of the real interest rate with the lagged one in the 
IS curve equation. Since in this study we model the behaviour of the effective federal funds 
rate, such a modification may also be justified on the grounds of rich empirical evidence (e.g. 
Cottarelli and Kourelis 1994; Borio and Fritz 1995) proving a sluggish pass-through between 
money market and bank lending rates. In particular, Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) estimated 
(for the U.S. economy) that only 32-41% of change in the money market rate was translated 
into the bank lending rate on impact, while the multiplier grew to 69-97% after a quarter. 
By putting the proposed modifications together, we obtain a model of the monetary 
transmission mechanism which consists of six equations – three structural equations and three 
expectations ones
44
: 
 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝜋𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝛼1)𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝛼2𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝜋,𝑡    (4.1) 
𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑡−1      (4.2) 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑥𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝛾1)𝐸𝑡𝑥𝑡+1  + 𝛾2(𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡) + 𝜀𝑥,𝑡   (4.3) 
𝐸𝑡𝑥𝑡+1 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝛿3𝑖𝑡−1      (4.4) 
𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡 = 𝜁0 + 𝜁1𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝜁2𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜁3𝑖𝑡−1      (4.5) 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃0 + 𝜃1𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜃2𝜋𝑡 + 𝜃3𝑥𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡       (4.6) 
 
                                                          
44
 The expectation equations (4.2), (4.4) and (4.5) share exactly the same set of explanatory variables because the 
rational expectations are defined in terms of the exact function of information available to the economic agents.  
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After some simple manipulations presented in Appendix A.3, the model is reducible into a 
three-equation reduced form which, after taking into account the 𝐴𝑅(1) nature of disturbance 
terms, may be presented as follows: 
 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝜙11 + 𝜙12𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝜙13𝑥𝑡 + 𝜙14𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜙15𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜙16𝜖𝜋,𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝜋,𝑡  (4.7) 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝜙21 + 𝜙22𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝜙23𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜙24𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜙25𝜖𝑥,𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑥,𝑡   (4.8) 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙31 + 𝜙32𝜋𝑡 + 𝜙33𝑥𝑡 + 𝜙34𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜙35𝜖𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑖,𝑡    (4.9) 
 
We treat the model given by equations (4.7) – (4.9) as our initial model of the monetary 
transmission mechanism.  
 
4.2.2 Estimation method 
Despite the recent developments of Bayesian techniques and their very common use in 
modern monetary economics, classical tools still remain the default choice when modelling 
nonlinearity and state-dependency of the monetary transmission. In particular none of the 
studies which were overviewed in subsection 2.5 and Appendix A1.5 employed a Bayesian 
approach to analyse asymmetries in the monetary transmission mechanism. In our opinion 
such a situation results from a greater availability of studies and books on how to model and 
test for nonlinearity within classical rather than Bayesian econometrics. In consequence, the 
modelling and testing know-how seems to be better established in the first than in the latter 
case, which is the main reason why we follow a classical approach as well. 
A typical New Keynesian model with rational model-consistent expectations requires that one 
employs an estimation technique which is potent to alleviate the problem of endogeneity of 
model-consistent expectations. The usually exploited Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) has proved to render highly variant estimates with respect to the sample selection and 
the list of instrument variables, even for linear models (see e.g. Donald, Imbens and Newey 
2009).
45
 The problems of weak instruments and large variance of the estimators are yet more 
severe for nonlinear models because they usually require a longer list of instrument variables 
(due to the greater number of estimated parameters in the model itself or during the process of 
                                                          
45
 One may expect that these problems contributed to the success of Bayesian techniques in estimating New 
Keynesian models. 
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testing linearity, which very often incorporates polynomial approximations) and the system of 
moment equations they yield is much more difficult to solve than for the linear case. Since 
instrument variables correspond to the assumed information set of rational economic agents, 
while moment conditions represent the process of ‘extracting information’ from instrument 
variables, the problem is far from being purely technical. Moreover, links among being 
independent, orthogonal and uncorrelated are weaker for nonlinear than for linear models
46
, 
which creates additional ambiguity as to how to specify moment conditions.
47
 Domínguez and 
Lobato (2004) also proved that in a nonlinear setting, GMM estimators are not necessarily 
consistent because ‘the GMM objective function may have several global minima’. 
On a more practical side, nonlinear models estimated via GMM may need longer time series 
than those estimated via Least Squares (see Appendix A.4 for a small experiment). Bearing in 
mind that in the previous paragraph we decided to substitute model-consistent expectations 
with the exact expectations and to substitute the current real interest rate with the lagged one, 
there is no longer any special reason to estimate the model using GMM. Since the problem of 
endogeneity is not a priori existent, we should rather stick to Least Squares estimators which, 
in such a case, are more efficient than GMM estimators. Therefore, in the presence of an 
explicit 𝐴𝑅(1) disturbance term we estimate the model using the Nonlinear Least Squares 
method. 
 
4.2.3 Data 
The analysed sample coincides with the Greenspan era, which spans from 1987Q3 to 2005Q4 
(73 observations). The baseline data set consists of the: 
 annualised quarterly growth rate of a seasonally adjusted GDP deflator (in percentage 
points) as a measure of 𝜋𝑡; 
 output gap estimates by the Congressional Budget Office (in percentage points) as a 
measure of 𝑥𝑡; 
 quarterly average effective federal funds rate (in percentage points) as a measure of 𝑖𝑡. 
                                                          
46
 See Rodgers, Nicewander and Toothaker (1984) for a short discussion on the differences among linearly 
independent, orthogonal and uncorrelated variables.  
47
 It is also worth noting that for linear models the OLS estimator can easily be obtained as a special case of the 
GMM estimator if the explanatory variable and instrument variable lists are one and the same. On the other 
hand, such a property does not generally hold for nonlinear models. 
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Although the employed variables are in line with many papers dealing with the monetary 
transmission mechanism, it is particularly worth stressing the importance of the output gap 
measure in the context of nonlinear modelling. As was already discussed in paragraph 2.2.3, 
simulations by Laxton, Rose and Tetlow (1993) showed that simple univariate detrending 
methods (including the HP filter) should be avoided when modelling nonlinearity since they 
seriously underestimate the true degree of nonlinearity in economic relationships. Instead, the 
authors proposed to use a combination of detrending methods and structural modelling, which 
is a method that is exactly exploited by the Congressional Budget Office to estimate the 
potential output and the output gap.   
 
4.3 Estimation results 
Table 4.1 presents the estimates of the initial model of the monetary transmission mechanism. 
Since the model is estimated in its reduced form, most of the estimated parameters in the 
inflation and output gap equations are not very informative themselves. However, it is easy to 
note that the estimate of parameter 𝜙13, which is a mapped one-to-one structural parameter 
𝛼2, is very low and statistically insignificant at a very high significance level (p-value 
= 0.9154). Bearing in mind that nonlinear modelling requires a relatively large number of 
degrees of freedom and that the baseline model should be possibly parsimonious, we also 
estimate an alternative version of the inflation equation in which the current value of the 
output gap is omitted. 
 
Table 4.1 The estimates of the initial model of the monetary transmission mechanism and the alternative version 
of the inflation equation (effective sample 1988Q1-2005Q4, Nonlinear Least Squares method). 
Eq.  𝜙…1 𝜙…2 𝜙…3 𝜙…4 𝜙…5 𝜙…6  ?̅?
2 𝐴𝐼𝐶 𝑆𝐼𝐶 
𝜋𝑡 
 0.3891 0.9083 0.0132 0.0427 -0.0286 -0.3540  
0.6026 1.8653 2.0550  [0.0361] [0.0000] [0.9154] [0.7369] [0.3282] [0.0063]  
𝜋𝑡  
 0.3949 0.9063 
- 
0.0556 -0.0288 -0.3506  
0.6084 1.8377 1.9958 
 [0.0267] [0.0000] [0.1308] [0.3206] [0.0062]  
𝑥𝑡 
 0.2235 -0.0554 0.9319 -0.0253 0.2708 
- 
 
0.9066 1.5177 1.6758  [0.3816] [0.5097] [0.0000] [0.5543] [0.0479]  
𝑖𝑡 
 1.1543 0.0710 0.2455 0.7294 0.8554 
- 
 
0.9799 0.6309 0.7890  [0.0543] [0.2690] [0.0020] [0.0000] [0.0000]  
  p-values in square brackets     
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The residual diagnostic tests (Table 4.2) performed here allow us not to reject the (individual) 
hypotheses of: normal distribution, no autocorrelation (up to 12 lags) and homoscedasticity of 
residuals for all equations at a 1% significance level. If the significance level is raised to 5%, 
the 𝜒2 version of the Breusch-Godfrey test signals a problem with the autocorrelation in the 
initial specification of the inflation equation. Finally, pushing up the significance level further 
to 10% requires that we reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation, homoscedasticity 
(Breusch-Pagan test) and normal distribution of residuals for the inflation equations (in both 
the initial and alternative specification), the output gap equation and the interest rate equation, 
respectively. The obtained results support the idea of substituting the initial specification of 
inflation equation with the alternative one, since then the model residuals have desirable 
properties at the typically employed 5% significance level.  
 
Table 4.2 P-values of residual diagnostic tests (𝜋𝑡
𝐴 stands for an alternative specification of the inflation 
equation) 
Equation 
 𝐻0: normal 
distribution 
 
𝐻0: no 
autocorrelation 
 𝐻0: homoscedasticity 
 
Jarque-Bera 
 Breusch-Godfrey*  Breusch-Pagan  ARCH*  White 
  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
𝜋𝑡  0.137  0.053 0.043  0.851 0.840  0.961 0.943  0.780 0.762 
𝜋𝑡
𝐴  0.129  0.061 0.054  0.736 0.724  0.963 0.945  0.750 0.734 
𝑥𝑡  0.925  0.479 0.392  0.074 0.075  0.764 0.716  0.487 0.470 
𝑖𝑡  0.088  0.652 0.558  0.325 0.314  0.877 0.839  0.431 0.415 
* up to 12 lags 
 
It is important to note that the variance-covariance matrix of the estimated residuals may be 
treated as diagonal no matter whether we look at the initial or alternative specification of the 
inflation equation (Table 4.3). The estimated residuals are not only individually uncorrelated 
among equations at a high significance level but also the p-value of the joint hypothesis (that 
all non-diagonal elements of the analysed variance-covariance matrix are equal to zero) is 
above any typically employed significance level – an LR test with the first-order Bartlett 
correction reports a p-value being equal to 0.8766 and 0.9036 for the initial and the 
alternative specification, respectively. Such an attribute is favourable from the perspective of 
both the properties of the Least Squares estimator and impulse response analysis. In the latter 
case there is no special need to apply any orthogonalisation procedure since we may already 
treat the residuals as being orthogonal.  
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Table 4.3 Correlation matrices of the estimated residuals 
 ?̂?𝜋,𝑡 ?̂?𝑥,𝑡 ?̂?𝑖,𝑡   ?̂?𝜋𝐴,𝑡 ?̂?𝑥,𝑡 ?̂?𝑖,𝑡 
?̂?𝜋,𝑡 1 
 
 
 
 ?̂?𝜋𝐴,𝑡 1 
 
 
 
 
?̂?𝑥,𝑡 
-0.1011 
1  
 
 ?̂?𝑥,𝑡 
-0.0902 
1  
 [0.4016] [0.4543] 
?̂?𝑖,𝑡 
0.0107 -0.0489 1  ?̂?𝑖,𝑡 
0.0123 -0.0489 1 
[0.9294] [0.6859] [0.9189] [0.6859]  
 p-values in square brackets   p-values in square brackets 
 
Bearing in mind the scope of this thesis, we are particularly interested in the model’s response 
to monetary policy shock – the only type of shock which is structurally identified in the model 
owing to one-to-one mapping between the structural and reduced form of the Taylor rule. 
Figure 4.1 presents the estimated impulse responses of the three endogenous variables to the 
unit (i.e. equal to one percentage point) one-off shock in the interest rate equation. Virtually, 
there is no difference between the impulse response functions under the initial and alternative 
specification of the model of the monetary transmission. In both cases, the observed patterns 
are consistent with the patterns presented in the literature (see e.g. Galí 2008, Ch. 3). 
 
Figure 4.1 Impulse responses of 𝜋𝑡, 𝑥𝑡 and 𝑖𝑡 to unit one-off shock in 𝑖𝑡 for the initial and the alternative 
specification of the model of the monetary transmission mechanism 
    
 
Since, as it was aforementioned, nonlinear modelling requires relatively large number of 
degrees of freedom and the baseline model should be possibly parsimonious, we set the 
alternative specification (i.e. initial specification of the inflation equation is substituted with 
the alternative one) as our baseline specification of the model of the monetary transmission 
mechanism. Under such a specification the performed diagnostic tests report no problems 
with autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity or lack of normal distribution of residuals at 5% 
significance level. One another advantage of such an approach is that now all the equations 
have the same number of the estimated parameters, what facilitates the procedure of testing 
89 
 
for nonlinearity and state-dependency, and makes the test results more comparable among the 
equations.  
To avoid possible mistakes with numeration of the parameters due to omitting  
𝜙13 in the inflation equation, we rewrite the notation of the baseline model of the monetary 
transmission mechanism by substituting 𝜙 with 𝜑. In general 𝜙𝑖𝑗 = 𝜑𝑖𝑗 but 𝜙14 = 𝜑13, 
𝜙15 = 𝜑14, 𝜙16 = 𝜑15:  
 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝜑11 + 𝜑12𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝜑13𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜑14𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜑15𝜖𝜋,𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝜋,𝑡   (4.10) 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝜑21 + 𝜑22𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝜑23𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜑24𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜑25𝜖𝑥,𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑥,𝑡   (4.11) 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑31 + 𝜑32𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑33𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑34𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜑35𝜖𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑖,𝑡    (4.12) 
 
Throughout the rest of the text we will refer to the model consisting of equations (4.10) – 
(4.12) as our baseline model of the monetary transmission mechanism. 
 
4.4 Summary 
In this section we introduced and estimated the baseline model of the monetary transmission 
mechanism. The performed diagnostic tests and the impulse response analysis prove that the 
model has desirable properties from both the econometric and economic perspective. The 
presented baseline model of the monetary transmission will later serve as a reference linear 
model when modelling nonlinearities and state-dependency of the monetary transmission 
mechanism. In the next section we perform nonlinearity and state-dependency tests, and we 
show that the baseline model of the monetary transmission mechanism hides some 
peculiarities which are not usually detected when the typical procedure of econometric 
modelling is applied.  
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5. Testing for nonlinearity and state-dependency of the monetary 
transmission mechanism 
5.1 Introduction 
Before directly proceeding to modelling nonlinearity and state-dependency, we perform some 
simple tests which are capable of detecting continuous forms of nonlinearity and state-
dependency. In particular, we follow the general idea of the Ramsey Regression Equation 
Specification Error Test (Ramsey RESET test) and we verify whether polynomial and 
interaction terms are statistically significant once they are included in the baseline model of 
the monetary transmission mechanism. Conversely to common practice, we develop and 
discuss the testing procedure which is based on the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test instead of 
the Wald or likelihood ratio (LR) tests. Such an approach is aimed at providing possibly 
robust evidence of the existence of nonlinearities and state-dependencies in the baseline 
model of the monetary transmission mechanism regardless of the properties of the particular 
unrestricted (nonlinear or state-dependent) model.  
 
5.2 Testing for nonlinearity 
In this subsection we test the null hypothesis of linearity against the alternative hypotheses of 
nonlinearity which may be approximated with the polynomial and interaction terms in the 
spirit of the Taylor formula. At the beginning we perform the standard Ramsey RESET test 
with the use of fitted values from the linear equations, while later we also carry out more 
detailed tests based on the right-hand side variables. As definition 1 (see subsection 1.4) 
states, while testing for nonlinearity we should be interested only in the products and linear 
combinations of variables which are already included in the set of explanatory variables, for 
each equation separately.  
It is important to emphasise that execution of equation specification error tests is not common 
practice in the case of micro-founded models of the monetary transmission mechanism. 
Usually, the functional form of the model is derived in a rigorous way under the DSGE 
framework and is assumed to be correct despite the fact that the model is typically log-
linearised and sometimes estimated in its reduced form. In other words, when it comes to 
estimation, the functional form of the model is usually taken for granted and the results of the 
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specification error tests are not reported. This context makes the results of the Ramsey 
RESET tests all the more interesting.  
 
5.2.1 Standard Ramsey RESET test 
The intuition behind the standard Ramsey RESET test is that the model is wrongly specified if 
the powers of the fitted values obtained from the baseline linear model are statistically 
significant once they are additionally included in that model. Technically, implementation of 
the standard Ramsey RESET test relies on the following two-stage algorithm: 
1. Estimate the model: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑡
𝐼
𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑡        (5.1) 
and collect the fitted values ?̂?𝑡. 
2. Estimate the model: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛾0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑡
𝐼
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗?̂?𝑡
𝑗𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜖𝑡      (5.2) 
and test whether ⋀ 𝜃𝑗 = 0
𝐽
𝑗=1 . 
 
Typically, the joint null hypothesis, ⋀ 𝜃𝑗 = 0
𝐽
𝑗=1 , is tested with the use of the simple F-test or 
Wald test regardless of the residuals’ properties in the unrestricted model. Nevertheless, it is 
easy to generalise the procedure and make it robust to problems with autocorrelation or 
heteroscedasticity of the residuals by substituting the standard variance-covariance matrix 
with a robust one in the formula for the test statistic (see e.g. Stock and Watson 2012, Ch. 
18.3). In particular, the White matrix may be used when the test equation suffers from 
heteroscedasticity, while the Newey-West matrix is suitable if there are problems with 
autocorrelation, or both autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. 
Taking into account that correctly carrying out the Ramsey RESET test requires information 
on residual diagnostic tests for the test equation (i.e. unrestricted model), Table 5.1 reports not 
only the p-values of the standard Ramsey RESET tests but also the p-values of the Breusch-
Godfrey and Breusch-Pagan tests. The results reveal that the output gap equation is the only 
equation which suffers from a wrongly specified functional form. Such an observation is, to 
some extent, consistent with the findings of Stracca (2010), who claimed that the IS curve is 
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not a structural relationship.
48
 At the same time, the inclusion of additional terms raised the p-
value of the Breusch-Pagan test in the output gap equation, which is in line with the point 
made by Kennedy (2008, Ch. 8) that the detected heteroscedasticity may very often be 
perceived as a symptom of an incorrect functional form rather than true heteroscedasticity of 
the error term. Similarly, the additional terms raised the p-value of the Breusch-Godfrey test 
in the case of the inflation equation, which supports the view that problems of an incorrect 
functional form and autocorrelation of the error term are very often interrelated in practice.
49
 
 
Table 5.1 P-values of Ramsey RESET tests and p-values of Breusch-Godfrey and Breusch-Pagan tests for 
Ramsey RESET test equations 
Equation 
 
Maximum 
power (𝐽) 
of fitted terms 
 
𝐻0: additional terms 
jointly insignificant  𝐻0: no autocorrelation  𝐻0: homoscedasticity 
  Ramsey RESET test  Breusch-Godfrey*  Breusch-Pagan 
  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
𝜋𝑡 
 3  0.9592 0.9592  0.3942 0.2890  0.2876 0.2765 
 4  0.6397 0.6376  0.5151 0.3786  0.2545 0.2454 
𝑥𝑡 
 3  0.0050 0.0032  0.5561 0.4320  0.4612 0.4423 
 4  0.0132 0.0088  0.6579 0.5176  0.1751 0.1718 
𝑖𝑡 
 3  0.9801 0.9801  0.7127 0.5917  0.2683 0.2583 
 4  0.6343 0.6321  0.7079 0.5715  0.3506 0.3353 
* up to 12 lags 
 
The literature suggests that the results of the standard Ramsey RESET test should be 
considered with the utmost caution. In particular, Greene (2012, Ch. 5.9) argued that the 
properties of the presented two-stage algorithm, where fitted values from (5.1) enter as 
regressors in (5.2), are dubious. Moreover, the standard Ramsey RESET test ‘gives no 
indication what the researcher should do next if the null model is rejected’ since ‘the rejection 
of the null model does not imply any particular alternative’ (Greene 2012, Ch. 5.9).   
Despite its obvious drawbacks, the standard Ramsey RESET test shows that in the case of the 
output gap equation, the common practice of treating the functional form of the model of the 
monetary transmission mechanism as correct may be somewhat too optimistic. In the next 
paragraph we investigate the problem of misspecification more in-depth, and we try to 
identify the specific explanatory variables which are responsible for contingent nonlinearities. 
 
                                                          
48
 It should be noted, however, that herein the IS curve is estimated in its reduced form and the current real 
interest rate is substituted with the lagged one. 
49
 A classic example is when a linear trend is fitted to data which were generated with the use of the quadratic 
function. Even if the observations lie on only one half of the parabola and the goodness of fit is very high, the 
residuals will be highly autocorrelated.  
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5.2.2 Right-hand side LM version of the RESET-type test for nonlinearity 
The Ramsey RESET test may be modified to include powers of the right-hand side (i.e. 
explanatory) variables rather than powers of the fitted values. It is also possible to expand the 
test equation with some interactions among the explanatory variables in the spirit of the 
Taylor approximation of a multivariable function. However, since the estimation of a complex 
test equation consumes a large number of degrees of freedom and additional terms are highly 
collinear, the practical feasibility of testing is seriously limited by the number of observations. 
Bearing in mind these limitations and the fact that we would like to identify specific 
explanatory variables which are responsible for possible nonlinearities, we may want to test 
whether ⋀ ⋀ 𝜃𝑘𝑖𝑗 = 0
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝐼
𝑖=1  for 𝑘 = 1,… , 𝐼 in the following sequence of equations: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛾𝑘0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑡
𝐼
𝑖=1 + ∑ ∑ 𝜃𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑧𝑘𝑡
𝑗𝐽
𝑗=1
𝐼
𝑖=1 + 𝜖𝑘𝑡   for 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐼 (5.4) 
 
In other words, in every single test equation only one explanatory variable (denoted as 𝑧𝑘𝑡) is 
allowed to be a potential source of nonlinearity. The obvious drawback of such a procedure of 
testing is that we do not control for the overall significance level. On the other hand, when 
testing for various forms or sources of nonlinearity this is the rule rather than the exception 
due to the aforementioned practical limitations. 
Although there exist many ways of testing linearity
50
 the proposed test distinguishes itself 
with a unique set of desirable characteristics – it is: 
 parametric, 
 consistent against many nonlinear alternatives, 
 recommended as a linearity test against some particular nonlinear alternatives, e.g. 
smooth transition autoregressive (𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅) models, which will be estimated in section 6. 
Taking above into consideration, the choice of the proposed test may be seen as a part of the 
adopted framework of modelling nonlinearity. 
A typical approach when testing ⋀ ⋀ 𝜃𝑘𝑖𝑗 = 0
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝐼
𝑖=1  in (5.4) is to estimate the unrestricted 
model and to use the Wald test or to estimate both unrestricted and restricted models and to 
use the LR test. We argue, however, that both solutions are questionable because: 
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 see e.g. Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim, and Granger (2010, Ch. 5 – 7) for discussion and further references. 
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 equation (5.4) serves only as a Taylor-type approximation of an unknown nonlinear 
functional form, the properties of which are not exactly recognised – e.g. a nonlinear 
model may include some parameters which are not identified under the null 
hypothesis. Then both the Wald and LR tests might be invalid. 
 testing whether ⋀ ⋀ 𝜃𝑘𝑖𝑗 = 0
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝐼
𝑖=1  in (5.4) requires having knowledge of the 
residuals’ properties in the unrestricted model. Although in the case of the Wald test 
the problem may be alleviated by applying robust versions of the variance-covariance 
matrix, if residuals in (5.4) are autocorrelated or heteroscedastic, the residuals in (5.4) 
do not necessarily share their properties with an unknown nonlinear model. In the case 
of the LR test the problem of autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity or discrepancy 
between the residuals’ properties in restricted and unrestricted models is difficult to 
overcome because the number of degrees of freedom in the LR statistic depends on the 
difference in the number of parameter space dimensions between the restricted and 
unrestricted model. 
 the Wald test is not invariant to the formulation of (nonlinear) hypotheses and units in 
which the variables are measured, especially in small samples (Kennedy 2008, Ch. 
4.5). Although the hypothesis ⋀ ⋀ 𝜃𝑘𝑖𝑗 = 0
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝐼
𝑖=1  is linear with respect to parameters 
𝜃𝑘𝑖𝑗, the underlying hypothesis linking the unknown nonlinear model and the 
restricted linear model might be nonlinear. Then the method of approximation adopted 
in (5.4) may bias the Wald statistic.   
 
Bearing in mind the limitations of the Wald and LR tests as discussed above, we propose to 
base the testing procedure on the LM test, i.e. the only test of the three which does not require 
that the unrestricted model has to be estimated and favours neither of the locally equivalent 
unknown nonlinear models (see Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim, and Granger 2010, Ch. 5.4) Although 
the three tests are asymptotically equivalent (Engle 1984), the LM test was shown to reject the 
null hypotheses the least often in linear models in small samples. Berndt and Savin (1977) 
proved that the values of the test statistics satisfy the inequality 𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑 ≥ 𝐿𝑅 ≥ 𝐿𝑀. Thus it is 
important to note that the LM test may be somewhat oversized.
51
 On the other hand, Kohler 
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 The discussion provided by Kennedy (2008, Ch. 4.5) concluded that whenever both restricted and unrestricted 
forms of the model are available, the LR test should be preferred in small samples. 
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(1982) showed that all three tests have the same power properties
52
, which means that the 
choice among the three tests may be, at least partially, based on the researcher’s level of 
conservativeness. Since treating the model of the monetary transmission mechanism as linear 
is well grounded and questioning such an approach should be supported with sound evidence, 
we find the conservative LM test to be an appropriate choice. 
By being conservative we also avoid the procedure of carrying out an LM test that is based on 
the outer product of the gradient (OPG) and the uncentred 𝑅2 from the regression of ones on 
the scores; a procedure which was found to result in overestimation of the LM statistic (see 
Kennedy 2008, Ch. 4.5 for a discussion). Instead, we apply the testing procedure that is 
recommended by Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim and Granger (2010, Ch. 5.3): 
 
1. Estimate the model (5.4) under the null hypothesis of linearity, i.e. estimate: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛾0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑡
𝐼
𝑖=1 + 𝜖𝑡        (5.5) 
 
2. Collect the residuals 𝑒𝑡, the number of estimated parameters 𝑝0 and compute the 
residual sum of squares 𝑆𝑆𝑅0. 
3. Estimate the following model: 
 
𝑒𝑡 = 𝛾𝑘0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑡
𝐼
𝑖=1 + ∑ ∑ 𝜃𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑧𝑘𝑡
𝑗𝐽
𝑗=1
𝐼
𝑖=1 + 𝜖𝑘𝑡   for 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐼 (5.6) 
 
4. Collect the number of estimated parameters 𝑝1 and compute the residual sum of 
squares 𝑆𝑆𝑅1 
5. Compute the 𝜒2 or the 𝐹 version of the LM-test statistic: 
 
𝐿𝑀𝜒2 = 𝑇
𝑆𝑆𝑅0−𝑆𝑆𝑅1
𝑆𝑆𝑅0
                              
𝐷
→ 𝜒2(𝑝1 − 𝑝0)   (5.7) 
𝐿𝑀𝐹 =
(𝑆𝑆𝑅0−𝑆𝑆𝑅1)/(𝑝1−𝑝0)
𝑆𝑆𝑅1/(𝑇−𝑝1)
       ~𝐹(𝑝1 − 𝑝0, 𝑇 − 𝑝1).
𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥.    (5.8) 
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 More precisely, once the sizes of the three tests are equalised, their powers will be equal as well, even in small 
samples. 
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Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim and Granger (2010, Ch. 5.3.2 and 16.3.2.) recommended that the 𝜒2 
statistic be used in large samples, while the 𝐹 version should be preferred in small and 
moderate samples due to its much better size properties, especially when the dimension of the 
null hypothesis is large.  
The tests (Table 5.2) performed here show that only the output gap equation exhibits 
statistically significant nonlinearities (with respect to 𝑥𝑡−1) at a 5% significance level and 
only for 𝐽 = 4.53 Taking into account that residuals from our baseline model cease to reveal 
desirable properties when the significance level is raised to 10% (see Table 4.2), we should 
not interpret p-values ∈ [5%; 10%] as evidence of nonlinearity at a 10% significance level. 
 
Table 5.2 P-values of right-hand-side LM RESET-type test for nonlinearity 
𝑧𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
𝜋𝑡−1 0.800 0.734  0.887 0.827  0.828 0.768  0.261 0.207  0.472 0.396  0.499 0.410 
𝑥𝑡−1 0.151 0.122  0.243 0.193  0.149 0.121  0.016 0.018  0.159 0.128  0.249 0.198 
𝑖𝑡−1 0.154 0.124  0.115 0.095  0.674 0.596  0.674 0.579  0.086 0.071  0.206 0.164 
𝜋𝑡 - -  - -  - -  - -  0.371 0.305  0.643 0.548 
𝑥𝑡 - -  - -  - -  - -  0.131 0.106  0.307 0.244 
 
The results obtained here may be perceived as consistent with the results of the standard 
Ramsey RESET test, which also showed that the output gap equation is the only equation that 
suffers from an incorrect (implicitly nonlinear) functional form. We argue, however, that such 
a conclusion is probably too optimistic. In the next paragraph we perform tests which may be 
perceived as an abutment point where testing for nonlinearity meets testing for state-
dependency. Specifically, we verify the existence of indirect forms of nonlinearity according 
to which the model parameters depend on the measures of central tendency or dispersion of 
the model variables. Since the current value of a particular variable may affect the current 
estimates of central tendency or dispersion, the actual relation among model variables may be 
nonlinear. 
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 Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim and Granger (2010, Ch. 16.3.2.) recommended that 𝐽 = 3 be used, while Escribano and 
Jordá (1999) suggested 𝐽 = 4. 
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5.2.3 Testing for indirect forms of nonlinearity 
Many of the theoretical concepts presented in section 2 are consistent with the parameters of 
the Phillips curve, the IS curve or the Taylor rule, being dependant on measures of central 
tendency or dispersion of the equation variables. In some cases such a prediction is explicitly 
put forward (e.g. costly adjustment and Lucas models for the Phillips curve or the cumulative 
prospect theory for the IS curve), while in many other cases the link is implicit or more subtle. 
Foremost, we argue that some of the theoretical concepts behind the nonlinearity of equations 
of the monetary transmission model fail to provide a rigorous distinction between simple 
nonlinearity and state-dependency in which a measure of central tendency is a ‘state’ variable. 
In other words, it is not always unequivocal whether the equation is nonlinear with respect to 
a specific variable or perhaps state-dependent with respect to a point estimate of central 
tendency of that variable. For example, imperfect credibility models propose that the shape of 
the Phillips curve may depend on variables influencing the central bank’s credibility – since 
the exhaustive set of such variables is unknown, one may expect that not only the actual level 
but also the average level and variance of inflation or the output gap may affect the central 
bank’s credibility. Under such circumstances testing for indirect forms of nonlinearity may be 
seen as a robustness check for the results of the standard nonlinearity tests.  
Second, point estimates of central tendency or dispersion for the inflation, output gap and 
interest rate may serve as proxies of the business or monetary cycle. Since many of the 
discussed concepts predict that the equation parameters may vary along the business or 
monetary cycle (e.g. as in the case of the IS curve), it seems reasonable to express such cycles 
in terms of point estimates of central tendency or dispersion for endogenous variables.  
Taking the above into consideration, we propose to test indirect forms of nonlinearity of the 
monetary transmission equations with respect to two simple measures – one of central 
tendency and one of dispersion. We estimate the point measures of central tendency and 
dispersion with the sample mean (𝑆𝑀 – sample mean) and sample unbiased variance (𝑆𝑉 – 
sample variance), respectively, over a four-quarter horizon.
54
 
The procedure of testing is similar as in the previous paragraph but is based on a slightly 
modified battery of test equations which take into account that state variables do not explicitly 
                                                          
54
 The formulas are as follows: 𝑦𝑡
𝑆𝑀 =
1
4
∑ 𝑦𝑡−𝑖
3
𝑖=0  for the sample mean and 𝑦𝑡
𝑆𝑉 =
1
3
∑ (𝑦𝑡−𝑖 − 𝑦𝑡
𝑆𝑀)23𝑖=0  for 
sample variance. 
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but only implicitly belong to the set of explanatory variables in the baseline linear model. 
Instead of (5.6), the test equations take the following form: 
 
𝑒𝑡 = 𝛾𝑘0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑡
𝐼
𝑖=1 +∑ 𝜗𝑘𝑗𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗𝐽
𝑗=1 + ∑ ∑ 𝜃𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗𝐽
𝑗=1
𝐼
𝑖=1 + 𝜖𝑘𝑡  for 𝑘 = 1,… , 𝐾 (5.9) 
 
The term ∑ 𝜗𝑘𝑗𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗𝐽
𝑗=1  captures the possibility of the standard omitted variable problem, which 
was non-existent in the previous paragraph, while the term ∑ ∑ 𝜃𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗𝐽
𝑗=1
𝐼
𝑖=1  refers to more 
complex forms of state-dependency according to which the parameters on the explanatory 
variables are functions of variable 𝑠𝑘𝑡. Taking both terms into consideration, in line with the 
presented procedure of testing, we test the null hypotheses that ⋀ ⋀ 𝜗𝑘𝑖𝑗 = 0
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝐼
𝑖=1  and 
⋀ ⋀ 𝜃𝑘𝑖𝑗 = 0
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝐼
𝑖=1  for 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾. 
The tests (Table 5.3) performed here show that in many cases the null hypothesis of linearity 
is rejected at a standard 5% significance level. Specifically, every equation exhibits 
statistically significant state-dependency with respect to at least one measure of central 
tendency, while the interest rate equation is additionally state-dependent with respect to 
sample variance of the output gap. 
 
Table 5.3 P-values of tests for indirect forms of nonlinearity 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum power 
𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
𝜋𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  0.211 0.168  0.288 0.224  0.074 0.064  0.030 0.032  0.094 0.079  0.095 0.082 
𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  0.415 0.335  0.658 0.543  0.035 0.033  0.014 0.019  0.092 0.077  0.066 0.061 
𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  0.014 0.016  0.024 0.027  0.464 0.377  0.114 0.096  0.006 0.008  0.004 0.008 
𝜋𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉  0.978 0.959  0.982 0.959  0.403 0.324  0.632 0.517  0.230 0.183  0.198 0.157 
𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉  0.432 0.350  0.208 0.164  0.223 0.177  0.277 0.217  0.005 0.007  0.018 0.023 
𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉  0.351 0.280  0.276 0.215  0.060 0.053  0.129 0.107  0.607 0.511  0.421 0.329 
 
Although it is infeasible to precisely verify the theoretical concepts presented in paragraphs 
2.2.2, 2.3.2 and 2.4.2 before estimation of the models incorporating the detected state-
dependencies, we suggest some ‘potential consistency’ links between the detected state-
dependencies and the aforementioned theoretical concepts. 
The inflation equation exhibits robust state-dependency with respect to the measure of central 
tendency of the interest rate. The explanation for this may be twofold. First, the interest rate is 
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highly correlated with the (central bankers’) inflation expectations, which may give support 
to, e.g. costly adjustment or downward wage rigidity models. Moreover, the average level of 
the interest rate may serve as a proxy of the central bank’s willingness to curb inflation, which 
is potentially consistent with imperfect credibility models.  
In the case of the output gap equation, state-dependency is detected with respect to the 
measure of central tendency of the output gap. Such an observation is potentially consistent 
with the phenomena of flight to quality and liquidity, credit channel theory and cumulative 
prospect theory. Furthermore, a sample mean of inflation was also found to be a source of 
state-dependency of the output gap equation. Although none of the concepts presented in 
paragraph 2.3.2 explicitly put forward such a relationship, the result may be perceived as 
possibly coherent with the phenomena of flight to quality and liquidity (the inflation 
influences the market sentiment) or the credit channel theory (the inflation has an impact on 
the enterprises’ balance sheets and the relative wealth of the lenders and borrowers). 
The interest rate equation is found to be state-dependent with respect to the measure of the 
central tendency of the interest rate. The result may give support to an opportunistic approach 
to disinflation and the importance of the zero lower bound. Additionally, the detected state-
dependency with respect to the measure of dispersion of the output gap is potentially 
consistent with the central bankers’ non-convex loss function and nonlinear weighting of 
probabilities, as well as uncertainty models (3) and (4) in paragraph 2.4.2. It is also worth 
noting that the revealed state-dependencies may be linked to some aspects of the Greenspan 
standard reported in subsection 3.6 which are hardly distinguishable from the general 
concepts behind the nonlinearity or state-dependency of the Taylor rule. 
 
5.3 Testing for state-dependency 
Similarly as in the previous subsection, here we test the null hypothesis of state-independency 
against the alternative hypotheses of state-dependency which may be approximated with the 
polynomial and interaction terms in the spirit of the Taylor formula. The general idea of 
testing is analogous as in the previous paragraph and is based on the same form of test 
equations (5.9). 
In this subsection, however, we test for state-dependency with respect to variables that do not 
explicitly depend on endogenous variables. The choice of potential ‘state’ variables is based 
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on the literature survey – the selected variables are grouped into 10 main categories which 
correspond to the theoretical sources of state-dependency which were discussed in sections 2 
and 3. Paragraphs 5.3.1 – 5.3.4 are supposed to meet the general premises behind the state-
dependency of the monetary transmission mechanism (section 2), while paragraphs 5.3.5 – 
5.3.10 are related to premises which are specific to the Greenspan era (section 3). 
Whenever there are many variables which may serve as proxies of sources of state-
dependency and the choice among them seems to be very subjective, we tend to test for state-
dependency with respect to a broad set of potential ‘state’ variables. Such a procedure may be 
seen as a built-in robustness check. It is also important to emphasise that we are not 
particularly interested in state-dependency with respect to specific individual variables but 
with respect to the discussed sources of state-dependency which are only approximated by the 
selected (proxy) variables. 
Before proceeding with the testing, we orthogonalise every potential ‘state’ variable against 
the time trend and the model variables.
55
 The first treatment aims to explicitly separate the 
problem of state-dependency from the problem of time-dependency because some variables, 
although globally stationary, may exhibit trends during the estimation sample. The second 
modification helps to alleviate the fact that many macroeconomic variables, including those 
chosen as potential ‘state’ variables, are highly collinear and correlated with the model 
variables. In consequence, it would be naive to perceive a simple three-equation monetary 
transmission model as a closed-loop system. Then a proposed orthogonalisation allows, with 
very careful forethought, to treat the potential ‘state’ variables as being exogenous during 
estimating of the model and calculating the generalised impulse response functions.
56
      
 
5.3.1 State-dependency with respect to measures of business cycle and climate 
Many of the concepts presented in section 2 predict that equations constituting the monetary 
transmission mechanism may be state-dependent with respect to measures of business cycle 
and climate. Capacity constraint models explicitly claim that the slope of the Phillips curve 
should depend on the level of capacity utilisation, while the concepts of procyclical 
competitiveness or procyclical elasticity of demand propose that parameters of the Phillips 
                                                          
55
 Technically, we collect residuals from simple regression in which a ‘state’ variable is a dependent variable, 
while the constant, time trend, 𝜋𝑡, 𝑥𝑡 and 𝑖𝑡 are explanatory variables. 
56
 Again, it is important to note that concepts of linearly independent, orthogonal and uncorrelated variables are 
not equivalent (Rodgers, Nicewander and Toothaker 1984). 
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curve may vary along the business cycle. Similarly, the credit channel theory and concepts of 
flight to quality/liquidity predict that the slope of the IS curve may depend on the level of 
economic activity, business climate and market sentiment. Consumer sentiment is also an 
intuitive variable that may affect the level of reference point which is believed to influence the 
shape of the IS curve according to the cumulative prospect theory. Finally, business climate 
measures may play a fundamental role in shaping the Taylor rule, e.g. when central bankers 
have asymmetric preferences, follow the opportunistic approach to disinflation or are 
uncertain about the level of economic activity or model’s parameters. 
Taking the above considerations into account, we test the state-dependency of monetary 
transmission with respect to four measures of the business cycle and climate as presented in 
Table 5.4 (see Appendix A.5 for a detailed description of the data). 
 
Table 5.4. The selected measures of business cycle and climate 
Tag   Short description 
𝑐𝑢𝑡  Capacity utilization 
𝑎𝑖_𝑚𝑎𝑡  Chicago Fed National Activity Index: three month moving average 
𝑎𝑖_𝑑𝑖𝑡  Chicago Fed National Activity Index: diffusion index 
𝑐𝑠𝑡  University of Michigan: Consumer Sentiment Index©  
 
The obtained results (see Table 5.5) suggest that the shape of the monetary transmission 
mechanism may vary along the business cycle mainly due to the state-dependency of the 
output gap and the interest rate equations, which exhibit statistically significant state-
dependency with respect to each time series and the results are almost insensitive to the 
choice of maximum power (𝐽 = 3 or 𝐽 = 4) and the test statistic (𝐹 or 𝜒2). Surprisingly, 
although many of the concepts discussed in Section 2 predict that the slope of the Phillips 
curve may be a function of business cycle stage, there is no evidence to support such claims. 
 
Table 5.5 P-values of tests for state-dependency with respect to measures of business cycle and climate 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
𝑐𝑢𝑡 0.268 0.213  0.532 0.424  0.030 0.030  0.044 0.044  0.000 0.001  0.001 0.003 
𝑎𝑖_𝑚𝑎𝑡 0.099 0.083  0.097 0.084  0.001 0.002  0.001 0.003  0.005 0.007  0.014 0.018 
𝑎𝑖_𝑑𝑖𝑡 0.201 0.160  0.295 0.230  0.002 0.003  0.000 0.001  0.014 0.016  0.026 0.029 
𝑐𝑠𝑡 0.119 0.098  0.152 0.123  0.006 0.008  0.031 0.033  0.010 0.012  0.007 0.011 
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5.3.2 State-dependency with respect to measures of labour market conditions 
Labour market conditions play a fundamental role in downward wage rigidity models which 
suggest that the slope of the Phillips curve is flatter when the labour market is in the 
doldrums. Some implicit relations also exist between the shape of the labour market and 
models of consumers’ behaviour and the concept of procyclical elasticity of demand because 
the consumers’ purchasing power crucially depends on the situation on the labour market. By 
the same token, labour market conditions influence the consumers’ reference point which is 
critical for the shape of the IS curve according to the cumulative prospect theory. Since the 
Federal Reserve’s dual mandate obliges central bankers to achieve full employment, one may 
also expect that the standing of the labour market may result in state-dependency of the 
Taylor rule, especially if central bankers have asymmetric preferences or are proponents of 
the opportunistic approach to disinflation. 
The state-dependency is tested with respect to four measures of the labour market conditions 
as listed in Table 5.6 (see Appendix A.5 for a detailed description of the data).  
 
Table 5.6 The selected measures of labour market conditions 
Tag   Short description 
𝑢𝑟𝑡  Civilian unemployment rate 
𝑤&𝑠𝑡  Compensation of employees: wages and salaries, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
𝑙𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑡  Civilian labour force participation rate 
𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡  Labour Market Conditions Index 
 
The outcomes (see Table 5.7) are sensitive to the selection of the ‘state’ variable but robust 
with respect to the choice of the maximum power (𝐽 = 3 or 𝐽 = 4) and the test statistic (𝐹 or 
𝜒2). The most robust evidence for state-dependency is found in the case of the output gap and 
interest rate equations with respect to the overall index of labour market conditions. At the 
same time, the dynamics of wages and salaries influence the shape of the inflation and output 
gap equations, although in the latter case the results are sensitive whether 𝐽 = 3 or 𝐽 = 4. The 
detected state-dependency of the inflation equation with respect to the dynamics of wages and 
salaries may be perceived as consistent with the existence of downward wage rigidity. 
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Table 5.7 P-values of tests for state-dependency with respect to measures of labour market conditions 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
𝑢𝑟𝑡 0.208 0.166  0.471 0.371  0.526 0.434  0.678 0.563  0.802 0.720  0.583 0.471 
𝑤&𝑠𝑡 0.011 0.013  0.025 0.029  0.031 0.031  0.068 0.062  0.218 0.173  0.356 0.277 
𝑙𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑡 0.082 0.070  0.152 0.123  0.146 0.118  0.167 0.134  0.445 0.361  0.339 0.263 
𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡 0.670 0.575  0.835 0.739  0.003 0.005  0.001 0.002  0.002 0.004  0.001 0.004 
 
5.3.3 State-dependency with respect to measures of financial conditions 
Although the general premises behind state-dependency which were discussed in section 2 
predict no explicit relation between financial conditions and the shape of the Phillips curve, 
one may argue that implicit links are existent; for example, the enterprises’ ability to invest in 
production capacity (capacity constraint models) may be seriously restrained by the current 
financial climate in the economy. Similarly, financial conditions may influence the pricing 
behaviour of enterprises via effects on barriers to enter the market, which play an important 
role in models of the firms’ strategic behaviour in an imperfectly competitive environment 
(e.g. limit pricing as entry deterrent or procyclical competitiveness). On the contrary, there is 
no doubt that the financial conditions are crucial for the shape of the IS curve – the concepts 
of flight to quality or liquidity and the credit channel theory find the situation on the financial 
market to be crucial for the slope of the IS curve. As far as the Taylor rule is concerned, 
financial conditions may be important when the zero lower bound is close to be binding or 
when the central bank uses its verbal power to influence the dynamics of some financial 
indicators via the expectations channel (e.g. providing the financial market with forward 
guidance). Moreover, conducting the robust policy in the presence of the models’ parameter 
uncertainty may require analysing the behaviour of many financial indicators; for example, a 
typical assumption of complete or at least constant pass-through between the federal funds 
rate and the interest rate faced by enterprises can (sometimes) be violated. Then the interest 
rate rule may exhibit state-dependency with respect to the shape of the financial market where 
the pass-through takes place. 
To supplement the above considerations, it is important to note that state-dependency with 
respect to measures of financial conditions (the general premises behind state-dependency) 
might hardly be distinguishable from state-dependency with respect to measures of financial 
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development and the Greenspan standard of conducting the monetary policy (premises behind 
state-dependency which are specific to the Greenspan era). 
Since there are many indicators which may serve as variables describing the financial 
conditions, we grouped them into four main subcategories: financial conditions indices and 
subindices, monetary aggregates, interest rate quality spreads and indicators of the credit 
portfolio. The selected variables are listed in Table 5.8, in which the dashed line separates the 
aforementioned subgroups (see Appendix A.5 for a detailed description of the data). 
 
Table 5.8 The selected measures of financial conditions 
Tag   Short description 
Indices of financial conditions 
𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑖𝑡  CredAbility Consumer Distress Index
57 
𝑓𝑐𝑛𝑙𝑠𝑡  Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Nonfinancial Leveral Subindex 
𝑓𝑐𝑙𝑠𝑡  Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Leverage Subindex 
𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑡  Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Credit Subindex 
𝑓𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑡  Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Risk Subindex 
𝑎𝑓𝑐𝑖𝑡  Chicago Fed Adjusted National Financial Conditions Index 
𝑓𝑐𝑖𝑡  Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Index 
Monetary aggregates 
𝑚𝑏𝑡  Board of governors monetary base, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
𝑚𝑏_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  Board of governors monetary base to gross domestic product (nominal ratio) 
𝑚𝑧𝑚𝑡  MZM (money zero maturity) stock, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
𝑚2𝑡  M2 money stock, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
Interest rate quality spreads 
𝑏𝑎𝑎_𝑖𝑡  Moody's seasoned Baa corporate bond minus federal funds rate 
𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑖𝑡  Moody's seasoned Aaa corporate bond minus federal funds rate 
Quality of credit portfolio 
𝑙𝑙𝑟_𝑡𝑙𝑡  Loan loss reserve to total loans for all U.S. banks 
𝑓𝑎𝑡𝑡  Number of failures and assistance transactions of all institutions for the United States 
𝑛𝑙_𝑡𝑙𝑡  Nonperforming loans to total loans for all U.S. banks 
𝑑𝑟𝑡  Delinquency rate on all loans 
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑡  Charge-off rate on all loans 
 
The results of the state-dependency tests (see Table 5.9) are highly sensitive to the choice of 
potential ‘state’ variable. Among the investigated variables, the CredAbility Consumer 
Distress Index
57
, nonperforming loans to total loans ratio and delinquency rate on all loans are 
the only variables which are found to be significant for all of the equations. On the contrary, 
the Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Index and Moody’s seasoned Baa corporate 
bond minus federal funds rate are the only variables which are insignificant in the performed 
tests for all of the equations no matter what the choice of 𝐽 (3 or 4) and test statistic (𝐹 or 𝜒2) 
                                                          
57
 ‘CredAbility Consumer Distress Index’ is a name invented by ClearPoint Credit Counseling Solutions 
(formerly CredAbility) – see www.credability.org. 
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is. As far as distinguished subgroups are concerned, the interest rate quality spreads are found 
to be irrelevant for all of the equations. In the case of the other three groups, for every 
equation at least three variables from each group are found to be significant ‘state’ variables. 
Overall, out of the 72 test statistics for every equation, 30, 28 and 34 are significant for the 
inflation, output gap, and interest rate equations, respectively. 
 
Table 5.9 P-values of tests for state-dependency with respect to measures of financial conditions 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
Indices of financial conditions 
𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑖𝑡 0.004 0.006  0.062 0.058  0.017 0.018  0.018 0.022  0.006 0.008  0.019 0.023 
𝑓𝑐𝑛𝑙𝑠𝑡 0.732 0.642  0.035 0.037  0.507 0.417  0.078 0.070  0.012 0.014  0.018 0.023 
𝑓𝑐𝑙𝑠𝑡 0.615 0.520  0.516 0.410  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.001  0.036 0.034  0.037 0.039 
𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑡 0.012 0.014  0.038 0.039  0.003 0.005  0.005 0.009  0.205 0.163  0.064 0.059 
𝑓𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑡 0.033 0.032  0.006 0.010  0.207 0.165  0.493 0.390  0.420 0.339  0.179 0.143 
𝑎𝑓𝑐𝑖
𝑡
 0.001 0.003  0.003 0.006  0.223 0.177  0.284 0.221  0.013 0.015  0.002 0.005 
𝑓𝑐𝑖𝑡 0.616 0.520  0.367 0.286  0.089 0.075  0.072 0.065  0.716 0.624  0.293 0.228 
Monetary aggregates 
𝑚𝑏𝑡 0.040 0.038  0.168 0.135  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.002  0.737 0.646  0.538 0.430 
𝑚𝑏_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 0.454 0.369  0.152 0.124  0.318 0.253  0.535 0.427  0.116 0.096  0.058 0.054 
𝑚𝑧𝑚𝑡 0.593 0.498  0.531 0.423  0.060 0.053  0.148 0.121  0.002 0.003  0.015 0.019 
𝑚2𝑡 0.641 0.546  0.655 0.540  0.451 0.366  0.430 0.337  0.002 0.004  0.000 0.000 
Interest rate quality spreads 
𝑏𝑎𝑎_𝑖𝑡 0.488 0.399  0.755 0.644  0.075 0.064  0.222 0.175  0.610 0.515  0.553 0.443 
𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑖𝑡 0.371 0.297  0.702 0.588  0.276 0.219  0.546 0.436  0.583 0.488  0.340 0.265 
Quality of credit portfolio 
𝑙𝑙𝑟_𝑡𝑙𝑡 0.325 0.259  0.202 0.160  0.108 0.090  0.309 0.240  0.024 0.025  0.103 0.088 
𝑓𝑎𝑡𝑡 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.423 0.342  0.483 0.381  0.298 0.237  0.454 0.357 
𝑛𝑙_𝑡𝑙𝑡 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.011 0.013  0.038 0.039  0.024 0.025  0.010 0.015 
𝑑𝑟𝑡 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.001 0.002  0.006 0.010  0.013 0.015  0.004 0.008 
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑡 0.185 0.148  0.062 0.058  0.031 0.030  0.006 0.010  0.137 0.111  0.276 0.215 
 
5.3.4 State-dependency with respect to measures of uncertainty 
Rational inattention models predict that economic agents pay relatively more attention to 
more volatile shocks. Then what matters for the slope of the Phillips curve is not the absolute 
but rather the relative uncertainty of inflation. In consequence, more general measures of 
uncertainty may also influence the shape of the Phillips curve. According to Bloom’s concept 
of the role of uncertainty shocks (Bloom 2009), increased uncertainty makes economic agents 
temporarily irresponsive to other shocks, but when uncertainty eases the impulses are 
propagated more strongly with some lag. As a result, the slope of the IS curve should be a 
function of uncertainty. Since uncertainty is also one of the fundamental factors driving 
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sentiment on the financial market and its pricing mechanism, one may also expect that 
measures of uncertainty should affect the shape of the IS curve via the credit channel and 
flight to quality and liquidity. Uncertainty about the level of economic activity (or other 
variables of interest), by analogy to Bloom’s concept of the role of uncertainty shocks (Bloom 
2009), may influence the central bankers’ responsiveness to inflation and output gaps, thus 
making the Taylor rule state-dependent. 
Finally, it is also worth recalling Bloom’s (2009) finding that periods of increased uncertainty 
often correspond with economic and financial crises (see paragraph 3.5.2.). Then the effects 
of uncertainty and crises might be difficult to tell apart. 
We test for state-dependency of the monetary transmission mechanism with respect to two 
measures of uncertainty as were developed by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2013) (see Table 
5.10). 
 
Table 5.10 The selected measures of uncertainty 
Tag   Short description 
𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑖𝑡  Economic Policy Uncertainty Index for United States by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2013) 
𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑡  Equity Market-related Economic Uncertainty Index by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2013) 
 
The results we obtain (see Table 5.11) show that the output gap and the interest rate equations 
exhibit state-dependency with respect to both measures of uncertainty (with some sensitivity 
to the choice of 𝐽), while no such relation is detected for the inflation equation. 
 
Table 5.11 P-values of tests for state-dependency with respect to measures of uncertainty 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑖𝑡 0.331 0.264  0.533 0.425  0.003 0.005  0.007 0.011  0.043 0.040  0.118 0.099 
𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑡 0.383 0.307  0.304 0.236  0.082 0.069  0.048 0.047  0.007 0.010  0.011 0.016 
 
5.3.5 State-dependency with respect to measures of globalisation 
As was discussed in subsection 3.3, globalisation may be an important factor standing behind 
the flattening of the Phillips curve in the Greenspan era (especially when compared to earlier 
Fed presidencies). On the other hand, there was only little theoretical and empirical support 
107 
 
for the hypothesis that globalisation may affect the shape of the IS curve. As far as the Taylor 
rule is concerned, the impact of globalisation was discussed to operate through at least three 
channels – one reinforces the problems of uncertainty while the other two call for 
modifications in the monetary policy strategy. 
The selected potential ‘state’ variables were divided into two subgroups corresponding to 
world and U.S. economies, respectively (see Table 5.12 for a short and Appendix A.5 for a 
detailed description of the data). Similarly as before, the dashed line separates the two groups. 
 
Table 5.12 The selected measures of globalisation 
Tag   Short description 
World data 
𝑤𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  World gross domestic product, constant 2005 dollar, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
𝑤𝑠_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  World gross savings, percent of world gross domestic product (nominal ratio) 
𝑤𝑑𝑠_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  World gross domestic savings, percent of world gross domestic product (nominal ratio) 
𝑤𝑒_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  World exports of goods and services, percent of world gross domestic product, (nominal ratio) 
U.S. data 
𝑒_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  Real exports of goods and services, percent of real gross domestic product (real ratio) 
𝑖_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  Real imports exports of goods and services, percent of real gross domestic product (real ratio) 
𝑐𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  Balance on current account, percent of gross domestic product (nominal ratio) 
𝑎𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  U.S. assets abroad, percent of gross domestic product (nominal ratio) 
𝑓𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  Foreign assets in the U.S., percent of gross domestic product (nominal ratio) 
𝑢𝑠𝑑𝑡  Trade weighted U.S. dollar index, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 
Table 5.13 P-values of tests for state-dependency with respect to measures of globalisation 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
World data 
𝑤𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 0.089 0.075  0.081 0.072  0.053 0.048  0.107 0.091  0.019 0.020  0.086 0.075 
𝑤𝑠_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 0.046 0.043  0.086 0.076  0.048 0.043  0.064 0.059  0.422 0.341  0.088 0.077 
𝑤𝑑𝑠_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 0.059 0.052  0.114 0.096  0.072 0.062  0.064 0.059  0.414 0.334  0.617 0.503 
𝑤𝑒_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 0.417 0.336  0.652 0.537  0.053 0.047  0.049 0.048  0.048 0.044  0.116 0.098 
U.S. data 
𝑒_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 0.052 0.047  0.105 0.090  0.209 0.166  0.264 0.206  0.035 0.034  0.159 0.129 
𝑖_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 0.170 0.137  0.392 0.305  0.095 0.080  0.084 0.074  0.120 0.099  0.115 0.096 
𝑐𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 0.000 0.001  0.000 0.002  0.000 0.001  0.001 0.003  0.439 0.356  0.275 0.214 
𝑎𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 0.060 0.053  0.112 0.095  0.069 0.060  0.114 0.096  0.667 0.572  0.867 0.780 
𝑓𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 0.140 0.113  0.127 0.105  0.225 0.179  0.159 0.129  0.640 0.545  0.661 0.546 
𝑢𝑠𝑑𝑡 0.265 0.211  0.384 0.299  0.753 0.664  0.765 0.656  0.411 0.331  0.310 0.241 
 
In the case of variables describing the world economy, the results of the state-dependency 
tests (see Table 5.13) are highly sensitive to the choice of ‘state’ variable, 𝐽 (3 or 4) or test 
statistic (𝐹 or 𝜒2). The most robust detection of state-dependency is reported for the inflation 
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and output gap equations with respect to the balance on the current account expressed as a 
percentage of the GDP. 
 
5.3.6 State-dependency with respect to measures of composition of the economy 
Among the many structural changes of the U.S. economy which were discussed in subsection 
3.4, we distinguished a pure composition effect. We argued that since the slopes of sectoral 
Phillips and IS curves may substantially vary among different sectors, the slopes of the 
aggregate Phillips and IS curve should follow the evolution of the economy’s composition. 
Such an environment should induce the monetary authorities to adjust their policy in line with 
the observed changes. Structural changes may also be perceived as an additional source of 
uncertainty due to problems with estimating the permanent and transitory components in real 
time. In consequence, one may expect that the changing composition of the economy should 
exert some influence on the shape of the Taylor rule. 
We propose to test state-dependency with respect to two simple measures of composition of 
the economy as listed in Table 5.14 (see Appendix A.5 for a detailed description of the data). 
 
Table 5.14 The selected measures of composition of the economy 
Tag   Short description 
𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡  Labour share in nonfarm business sector 
𝑠𝑣𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  Services: value added: percent of gross domestic product (nominal ratio) 
 
We find that none of the selected variables is significant for the inflation equation, while both 
variables are significant for the output gap equation (see Table 5.15). The interest rate 
equation exhibits significant state-dependency only with respect to labour share, but the 
results are sensitive to the choice of 𝐽. 
 
Table 5.15. P-values of tests for state-dependency with respect to measures of composition of the economy 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
Maximum 
power 
 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 
 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum  
power 
 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡 0.125 0.102  0.321 0.250  0.008 0.010  0.019 0.023  0.001 0.002  0.001 0.003 
𝑠𝑣𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 0.183 0.146  0.154 0.125  0.003 0.005  0.011 0.016  0.399 0.321  0.340 0.265 
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5.3.7 State-dependency with respect to measures of potential growth and development 
In subsection 3.4 we argued that rapid development of information and computer technology 
was potent to influence the shape of the Phillips curve through many potential channels (e.g. 
via lowering the costs of price changes and logistics or facilitating price comparisons and 
forecasts but increasing uncertainty). At the same time, the influence of the rapid development 
of ICT on the IS curve seemed to be operating mainly through better access to information 
and forecasts and increased uncertainty related to the ongoing structural changes.
58
 As we 
emphasised in the previous paragraph and in paragraph 3.4.3, the same channels could also 
influence the Taylor rule. 
Here we test for state-dependency with respect to variables which might be seen as proxies of 
the effects of ICT development rather than the ICT development itself. It is also worth noting 
that the selected variables cover a broader set of processes that might have boosted 
technological progress. Naturally, such a choice of ‘state’ variables is partially imposed by 
data availability, but we also argue that ICT development was a prerequisite for progress in 
many other closely related areas (e.g. development of financial services and innovations and 
the emergence of knowledge economy). Since such processes are prolonged in time, using the 
potential GDP, R&D or number of patents applications as transition variables seems to be a 
sensible choice (see Table 5.16 for a short and Appendix A.5 for a detailed description of the 
data). 
 
Table 5.16 The selected measures of potential growth and development 
Tag   Short description 
𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡  
Real potential gross domestic product, chained 2009 dollars, annualised percent change from 
quarter ago 
𝑟𝑑_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
Real gross domestic product: research and development, percent of real gross domestic product, 
chained 2009 dollars (real ratio) 
𝑟𝑑𝑡  
Gross domestic product: research and development, chained 2009 dollars, annualised percent 
change from quarter ago 
𝑝𝑎_𝑟𝑡  Patent applications, residents, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
𝑝𝑎_𝑟𝑛𝑡  Patent applications, residents + nonresidents, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 
The test results (see Table 5.17) show that all three equations exhibit significant state-
dependency with respect to potential growth. Moreover, research and development outlays to 
the GDP ratio are a source of state-dependency in the case of the inflation equation. 
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 In the next paragraph we analyse state-dependency with respect to measures of financial development, which 
is closely related to the development of information and computer technology. 
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Table 5.17 P-values of tests for state-dependency with respect to measures of potential growth and development 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.006 0.008  0.004 0.007  0.049 0.045  0.004 0.008 
𝑟𝑑_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.307 0.244  0.490 0.387  0.144 0.117  0.257 0.201 
𝑟𝑑𝑡 0.196 0.156  0.367 0.285  0.237 0.188  0.427 0.334  0.616 0.521  0.787 0.680 
𝑝𝑎_𝑟𝑡 0.494 0.405  0.761 0.652  0.784 0.700  0.612 0.498  0.773 0.687  0.628 0.513 
𝑝𝑎_𝑟𝑛𝑡 0.638 0.543  0.859 0.769  0.344 0.274  0.597 0.484  0.302 0.240  0.219 0.173 
 
5.3.8 State-dependency with respect to measures of financial development 
Financial development is yet another manifestation of structural changes in the U.S. economy 
apart from the two that were considered in the last two paragraphs. As we discussed in 
subsection 3.4, financial innovations were potent to affect the shape of the IS curve (e.g. via 
eroding the monopolistic positon of the central bank as a provider of means of payment, 
dampening the credit channel of the monetary policy or facilitating intertemporal substitution 
of income and cash flows). We also argued that such structural changes may call for some 
important strategic and operational modification of the monetary policy framework. At the 
same time, however, in the literature we found no theoretical support for the financial 
development impact on the shape of the Phillips curve. 
 
Table 5.18 The selected measures of financial development of the economy 
Tag   Short description 
Money supply to GDP ratios 
𝑚𝑧𝑚_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  MZM (money zero maturity) stock to gross domestic product (nominal ratio) 
𝑚2_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  M2 money stock to gross domestic product (nominal ratio) 
Bank assets ratios 
𝑡𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  Total assets at all commercial banks, percent of gross domestic product (nominal ratio) 
𝑏𝑐_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  Bank credit at all commercial banks, percent of gross domestic product (nominal ratio) 
𝑏𝑐_𝑑𝑡  Bank credit at all commercial banks, percent of deposits of all commercial banks 
𝑐𝑙_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  Consumer loans at all commercial banks, percent of gross domestic product (nominal ratio) 
𝑟𝑒𝑙_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  Real estate loans at all commercial banks, percent of gross domestic product (nominal ratio) 
𝑡𝑎𝑠_𝑡𝑎𝑡  
Treasury and agency securities at all commercial banks, percent of total assets of all commercial 
banks 
𝑙𝑡𝑑_𝑑𝑡  Large time deposits at all commercial banks, percent of deposits of all commercial banks 
𝑛𝑓𝑏_𝑐𝑏𝑡  Total assets of nonfinancial corporate business, percent of total assets of all commercial banks 
Other measures 
𝑚𝑓_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
Money market mutual funds: total financial assets, percent of gross domestic product (nominal 
ratio) 
𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑡  Net interest margin for all U.S. banks 
𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑡  Return on average assets for all U.S. banks 
𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑘_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  Wilshire 5000 Full Cap Price Index©, percent of gross domestic product (nominal ratio) 
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Similarly as in the previous paragraph, we test for state-dependency with respect to variables 
which might be seen as proxies of some effects of financial development rather than the 
financial development itself. In particular, we use a broad set of variables which may be 
perceived as measures of financialisation of the economy, i.e. money supply to GDP ratios 
and various bank asset ratios (see Table 5.18 for a short and Appendix A.5 for a detailed 
description of the data). 
Surprisingly, despite the lack of strong theoretical support, we find that the inflation equation 
is state-dependent with respect to the largest number of selected transition variables (9 out of 
14) (see Table 5.19). On the other hand, the output gap and interest rate equations are found 
to be state-dependent with respect to only 3 out of 14 variables, although there was strong 
theoretical justification suggesting state-dependency of the IS curve. Moreover, one detection 
is sensitive to the choice of 𝐽 (3 or 4). 
 
Table 5.19 P-values of tests for state-dependency with respect to measures of financial development of the 
economy 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
Money supply to GDP ratios 
𝑚𝑧𝑚_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.001 0.002  0.000 0.002  0.161 0.130  0.202 0.160 
𝑚2_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.608 0.513  0.798 0.694  0.607 0.512  0.486 0.384 
Bank assets ratios 
𝑡𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 0.001 0.002  0.004 0.008  0.653 0.557  0.825 0.727  0.628 0.532  0.186 0.148 
𝑏𝑐_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 0.008 0.010  0.032 0.034  0.755 0.667  0.838 0.742  0.626 0.530  0.301 0.235 
𝑏𝑐_𝑑𝑡 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.421 0.340  0.458 0.360  0.222 0.177  0.227 0.179 
𝑐𝑙_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 0.920 0.871  0.733 0.621  0.088 0.074  0.033 0.035  0.540 0.447  0.582 0.470 
𝑟𝑒𝑙_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.148 0.120  0.113 0.095  0.505 0.415  0.187 0.149 
𝑡𝑎𝑠_𝑡𝑎𝑡 0.087 0.074  0.182 0.145  0.298 0.237  0.100 0.086  0.116 0.095  0.140 0.115 
𝑙𝑡𝑑_𝑑𝑡 0.001 0.002  0.002 0.006  0.582 0.488  0.382 0.297  0.246 0.195  0.283 0.221 
𝑛𝑓𝑏_𝑐𝑏𝑡 0.235 0.187  0.180 0.144  0.158 0.128  0.279 0.218  0.088 0.074  0.041 0.041 
Other measures 
𝑚𝑓_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 0.294 0.234  0.401 0.313  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.003 0.004  0.007 0.012 
𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑡 0.009 0.011  0.000 0.002  0.064 0.056  0.148 0.121  0.172 0.138  0.188 0.150 
𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑡 0.061 0.054  0.042 0.043  0.519 0.428  0.233 0.183  0.087 0.074  0.098 0.085 
𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑘_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 0.001 0.002  0.002 0.004  0.350 0.280  0.514 0.408  0.267 0.212  0.194 0.154 
 
5.3.9 State-dependency with respect to variables related to the ‘Greenspan conundrum’ 
As we argued in paragraph 3.5, flight to quality in an international dimension combined with 
the global saving glut is potent to affect the central bank’s leverage over long-term interest 
rates with the use of the short-term rate. It is plausible that such a situation may influence the 
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shape of the monetary transmission mechanism, i.e. affect the parameters of the Phillips and 
IS curves. Failure to control long-term interest rates could also induce the monetary 
authorities to adjust their monetary rule.  
We propose to test state-dependency with respect to variables related to the ‘Greenspan 
conundrum’, i.e. to measures of spreads between the long- and short-term interest rate (see 
Table 5.20 for a short and Appendix A.5 for a detailed description of the data). 
 
Table 5.20 The selected variables related to ‘Greenspan conundrum’ 
Tag   Short description 
𝑡10𝑦_3𝑚𝑡  10-year treasury constant maturity rate minus 3-month treasury constant maturity rate 
𝑡10𝑦_𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑡  10-year treasury constant maturity rate minus federal funds rate 
 
According to the tests (see Table 5.21) performed here, none of the selected variables has a 
statistically significant influence on the inflation and output gap equation, while both 
variables exert such an influence on the interest rate equation. 
 
Table 5.21 P-values of tests for state-dependency with respect to variables related to ‘Greenspan conundrum’ 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
𝑡10𝑦_3𝑚𝑡 0.438 0.355  0.669 0.554  0.608 0.513  0.847 0.754  0.005 0.008  0.025 0.029 
𝑡10𝑦_𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑡 0.807 0.726  0.635 0.520  0.357 0.286  0.394 0.307  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
 
5.3.10 State-dependency with respect to variables related to some aspects of the 
Greenspan standard 
In subsection 3.6 we tried to find potential sources of state-dependency in the Greenspan 
standard, i.e. the way Greenspan conducted the monetary policy. We found that Greenspan 
was known to be a proponent of pre-emptive actions against very low probable but also very 
adverse events, and he followed the principle of ‘don’t try to burst bubbles; mop up after’. 
Obviously, such features of the Greenspan standard should result in state-dependency of the 
Taylor rule with respect to the dynamics of some assets’ prices. Since the ‘Greenspan put’ 
(the implicit put option against large asset price drops) could have been taken into account by 
economic agents, one may also expect that this element of the Greenspan standard was potent 
to influence the shapes of the Phillips and IS curves (especially those of the latter due to its 
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relation to the financial market via interest rate and investment-saving decision-making 
process). 
We propose to test for state-dependency with respect to the dynamics of three groups of 
assets: stock exchange indices, real estate and commodities.
59
 As previously, the groups are 
separated with a dashed line in Table 5.22 (see Appendix A.5 for a detailed description of the 
data). 
 
Table 5.22 The selected measures of variables related to some aspects of Greenspan standard 
Tag   Short description 
Stock prices 
𝑠𝑝500𝑡  S&P 500©, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑑𝑡  NASDAQ Composite Index©, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑡  Wilshire 5000 Full Cap Price Index©, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
𝑑𝑗𝑐𝑡  Dow Jones Composite©, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑎𝑡  Dow Jones Industrial Average©, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑑100𝑡  NASDAQ 100©, index, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
Real estate prices 
𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑡  S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index©, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
ℎ𝑝𝑖𝑡  
All-transactions house price index by U.S. Federal Housing Finance Agency, annualised percent 
change from quarter ago 
Commodity prices 
𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑡  
Spot oil price: West Texas Intermediate©, dollars per barrel, annualised percent change from 
quarter ago 
𝑐𝑝𝑒𝑡  World Bank commodity price data: energy, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
𝑐𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑡  World Bank commodity price data: nonenergy, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 
We find (see Table 5.23) that the dynamics of stock indices have no effect on the interest rate 
equation and virtually no effect on the shape of the inflation equation, while they exert a 
significant influence on the output gap equation. Surprisingly, although all of the selected 
indices are highly collinear and measure a similar underlying economic process (i.e. dynamic 
of the stock exchange), the results are sensitive to the choice of index. The dynamics of prices 
of real estate are found to influence only the interest rate equation and only when the 
S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index© is a transition variable. As far as 
commodity prices are concerned, we find that oil prices are important for the interest rate 
equation. There is also some evidence that energy commodity prices are an important source 
of state-dependency of the inflation and the output gap equations but the outcomes are 
                                                          
59
 We do not take debt market assets into account, since their dynamic is related to the ‘Greenspan conundrum’ 
rather than the Greenspan standard – Blinder and Reis (2005) abstracted from prices on the domestic debt market 
in their analysis of the Greenspan standard. 
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sensitive to the choice of test statistic and 𝐽. At the same time, non-energy commodity prices 
seem to be irrelevant to the shape of all three equations. 
 
Table 5.23 P-values of tests for state-dependency with respect to variables related to some aspects of Greenspan 
standard 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
Stock prices 
𝑠𝑝500𝑡 0.138 0.112  0.280 0.218  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.001  0.218 0.174  0.234 0.183 
𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑑𝑡 0.208 0.166  0.089 0.078  0.232 0.185  0.026 0.029  0.348 0.278  0.164 0.132 
𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑡 0.060 0.053  0.129 0.107  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.002  0.407 0.328  0.180 0.144 
𝑑𝑗𝑐𝑡 0.783 0.698  0.627 0.512  0.010 0.012  0.057 0.054  0.167 0.134  0.270 0.211 
𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑎𝑡 0.628 0.533  0.187 0.149  0.000 0.001  0.001 0.003  0.409 0.330  0.476 0.376 
𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑑100𝑡 0.082 0.070  0.040 0.041  0.043 0.040  0.084 0.074  0.098 0.082  0.112 0.095 
Real estate prices 
𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑡 0.544 0.451  0.448 0.351  0.123 0.100  0.299 0.232  0.008 0.010  0.048 0.047 
ℎ𝑝𝑖𝑡 0.551 0.457  0.548 0.439  0.165 0.133  0.122 0.102  0.229 0.182  0.406 0.317 
Commodity prices 
𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑡 0.194 0.155  0.207 0.164  0.722 0.631  0.290 0.226  0.005 0.007  0.011 0.016 
𝑐𝑝𝑒𝑡 0.053 0.048  0.163 0.131  0.310 0.247  0.010 0.015  0.058 0.051  0.063 0.058 
𝑐𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑡 0.610 0.515  0.670 0.555  0.782 0.697  0.712 0.598  0.250 0.198  0.326 0.253 
 
5.4 Summary 
In this section we showed that linearity and state-independency of the monetary transmission 
mechanism is a questionable assumption. Less euphemistically, the null hypotheses of 
linearity and state-independency of the baseline model of the monetary transmission 
mechanism were broadly rejected by the tests performed here despite the conservative 
approach to testing which was based on LM-type tests. 
The results were particularly strong in the case of state-dependency of the output gap equation 
(see Table 5.24), which contrasts with the fact that the problem of state-dependency of the IS 
curve does not receive too much attention in the literature. Conversely, the literature is 
focused on nonlinearity of the Phillips curve and the Taylor rule while in these cases our 
results were the weakest. It also seems that in the case of some sources of state-dependency 
which were found important for particular equations (e.g. financial development for the 
inflation equation) the theoretical predictions suggested by the literature are rather implicit 
than explicit. On the one hand this may signal some promising area for a theoretical research, 
while on the other hand this also calls us to substantiate our findings with more detailed 
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empirical results. Therefore in the following section we move on to econometric modelling of 
the nonlinearity and state-dependency of the monetary transmission mechanism. 
 
Table 5.24 Percentage of rejections of hypothesis of linearity and state-independency 
  inflation 
equation 
 
output gap 
equation 
 
interest rate 
equation 
 overall 
nonlinearity*  11%  22%  18%  17% 
state-dependency  31%  38%  33%  34% 
business cycle and climate  0%  100%  100%  67% 
labour market conditions  25%  38%  25%  29% 
financial conditions  42%  39%  47%  43% 
- indices of financial conditions  57%  43%  57%  52% 
 - monetary aggregates  13%  25%  50%  29% 
 - interest rate quality spreads  0%  0%  0%  0% 
 - quality of credit portfolio  60%  60%  50%  57% 
uncertainty  0%  75%  75%  50% 
globalisation  18%  25%  15%  19% 
 - world data  13%  38%  25%  25% 
 - U.S. data  21%  17%  8%  15% 
composition of the economy  0%  100%  50%  50% 
potential growth and development  40%  20%  20%  27% 
financial development  68%  18%  11%  32% 
 - money supply to GDP ratios  100%  50%  0%  50% 
 - bank assets ratios  63%  6%  6%  25% 
 - other measures  63%  25%  25%  38% 
Greenspan conundrum  0%  0%  100%  33% 
Greenspan standard  7%  45%  18%  23% 
 - stock prices  8%  75%  0%  28% 
 - real estate prices  0%  0%  50%  17% 
 - commodity prices  8%  17%  33%  19% 
* including indirect nonlinearity 
linearity 
state-independency 
      
nonlinearity 
state-dependency 
0% (0%, 20%] (20%, 40%] (40%, 60%] (60%, 80%] (80%, 100%] 
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6. Modelling nonlinearity and state-dependency of the monetary 
transmission mechanism  
6.1 Introduction 
As was mentioned before, in this section we deal with the process of econometric modelling 
of nonlinearity and state-dependency of the monetary transmission mechanism. At the very 
beginning we shortly analyse the adopted approach, which is based on smooth transition 
autoregressive (𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅) models, and only later do we discuss the results of estimation and 
evaluation of the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models. 
 
6.2 Overview of the 𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑹 framework 
Before proceeding to the results of the modelling exercise, we find it useful to present some 
basic information on the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 framework and justify our choice. Although the beginning of 
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models dates back to the 1970s and 1980s, it was Teräsvirta (1994) who put in order 
some of the dispersed motifs into a more general theory and modelling strategy of 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 
models.
60
 Since then many modifications and developments have been proposed and neither a 
unified nor indisputable 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 methodology has been coined yet. Therefore, many aspects of 
the modelling procedure are subjected to the econometrician’s choice. The following 
paragraphs should shed some light on the adopted modelling strategy and on the arguments 
behind our choice.  
 
6.2.1 Concept of 𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑹 models 
The standard smooth transition regression (𝑆𝑇𝑅) model is an additive nonlinear model that 
can be perceived as a switching regression model with two regimes and an observable 
switching variable 𝑠𝑡: 
 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝝋
′𝒛𝑡 +𝝍
′𝒛𝑡𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝒄) + 𝜀𝑡   𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝒄) ∈ [0; 1]  (6.1) 
 
                                                          
60
 See Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim and Granger (2010, Ch. 16.3.1) for a historical note. 
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If 𝒛𝑡 contains lagged values of the dependent variable 𝑦𝑡, the model is usually called a smooth 
transition autoregressive (𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅) model. The equation (6.1) reveals that the 𝑆𝑇(𝐴)𝑅 model is 
actually a weighted average of two linear models and that the relative weight assigned to each 
of the two linear models depends on the value of the transition function 𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝒄), where 𝛾 is 
the smoothing parameter, 𝒄 = (𝑐1, … , 𝑐𝐾)
′ are the location parameters, and 𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝒄) is 
continuous with respect to transition (or switching) variable 𝑠𝑡 in the parameter space. 
Although the catalogue of transition functions is potentially infinite, the transition function 
𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝒄) typically takes one of the three following forms: 
 
𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝒄) = (1 + exp {−𝛾(𝑠𝑡 − 𝑐)})
−1   𝛾 > 0   (6.2) 
𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝒄) = (1 + exp {−𝛾(𝑠𝑡 − 𝑐1)(𝑠𝑡 − 𝑐2)})
−1  𝑐1 < 𝑐2, 𝛾 > 0  (6.3) 
𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝒄) = 1 − exp {−𝛾(𝑠𝑡 − 𝑐)
2}    𝛾 > 0   (6.4) 
 
The transition functions (6.2), (6.3), and (6.4) correspond with the 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1, 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 and 
𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models, respectively, where 𝐿 stands for logistic and 𝐸 for exponential, while 1 and 2 
denote the number of location parameters 𝑐𝑘 in the 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models. Figure 6.1 presents the 
difference among the defined transition functions depending on the value of the smooth 
parameter 𝛾. 
 
Figure 6.1 The plot of 𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝒄) for 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 (𝑐 = 0), 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 (𝑐1 = −0.5, 𝑐2 = 0.5) and 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 (𝑐 = 0) 
specifications, depending on the value of the smooth parameter 𝛾 (the value of 𝑠𝑡 on X-axis) 
   
 
Intuitively, the 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 model is adequate when model behaviour differs for small and large 
values of 𝑠𝑡 (e.g. inflation dynamics varies between low and high inflation or capacity 
utilisation regimes), while 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 and 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 are more appropriate when model behaviour 
is different for moderate and extreme values of 𝑠𝑡 but similar at both extremes of 𝑠𝑡 (e.g. 
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inflation dynamics is similar in deflation and high inflation regimes but different when the 
inflation is at low levels). Such properties make the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 framework a good choice when 
looking for various types of asymmetries (see definition 3 in subsection 1.6). 
From the econometric perspective the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 framework may be perceived as a framework 
which brings together the pros and alleviates the cons of threshold regression and the Markov-
switching regression models. The switching variable is observable (can be controlled by an 
econometrician) and the transition is smooth at the same time, which means that there is no 
trade-off between the two features. What is more, 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models are quite parsimonious (e.g. 
when compared to polynomial models) and nest a linear model as a special case which is not a 
property held by many other nonlinear models (e.g. min-max and nonparametric models). 
According to Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim and Granger (2010, Ch. 16.3.1), the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 modelling 
strategy consists of three stages: specification, estimation and evaluation. However, since the 
first two stages greatly overlap and the procedure of modelling is iterative until a satisfactory 
model is found, we propose to modify the strategy and to follow more legible and non-
overlapping steps of modelling, i.e. preliminary specification, estimation, model selection and 
evaluation. The main advantage of the proposed solution is that the catalogue of plausible 
model specifications is set at the beginning of the modelling exercise and the chosen model is 
the best one (i.e. not only a satisfactory one) among the available alternatives.
61
 The following 
subsections are devoted to consecutive stages of such a strategy. 
 
6.2.2 Preliminary specification 
In the preliminary specification stage the baseline linear model should be tested against the 
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 alternative. The problem of testing is, however, complicated by the fact that the 
nuisance parameters 𝛾 and 𝒄 are not identified under the null hypothesis of linearity (see, e.g. 
Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim and Granger 2010, Ch. 5.5). The recommended solution is to 
approximate the transition function with a Taylor expansion around the 𝛾 = 0 and to apply 
the LM-type test, the asymptotic properties of which are unaffected under relatively weak 
statistical conditions. 
                                                          
61
 Obviously this comes at the cost of computational time since all plausible models (i.e. not only the most 
plausible one) should be estimated. 
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In fact, the procedure of testing which was presented in paragraph 5.5.2 and used there and in 
subsequent paragraphs for testing linearity against nonlinearity and state-independency 
against state-dependency is exactly the same procedure of testing linearity against the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 
alternative which was recommended by Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim and Granger (2010, Ch. 16.3.2). 
Whenever the null hypothesis of linearity or state-independency is rejected at a 5% 
significance level (for a particular value of 𝐽 and choice of test statistic 𝐹 or 𝜒2), an 
econometrician is permitted to take the next step and to determine the catalogue of plausible 
transition functions; otherwise the model should be treated as linear. 
The procedure of choosing the plausible transition functions depends on whether the 
maximum power 𝐽 in test equations (5.6) and (5.9) was set to 3, as was recommended by 
Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim and Granger (2010 Ch. 16.3.2), or 4, as was suggested by Escribano 
and Jordá (1999). 
For 𝐽 = 3, the following sequence of Wald tests should be executed: 
1. 𝐻03:  ⋀ 𝜃𝑘𝑖3 = 0
𝐼
𝑖=1  in (5.6) or ⋀ 𝜗𝑘𝑖3 = 𝜃𝑘𝑖3 = 0
𝐼
𝑖=1  in (5.9) 
2. 𝐻02|𝐻03:  ⋀ 𝜃𝑘𝑖2 = 0
𝐼
𝑖=1  in (5.6)  or ⋀ 𝜗𝑘𝑖2 = 𝜃𝑘𝑖2 = 0
𝐼
𝑖=1  in (5.9) 
3. 𝐻01|𝐻02:  ⋀ 𝜃𝑘𝑖1 = 0
𝐼
𝑖=1  in (5.6)  or ⋀ 𝜗𝑘𝑖1 = 𝜃𝑘𝑖1 = 0
𝐼
𝑖=1  in (5.9) 
If the p-value for 𝐻02 is smaller than for 𝐻03 and p-value for 𝐻02 is smaller than for 𝐻01, the 
𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 or 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model62 should be selected. Otherwise, one should choose the 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
specification. 
For 𝐽 = 4, the procedure of testing is symmetric and there are only two Wald tests which 
should be executed: 
1. 𝐻02
∗ : ⋀ 𝜃𝑘𝑖2 = 𝜃𝑘𝑖4 = 0
𝐼
𝑖=1  in (5.6)  or ⋀ 𝜗𝑘𝑖2 = 𝜃𝑘𝑖2 = 𝜗𝑘𝑖4 = 𝜃𝑘𝑖4 = 0
𝐼
𝑖=1  in (5.9) 
2. 𝐻01
∗ : ⋀ 𝜃𝑘𝑖1 = 𝜃𝑘𝑖3 = 0
𝐼
𝑖=1  in (5.6)  or ⋀ 𝜗𝑘𝑖1 = 𝜃𝑘𝑖1 = 𝜗𝑘𝑖3 = 𝜃𝑘𝑖3 = 0
𝐼
𝑖=1  in (5.9) 
If the p-value for 𝐻02
∗  is smaller than for 𝐻01
∗ , the 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 or 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 specification should be 
chosen; in the other case the 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 model is more appropriate. 
Obviously, both procedures are heuristic in the sense that the overall significance level is 
unknown. Therefore, the results of the procedures should be treated as a recommendation 
rather than as a rigorous verdict as to which model should be chosen; for example, our 
experience in handling 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models reveals that the 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 or 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 specification is 
                                                          
62
 The procedure gives no hint on whether the 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 or 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 specification should be chosen. 
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suggested somewhat too often because the 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 model is later strongly preferred at the 
estimation and evaluation stage. We find that such a situation usually takes place when the 
majority of observations is located at only one half of the 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 or 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 transition 
functions, i.e. when the 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 and 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 or 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 specifications might be difficult to 
empirically differentiate between. Bearing in mind that fact, whenever the 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 or 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 
specification is suggested, we also recommend that the 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 model be estimated as an 
alternative. 
In our procedure of determining the preliminary specification we continue the distinction 
between the results for different values of  𝐽 (3 or 4) and test statistics (𝐹 or 𝜒2), which means 
that for every ‘nonlinear’ or ‘state’ transition variable we have four verdicts on the suggested 
preliminary specification. The model is claimed to be linear or state-independent (against 
nonlinearity or state-dependency) with respect to the selected transition variable if in all cases 
there is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis of linearity or state-independency 
(i.e. when in paragraphs 5.2.2 – 5.3.10 the p-values are higher than 5% no matter what the 
choice of 𝐽 and test statistic is). If there is at least one suggestion for the 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
specification, we treat such a specification as a plausible one. We adopt an analogous rule for 
the 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 and 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 specifications, however, by bringing the aforementioned 
recommendation into life we always add the 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 specification to the set of plausible 
transition functions as an alternative.  
In summary, the adopted procedure of determining the catalogue of plausible preliminary 
specifications may end up with one of the three following conclusions: 
1. The model is linear or state-independent – no 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model will be estimated. 
2. Only models with the 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 specification will be estimated and compared against 
the linear baseline. 
3. Models with 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1, 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 and 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 specifications will be estimated and 
compared against the linear baseline. 
The following paragraph deals with the estimation stage of models in their preliminary 
functional forms, while the next paragraph reveals how the final specifications of the models 
were chosen.  
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6.2.3 Estimation 
The 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models can be estimated with the use of the Nonlinear Least Squares (NLS) 
estimator. If the error term is normally distributed, the NLS estimation is equivalent to the 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE), while in the case of non-normal error the estimates 
may be interpreted as obtained via the Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimation (QMLE) (van 
Dijk, Teräsvirta, Franses 2002). The NLS estimator is consistent under various types of 
regularity conditions which are ‘expected to hold quite generally in practice’ (Mittelhammer, 
Judge and Miller 2000). More rigorous regularity conditions assure that the NLS estimator is 
also asymptotically normally distributed. 
Since the NLS estimator for 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models has no closed-form solution, appropriate numerical 
techniques should be applied to obtain the estimates. The optimisation procedure may be 
greatly supported with the initial values. In particular, it is sensible to obtain them by 
searching over the grid for values of 𝛾 and 𝒄 which minimise the sum of squared residuals in 
the conditionally linear model. Unfortunately, even feeding the optimisation procedure with 
very good starting values does not guarantee a successful estimation, especially in small 
samples. The problem arises because an adequate estimation of 𝛾 and 𝒄 requires much 
information on the curvature of the transition function, i.e. a large number of observations 
located in the neighbourhood of 𝒄, which is unlikely to happen in small samples.63 
Despite the many attempts and experiments (including, e.g. a lower and upper bound, 
restrictions for the parameters and iterative parameter-by-parameter estimation with 
updating), we failed to find a procedure which would allow to successfully estimate all of the 
parameters for all of the models. Therefore, we calibrated the values of 𝛾 and 𝒄 on the basis of 
the conditional sum of squared residuals, allowing: 
 rescaled64 parameter 𝛾 to take a value from 0.1 to 32 with an intercept 0.1 
 parameter 𝑐 to take a value from 𝑝5(𝑠𝑡) to 𝑝95(𝑠𝑡) (i.e. from the 5𝑡ℎ to 95𝑡ℎ 
percentile of the transition variable) with an intercept  
𝑝95(𝑠𝑡)−𝑝5(𝑠𝑡)
100
 (for 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 and 
𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅) 
                                                          
63
 See van Dijk, Teräsvirta and Franses (2002) or Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim and Granger (2010 Ch. 16.3.3) for a 
short discussion and further references. 
64
 To make the parameter 𝛾 scale-free, it should be divided by the sample standard deviation of the transition 
variable (for 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1) or its square (𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 and 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅) (Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim and Granger 2010 Ch. 16.3.3). 
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 parameter 𝑐1 to take a value from 𝑝5(𝑠𝑡) to 𝑝50(𝑠𝑡) with an intercept  
𝑝50(𝑠𝑡)−𝑝5(𝑠𝑡)
50
 (for 
𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2) 
 parameter 𝑐2 to take a value from 𝑝50(𝑠𝑡) to 𝑝95(𝑠𝑡) with an intercept  
𝑝50(𝑠𝑡)−𝑝5(𝑠𝑡)
50
 
(for 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2) 
It is worth noting that the adopted solution is much more flexible and less arbitrary than the 
ones chosen, e.g. by Weise (1999) or Huh and Lee (2002), who also found difficulties in ‘pure 
estimation’ of the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models. Since the equations in our baseline linear model contain 
𝐴𝑅(1) error terms, despite the aforementioned calibration the NLS estimation is employed 
anyway. 
 
6.2.4 Model selection 
The model selection stage aims to choose model(s) which will later serve as a basis for both 
econometric and economic inference. Therefore, at this stage not only should the final 
specification of the transition function be selected but also possible restrictions on the model 
parameters need to be taken into account. Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim and Granger (2010, Ch. 
16.3.2) showed that there are many possible restrictions (and their combinations) which may 
be potentially considered. However, since the main aim of this thesis is to verify the 
assumption of linearity and state-independency of the monetary transmission mechanism, we 
find the restrictions  𝜓𝑗 = 0 in (6.1) to be our major focus point. As in every equation in our 
baseline model, there are four parameters containing information on the structural parameters, 
so in every case we have (4
1
) + (4
2
) + (4
3
) = 14 sets of restrictions between the baseline linear 
model and the model where no 𝜓𝑗 is restricted to 0. 
Bearing in mind that in some cases we want to select the final model among many 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1, 
𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 and 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 specifications which are not nested in one another, we cannot adopt a 
standard procedure of model selection based on the Wald or LR tests. Such a procedure is also 
infeasible due to the aforementioned fact that the nuisance parameters 𝛾 and 𝒄 are not 
identified under the linear model against which we would like to compare the estimated 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 
models as well. Then the information criteria seem to be a natural choice. An additional 
advantage of using the information criteria is that the finally selected 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models are not 
only statistically significantly ‘better’ but also more parsimonious than the linear baseline. In 
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other words the proposed approach verifies whether it econometrically pays off to make the 
effort of switching from the standard linear approach to the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 framework.  
Econometricians usually point out that the Bayesian or Schwarz Information Criterion 
(𝐵𝐼𝐶/𝑆𝐼𝐶) has better properties than the Akaike Information Criterion (𝐴𝐼𝐶) since the 
𝐵𝐼𝐶/𝑆𝐼𝐶 is derived under Bayesian methods and it is a consistent model selector, while 𝐴𝐼𝐶 
lacks a Bayesian background and tends to select models which are overparameterised (see, 
e.g. Kennedy 2008 Ch. 6). Burnham and Anderson (2002) showed, however, that such 
statements should be treated as econometric ‘half-truths’ – both information criteria can be 
obtained via Bayesian methods but under different priors, and both information criteria are 
consistent but under different assumptions. More specifically, the 𝐴𝐼𝐶 asymptotically chooses 
the best model if the true model is not among the available ones, while the 𝐵𝐼𝐶/𝑆𝐼𝐶 selects 
consistently if the true model is obtainable. Therefore, the choice should be based on whether 
the performed analysis aims to explore the available data with neither a strong prior nor null 
hypothesis or rather confronts a particular prior or hypothesis with the data. 
Taking the above-mentioned characteristics of the information criteria into consideration, we 
propose to use the 𝐵𝐼𝐶/𝑆𝐼𝐶 to decide whether any 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model is better than the linear 
baseline and, if positive, to select the best 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model with the use of the 𝐴𝐼𝐶. As far as we 
know, this is the first time such a procedure has been proposed, nevertheless, we believe that 
it fits the research context better than choosing a single information criterion. Since the linear 
baseline is our prior and null hypothesis that we want to confront with the data, it is sensible 
to use the 𝐵𝐼𝐶/𝑆𝐼𝐶 as a consistent selector if the true model is among those being analysed. 
On the other hand, once we find that our prior and null hypothesis of linearity is rejected, we 
know that all of the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models we are considering are just a (rough) approximation of the 
true model and we are not able to find the real data-generating process. Then it is desirable to 
choose an 𝐴𝐼𝐶 which consistently selects the best model if the true model is out of reach.  
 
6.2.5 Evaluation 
The evaluation stage is important because it allows to verify whether the assumptions 
underlying the estimation process are satisfied from a statistical point of view. In particular, 
we focus our attention on testing the assumption of no autocorrelation which is crucial for the 
consistency of the NLS estimator. Moreover, we test whether the functional form is not 
misspecified. Although we already know that the estimated models are just rough 
124 
 
approximations of the data-generating process, and in that sense their functional forms are not 
correct, we should know how reliable the employed functional form is and how cautiously we 
should interpret the estimation results. 
We perform a test of no autocorrelation in the general form as was proposed by Teräsvirta, 
Tjøstheim and Granger (2010, Ch. 16.3.4) and van Dijk, Teräsvirta and Franses (2002): 
1. Collect the residuals 𝑒𝑡 and the number of estimated parameters 𝑝0 and compute the 
residual sum of squares 𝑆𝑆𝑅0 and gradients evaluated at the estimated parameters 𝒈𝑡 
from the estimated 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model. 
2. Regress 𝑒𝑡 on 𝒈𝑡 and 𝑒𝑡−1, 𝑒𝑡−2, ..., 𝑒𝑡−𝑞 up to the selected lag order, collect the 
number of estimated parameters 𝑝1 and compute the residual sum of squares 𝑆𝑆𝑅1. 
3. Compute the 𝜒2 or the 𝐹 version of the LM-test statistic: 
 
𝐿𝑀𝜒2 = 𝑇
𝑆𝑆𝑅0−𝑆𝑆𝑅1
𝑆𝑆𝑅0
                              
𝐷
→ 𝜒2(𝑝1 − 𝑝0)   (6.5) 
𝐿𝑀𝐹 =
(𝑆𝑆𝑅0−𝑆𝑆𝑅1)/(𝑝1−𝑝0)
𝑆𝑆𝑅1/(𝑇−𝑝1)
       ~𝐹(𝑝1 − 𝑝0, 𝑇 − 𝑝1).
𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥.    (6.6) 
 
We implement two amendments to the above procedure. The first amendment is suggested by 
van Dijk, Teräsvirta and Franses (2002), who recommended that 𝑒𝑡 be substituted with its 
orthogonalised against 𝒈𝑡 counterpart, since optimisation algorithms do not guarantee exact 
orthogonality of 𝑒𝑡 and 𝒈𝑡. The second modification, recommended by Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim 
and Granger (2010, Ch. 16.3.4) and also known from the Breusch-Godfrey test, aims to 
alleviate the size distortion problem by substituting missing lags of 𝑒𝑡 with zeros. As in the 
case of the baseline linear model diagnostic, we set 𝑞 = 12. 
As far as testing for the correct functional form is concerned, due to a too small sample size 
and computational problems we are not able to neither test for parameter constancy nor 
perform some of the parameter-consuming tests of no additive nonlinearity as was suggested 
by Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim, and Granger (2010, Ch. 16.3.4).65 In such a situation the authors 
recommended that the LM version of the Ramsey-RESET test be performed. The procedure is 
                                                          
65
 A test for the additive 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model would require that one estimate a fully specified 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model extended 
with polynomial components (in our case 12 or 16 additional parameters), while a test for more general additive 
nonlinearity would require, in our case, that we estimate at least 30 parameters in total (for the third-order 
polynomial). 
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analogous as in the test of no autocorrelation, but lags of 𝑒𝑡 should be substituted with powers 
of fitted values from the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model. As was the case before, we set the maximum power 𝐽 
to 3 or 4. 
Moreover, we also report the results of the Jarque-Bera normality test that is applied to the 
residuals. The results tell whether the estimates may be perceived as obtained via the 
Maximum Likelihood or Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE or QMLE). 
Additionally, non-normality of residuals may suggest that we treat the results of other 
diagnostic tests with greater cautiousness since the empirical distributions of test statistics 
may deviate from the theoretical distributions to a larger extent than otherwise. On the other 
hand, it is worth emphasising that any stochastic simulation of the generalised impulse 
response functions would be based on bootstrapped rather than on theoretical distributions of 
shocks, which immunise the impulse responses against non-normality of the model residuals. 
The literature does not suggest any special need for ex-post-testing for heteroscedasticity. On 
the one hand, the homoscedasticity assumption was already verified before linearity testing 
(i.e. when it truly mattered), while, on the other hand, in the context of nonlinearity, 
heteroscedasticity tests should be regarded as tests for general misspecification rather than as 
tests for true heteroscedasticity, especially for quarterly macroeconomic data.
66
 Finally, in this 
thesis we perform no statistical inference based on the coefficients’ variance-covariance 
matrix from the estimated 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models. 
At the end of this paragraph it is important to emphasise that the suggested tests are not 
specific about what should be done if the null hypothesis is rejected. Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim 
and Granger (2010, Ch. 16.3.4) claimed that the tests discussed here should be perceived as 
various tests for general misspecification without being precise about its nature. Then ‘the 
idea of extending the model further has to be weighted against other considerations such as 
the risk of overfitting’. They also found it important to apply low significance levels as to 
‘obtain some protection against overfitting’. Therefore, even if the null hypothesis is rejected 
at a 1% significance level, we treat the negative result as information on the model’s 
shortcomings rather than as an incentive to modify the model. Bearing in mind the large 
number of estimated equations, we want to stick to a unified framework of modelling without 
                                                          
66
 See, e.g. Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim and Granger (2010, Ch. 16.3.4) for a short discussion on the reasonableness of 
testing for heteroscedasticity in the context of the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 framework, or Kennedy (2008, Ch. 8) for more general 
considerations regarding relations between problems of heteroscedasticity and misspecification.  
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any discretionary departures for individual equations.
67
 Then there might be two extreme 
approaches as to how to treat the (generalised) impulse response functions obtained from 
models whose certain equations were rejected by the diagnostic tests: 
 treat the obtained results as non-existent since they are unreliable due to the 
inconsistency of the estimator 
 treat the obtained results very cautiously as a rough approximation. 
Whenever we analyse impulse response functions based on such models in section 7, we will 
very explicitly inform about the negative results of the diagnostic tests. 
 
6.2.6 Methodological remarks 
In our case the estimated 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 equations take the following general forms: 
 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝜑11 + 𝜑12𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝜑13𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜑14𝑖𝑡−1 + 
           + (𝜓11 + 𝜓12𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝜓13𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜓14𝑖𝑡−1)𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝒄) + 𝜑15𝜖𝜋,𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝜋,𝑡  (6.7) 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝜑21 + 𝜑22𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝜑23𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜑24𝑖𝑡−1 + 
          +(𝜓21 + 𝜓22𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝜓23𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝜓24𝑖𝑡−1)𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝒄) + 𝜑25𝜖𝑥,𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑥,𝑡  (6.8) 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑31 + 𝜑32𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑33𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑34𝑖𝑡−1 + 
         +(𝜓31 + 𝜓32𝜋𝑡 + 𝜓33𝑥𝑡 + 𝜓34𝑖𝑡−1)𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝒄) + 𝜑35𝜖𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑖,𝑡  (6.9) 
 
Since, analogously as in the case of the baseline model, the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models are estimated in 
their reduced forms, the estimated parameters are not very informative themselves. Bearing in 
mind the scope of this thesis, however, we are particularly interested in the models’ response 
to monetary policy shock – the only type of shock which is structurally identified in the model 
owing to one-to-one mapping between the structural and reduced form of the Taylor rule. 
Therefore, in the following subsections we present and discuss only the final model selections 
(𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1, 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2, 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 or 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅) and the results of diagnostic tests as to provide 
information whether the estimated equations are correctly specified. 
                                                          
67
 Since the test equations in section 5 are based on the Taylor approximation, there might exist many locally 
equivalent alternatives to the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 specification, some of which could be potentially preferred over both the 
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 specification and the linear baseline. 
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Detailed estimates of the finally selected 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models are available in Tables A7.1 – A7.11 
in Appendix A7. 
 
6.3 Modelling nonlinearity 
In this subsection we briefly describe the results of modelling the (explicit) nonlinearity of the 
monetary transmission mechanism. 
As was shown in Table 5.2, the output gap equation is the only one which exhibits statistically 
significant (at a 5% significance level) nonlinearity (with respect to 𝑥𝑡−1, but only for 𝐽 = 4). 
The performed procedure of specifying the preliminary functional form (see Table A6.1 in 
Appendix A.6) suggests the 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 specification as the only one which should be 
considered against the linear baseline. According to the information criteria, the finally 
estimated 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 model is better than the linear one, while the diagnostic tests reveal no 
problems with autocorrelation, the incorrect functional form or a lack of residual normality. 
 
Table 6.1 Final model selection and p-values of diagnostic tests when modelling nonlinearity 
Eq. 
 
𝑧𝑡 
 
Functional 
form 
 
𝐻0: no 
autocorrelation 
 𝐻0: correct functional form  
𝐻0: normal 
distribution 
    
Maximum power 
𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum power 
𝐽 = 4 
 
Jarque-Bera 
   𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  
𝑥𝑡   𝑥𝑡−1  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.733 0.597  0.214 0.173  0.222 0.173  0.913 
 
In summary, we find that the estimated 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model appropriately incorporates the nonlinear 
nature of the output gap equation and that such a model may be exploited to calculate 
generalised impulse responses in section 7 without any additional reservations regarding 
diagnostic tests. 
 
6.4 Modelling indirect forms of nonlinearity 
Analogously as in the previous subsection, here we briefly describe the results of modelling 
indirect forms of nonlinearity of the monetary transmission mechanism. 
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The tests performed in paragraph 5.2.3 (Table 5.3) show that in 5 cases the assumption of 
state-independency is rejected. Nevertheless, only in 3 cases (once for each equation) are the 
estimated 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models (see Table A6.2 in Appendix A.6 for preliminary specifications) 
found to be more parsimonious than the linear baseline. Although, such results may suggest 
that either the ‘degree of state-dependency’ is somewhat overestimated by the tests being 
performed or the detected state-dependency should be modelled with the use of other models 
than 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models (e.g. due to the aforementioned local equivalency of the nonlinear 
specification which is an alternative to the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 specification), it is important to recall once 
again that criterions of statistical significance and parsimoniousness are not equivalent. 
At the model selection stage, according to the employed procedure, 3 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models (out of 5 
cases) are selected. These are the: 
 inflation equation, state-dependent with respect to the measure of central tendency of 
the interest rate 
 output gap equation, state-dependent with respect to the measure of central tendency 
of the output gap 
 interest rate equation, state-dependent with respect to the measure of variance of the 
output gap. 
 
Table 6.2 Final model selection when modelling indirect forms of nonlinearity 
𝑠𝑡  inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
𝜋𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀   𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀   𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀   𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝜋𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉   𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉   𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉   𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
 
The diagnostic tests performed here reveal that none of the estimated equations suffers from 
the problem of autocorrelation or incorrect functional form, although one equation (𝑖𝑡 with 
respect to 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉 ) has a non-normal distribution at a 5% significance level (but normal at 1%). 
Bearing in mind the suggestion by Teräsvirta, Tjøstheim and Granger (2010, Ch. 16.3.4), i.e. 
to apply low significance levels when performing 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 diagnostic tests, we find the obtained 
results satisfactory. 
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Table 6.3 P-values of diagnostic tests when modelling indirect forms of nonlinearity 
Eq. 
 
𝑠𝑡 
 
Functional 
form 
 
𝐻0: no 
autocorrelation 
 𝐻0: correct functional form  
𝐻0: normal 
distribution 
    
Maximum power 
𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum power 
𝐽 = 4 
 
Jarque-Bera 
   𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  
𝜋𝑡   𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀   𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.970 0.929  0.753 0.716  0.873 0.842  0.270 
𝑥𝑡   𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀   𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.215 0.161  0.519 0.481  0.486 0.436  0.599 
𝑖𝑡  𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉   𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.619 0.492  0.146 0.118  0.269 0.221  0.010 
 
In summary, we find that indirect forms of nonlinearity play an important role in the monetary 
transmission mechanism. An analysis of asymmetry of monetary transmission is, to a great 
extent, based on the results obtained here. Thus, it is all the more important to recall once 
again that diagnostic tests show that all of the estimated equations are correctly specified at a 
1% significance level. 
 
6.5 Modelling state-dependency 
In this subsection we test for state-dependency. Analogously as in the previous section, we 
divide the subsection into 10 paragraphs corresponding to the theoretical sources of state-
dependency which were discussed in sections 2 and 3. 
 
6.5.1 State-dependency with respect to measures of business cycle and climate 
Despite a very rich theoretical background, according to the adopted selection procedure (see 
Table A6.3 in Appendix A.6 for preliminary specifications) the inflation equation reveals no 
state-dependency with respect to the selected measures of business cycle and climate. On the 
other hand, however, we find rich evidence of such state-dependency for the output gap and 
the interest rate equations. In the first case, 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models are selected for each variable, while 
in the latter case  – for each variable except for the Consumer Sentiment Index. 
The diagnostic tests show that only once (the test of a correct functional form for the output 
gap equation with respect to capacity utilisation) are the estimated p-values lower than a 1% 
significance level. It may be expected that the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 framework is not potent to account 
appropriately for state-dependency of the output gap equation with respect to capacity 
utilisation. Therefore, as was already mentioned, results based on such estimates should be 
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treated with the utmost caution. In three cases the p-values are lower than 5% but higher than 
1% –  a result we find satisfactory in the research context. 
 
Table 6.4 Final model selection when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of business cycle 
and climate 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 Short data description 
inflation 
equation 
output gap 
equation 
interest rate 
equation 
𝑐𝑢𝑡 Capacity utilization 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
𝑎𝑖_𝑚𝑎𝑡 Chicago Fed National Activity Index: three month moving average 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
𝑎𝑖_𝑑𝑖𝑡 Chicago Fed National Activity Index: diffusion index 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
𝑐𝑠𝑡 University of Michigan: Consumer Sentiment Index© 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
 
Table 6.5 P-values of diagnostic tests when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of business 
cycle and climate 
Eq. 
 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
 
Functional 
form 
 
𝐻0: no 
autocorrelation 
 𝐻0: correct functional form  
𝐻0: normal 
distribution 
    
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Jarque-Bera 
   𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  
𝑥𝑡  
 𝑐𝑢𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.994 0.986  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.756 
 𝑎𝑖_𝑚𝑎𝑡  𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅  0.041 0.031  0.086 0.067  0.171 0.135  0.594 
 𝑎𝑖_𝑑𝑖𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.716 0.608  0.142 0.118  0.228 0.190  0.422 
 𝑐𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.168 0.109  0.308 0.260  0.486 0.421  0.367 
𝑖𝑡 
 𝑐𝑢𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.023 0.019  0.350 0.306  0.516 0.459  0.062 
 𝑎𝑖_𝑚𝑎𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.823 0.732  0.242 0.209  0.301 0.257  0.661 
 𝑎𝑖_𝑑𝑖𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.976 0.953  0.499 0.460  0.710 0.670  0.321 
 
6.5.2 State-dependency with respect to measures of labour market conditions 
Similarly as in the previous paragraph, and despite sound theoretical premises, we find no 
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅-type state-dependency of the inflation equation with respect to measures of labour 
market conditions, combined with evidence of such state-dependency for the output gap and 
interest rate equations (2 and 1 models, respectively, out of 4 chances). Such a pattern 
suggests that labour market climate does not substantially affect the price-setting mechanism 
(e.g. via downward wage rigidity) or the underlying impact cannot be successfully 
approximated with the use of the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 framework.68 At the same time labour market 
condition seem to play an important role in shaping investment and consumption decision-
making processes, while the monetary authorities seem to adjust their policy rule in line with 
the evolution of situation on the labour market.  
                                                          
68
 It is worth recalling that, since the model is estimated in its reduced form, the presented interpretation should 
be treated with caution.  
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Likewise, the diagnostic tests detect that in only one case is the output gap equation (with 
respect to the Labour Market Conditions Index) claimed to have an incorrect functional form 
at a 1% significance level, which should induce us to look at the obtained estimates carefully. 
 
Table 6.6 Final model selection when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of labour market 
conditions 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 short data description 
inflation 
equation 
output gap 
equation 
interest rate 
equation 
𝑢𝑟𝑡 Civilian unemployment rate 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑤&𝑠𝑡 
Compensation of employees: wages and salaries, annualised percent 
change from quarter ago 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑙𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑡 Civilian labour force participation rate 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡 Labour Market Conditions Index 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
 
Table 6.7 P-values of diagnostic tests when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of labour 
market conditions 
Eq. 
 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
 
Functional 
form 
 
𝐻0: no 
autocorrelation 
 𝐻0: correct functional form  
𝐻0: normal 
distribution 
    
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Jarque-Bera 
   𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  
𝑥𝑡  
 𝑤&𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.026 0.024  0.294 0.258  0.413 0.364  0.753 
 𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.497 0.391  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.738 
𝑖𝑡  𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.889 0.799  0.431 0.380  0.610 0.549  0.309 
 
6.5.3 State-dependency with respect to measures of financial conditions 
Since we have employed 18 measures of financial conditions, it comes as no surprise that the 
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models are preferred over the linear baseline many times over. Specifically, we find 1, 
9 and 4 such cases for the inflation, output gap and interest rate equations, respectively. 
As far as the diagnostic tests are considered, the adopted functional form is discovered to be 
incorrect at a 1% level for the interest rate equation with respect to the CredAbility Consumer 
Distress Index. 
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Table 6.8 Final model selection when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of financial 
conditions 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 short data description 
inflation 
equation 
output gap 
equation 
interest rate 
equation 
Indices of financial conditions 
𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑖𝑡 CredAbility Consumer Distress Index 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
𝑓𝑐𝑛𝑙𝑠𝑡 
Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Nonfinancial Leveral 
Subindex 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑓𝑐𝑙𝑠𝑡 Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Leverage Subindex 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑡 Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Credit Subindex 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑓𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑡 Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Risk Subindex 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑎𝑓𝑐𝑖𝑡 Chicago Fed Adjusted National Financial Conditions Index 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑓𝑐𝑖𝑡 Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Index 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
Monetary aggregates 
𝑚𝑏𝑡 
Board of governors monetary base, annualised percent change from 
quarter ago 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑚𝑏_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 
Board of governors monetary base to gross domestic product (nominal 
ratio) 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑚𝑧𝑚𝑡 
MZM (money zero maturity) stock, annualised percent change from 
quarter ago 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
𝑚2𝑡 M2 money stock, annualised percent change from quarter ago 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
Interest rate quality spreads 
𝑏𝑎𝑎_𝑖𝑡 Moody's seasoned Baa corporate bond minus federal funds rate 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑖𝑡 Moody's seasoned Aaa corporate bond minus federal funds rate 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
Quality of credit portfolio 
𝑙𝑙𝑟_𝑡𝑙𝑡 Loan loss reserve to total loans for all U.S. banks 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑓𝑎𝑡𝑡 
Number of failures and assistance transactions of all institutions for the 
United States 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑛𝑙_𝑡𝑙𝑡 Nonperforming loans to total loans for all U.S. banks 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑑𝑟𝑡 Delinquency rate on all loans 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑡 Charge-off rate on all loans 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
 
Table 6.9 P-values of diagnostic tests when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of financial 
conditions 
Eq. 
 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
 
Functional 
form 
 
𝐻0: no 
autocorrelation 
 𝐻0: correct functional form  
𝐻0: normal 
distribution 
    
Maximum power 
𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum power 
𝐽 = 4 
 
Jarque-Bera 
   𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  
𝜋𝑡   𝑓𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2  0.458 0.341  0.259 0.219  0.127 0.098  0.362 
𝑥𝑡  
 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑖𝑡  𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅  0.402 0.309  0.013 0.011  0.029 0.023  0.950 
 𝑓𝑐𝑙𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.791 0.667  0.525 0.475  0.351 0.290  0.492 
 𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.463 0.346  0.082 0.063  0.113 0.087  0.832 
 𝑚𝑏𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.446 0.331  0.635 0.596  0.315 0.263  0.720 
 𝑛𝑙_𝑡𝑙𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.759 0.642  0.086 0.066  0.179 0.142  0.983 
 𝑑𝑟𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.785 0.674  0.383 0.338  0.041 0.030  0.517 
𝑖𝑡 
 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑖𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.041 0.035  0.002 0.002  0.003 0.003  0.084 
 𝑚𝑧𝑚𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.814 0.708  0.699 0.665  0.215 0.173  0.833 
 𝑚2𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.771 0.671  0.224 0.192  0.229 0.191  0.062 
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6.5.4 State-dependency with respect to measures of uncertainty 
The adopted selection procedure detects no role for the selected measures of uncertainty as 
sources of state-dependency of the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅-type for the inflation or interest rate equation, while 
such a role is found for the output gap (2 times out of 2 chances). 
The diagnostic tests reveal no problems at a 1% significance level. 
 
Table 6.10 Final model selection when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of uncertainty 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 short data description 
inflation 
equation 
output gap 
equation 
interest rate 
equation 
𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑖𝑡 
Economic Policy Uncertainty Index for United States by Baker, 
Bloom and Davis (2013) 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑡 
Equity Market-related Economic Uncertainty Index by Baker, Bloom 
and Davis (2013) 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
 
Table 6.11 P-values of diagnostic tests when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of uncertainty 
Eq. 
 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
 
Functional 
form 
 
𝐻0: no 
autocorrelation 
 𝐻0: correct functional form  
𝐻0: normal 
distribution 
    
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Jarque-Bera 
   𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  
𝑥𝑡  
 𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑖𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.750 0.646  0.053 0.043  0.097 0.078  0.796 
 𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.310 0.233  0.361 0.322  0.266 0.225  0.540 
 
6.5.5 State-dependency with respect to measures of globalisation 
The pattern from paragraphs 6.5.1, 6.5.2 and 6.5.4 repeats when modelling state-dependency 
with respect to measures of globalisation. According to the adopted procedure of model 
selection, the linear inflation equation is found to be more parsimonious than the proposed 
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 alternatives, which is at odds with the suggestions in the literature. On the other hand, a 
𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅-type state-dependency is detected for the output gap (2 times out of 10 chances) and 
the interest rate equations (3 times out of 20 chances), although in these cases theoretical 
support for such a result is much weaker than for the inflation equation. 
The diagnostic tests detect a lack of normal distribution of residuals for one interest rate 
equation at a 1% significance level. Therefore, the results of the two other diagnostic tests 
should be treated with greater caution since the small-sample properties of the test statistics 
may significantly deviate from the nominal ones. 
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Table 6.12 Final model selection when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of globalisation 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 short data description 
inflation 
equation 
output gap 
equation 
interest rate 
equation 
World data 
𝑤𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 
World gross domestic product, constant 2005 dollar, annualised 
percent change from quarter ago 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
𝑤𝑠_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 
World gross savings, percent of world gross domestic product 
(nominal ratio) 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑤𝑑𝑠_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 
World gross domestic savings, percent of world gross domestic 
product (nominal ratio) 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑤𝑒_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 
World exports of goods and services, percent of world gross 
domestic product, (nominal ratio) 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
U.S. data 
𝑒_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 
Real exports of goods and services, percent of real gross 
domestic product (real ratio) 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 
𝑖_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 
Real imports exports of goods and services, percent of real 
gross domestic product (real ratio) 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑐𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 
Balance on current account, percent of gross domestic product 
(nominal ratio) 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑎𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 
U.S. assets abroad, percent of gross domestic product (nominal 
ratio) 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑓𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 
Foreign assets in the U.S., percent of gross domestic product 
(nominal ratio) 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑢𝑠𝑑𝑡 
Trade weighted U.S. dollar index, annualised percent change 
from quarter ago 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
 
Table 6.13 P-values of diagnostic tests when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of 
globalisation 
Eq. 
 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
 
Functional 
form 
 
𝐻0: no 
autocorrelation 
 𝐻0: correct functional form  
𝐻0: normal 
distribution 
    
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Jarque-Bera 
   𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  
𝑥𝑡  
 𝑤𝑠_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.806 0.698  0.834 0.812  0.876 0.851  0.710 
 𝑐𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅  0.393 0.287  0.206 0.171  0.308 0.256  0.770 
𝑖𝑡 
 𝑤𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.494 0.342  0.858 0.834  0.768 0.718  0.197 
 𝑤𝑒_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.695 0.555  0.024 0.017  0.025 0.017  0.000 
 𝑒_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2  0.197 0.147  0.261 0.227  0.440 0.391  0.351 
 
6.5.6 State-dependency with respect to measures of composition of the economy 
As in the case of state-dependency with respect to measures of uncertainty, according to the 
adopted procedure of model selection, the linear inflation and interest rate equations are found 
to be more parsimonious than concurrent 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models in which the selected measures of 
composition of the economy are transition variables. At the same time, state-dependency of 
the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅-type is identified for the output gap equation for both variables. 
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The diagnostic tests reveal no problems at a 1% significance level. 
 
Table 6.14 Final model selection when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of composition of 
the economy 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 short data description 
inflation 
equation 
output gap 
equation 
interest rate 
equation 
𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡 Labour share in nonfarm business sector 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑠𝑣𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 
Services: value added: percent of gross domestic product 
(nominal ratio) 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
 
Table 6.15 P-values of diagnostic tests when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of 
composition of the economy 
Eq. 
 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
 
Functional 
form 
 
𝐻0: no 
autocorrelation 
 𝐻0: correct functional form  
𝐻0: normal 
distribution 
    
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Jarque-Bera 
   𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  
𝑥𝑡  
 𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.840 0.743  0.446 0.401  0.588 0.533  0.707 
 𝑠𝑣𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.921 0.863  0.434 0.394  0.122 0.098  0.684 
 
6.5.7 State-dependency with respect to measures of potential growth and development 
The algorithm of model selection employed here finds 2, 1 and 2 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models (out of 6 
chances) to be more parsimonious than the linear baselines of the inflation, output gap and 
interest rate equations, respectively. Interestingly, in all three cases the potential GDP is found 
to be a relevant transition variable – a result which is unique for all of the investigated 
transition variables. Such an outcome may question whether the standard approach of separate 
modelling of the business cycle and long-term growth is not an excessive simplification. After 
all, the long-run neutrality of monetary policy, which usually serves as a main justification for 
such a paradigm, does not imply that potential growth exerts no impact on e.g. price-setting 
and investment decisions of the firms or central bankers’ decision making-process. 
As far as the diagnostic tests are concerned, the only problem detected at a 1% significance 
level is the lack of normal distribution of residuals in one inflation equation (with respect to 
research and development to the GDP real ratio). As was already mentioned before, in such a 
case the results of the other diagnostic test for that equation should be treated with caution. 
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Table 6.16 Final model selection when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of potential growth 
and development 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 Short data description 
inflation 
equation 
output gap 
equation 
interest rate 
equation 
𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 
Real potential gross domestic product, annualised percent change 
from quarter ago 
𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
𝑟𝑑_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 
Real gross domestic product: research and development, percent of 
real gross domestic product, (real ratio) 
𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑟𝑑𝑡 
Real gross domestic product: research and development, annualised 
percent change from quarter ago 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑝𝑎_𝑟𝑡 
Patent applications, residents, annualised percent change from 
quarter ago 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑝𝑎_𝑟𝑛𝑡 
Patent applications, residents + nonresidents, annualised percent 
change from quarter ago 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
 
Table 6.17 P-values of diagnostic tests when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of potential 
growth and development 
Eq. 
 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
 
Functional 
form 
 
𝐻0: no 
autocorrelation 
 𝐻0: correct functional form  
𝐻0: normal 
distribution 
    
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Jarque-Bera 
   𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  
𝜋𝑡  
 𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.052 0.032  0.142 0.107  0.224 0.169  0.290 
 𝑟𝑑_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.488 0.383  0.429 0.389  0.442 0.392  0.001 
𝑥𝑡   𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.381 0.291  0.855 0.838  0.957 0.949  0.774 
𝑖𝑡  𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.666 0.524  0.490 0.440  0.647 0.590  0.186 
 
6.5.8 State-dependency with respect to measures of financial development 
In line with the model selection procedure, the inflation equation is found to reveal no state-
dependency of the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅-type with respect to the proposed transition variables, while assets 
held by money market mutual funds to GDP are detected to yield more parsimonious 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 
models for the output gap and the interest rate equations than the linear baselines. 
No problems are detected at either a 1% or 5% significance level. 
 
Table 6.18 Final model selection when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of financial 
development of the economy 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 Short data description 
inflation 
equation 
output gap 
equation 
interest rate 
equation 
Money supply to GDP ratios 
𝑚𝑧𝑚_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 
MZM (money zero maturity) stock to gross domestic product 
(nominal ratio) 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑚2_𝑔𝑑𝑝
𝑡
 M2 money stock to gross domestic product (nominal ratio) 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
137 
 
Bank assets ratios 
𝑡𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 
Total assets at all commercial banks, percent of gross domestic 
product (nominal ratio) 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑏𝑐_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 
Bank credit at all commercial banks, percent of gross domestic 
product (nominal ratio) 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑏𝑐_𝑑𝑡 
Bank credit at all commercial banks, percent of deposits of all 
commercial banks 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑐𝑙_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 
Consumer loans at all commercial banks, percent of gross 
domestic product (nominal ratio) 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑟𝑒𝑙_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 
Real estate loans at all commercial banks, percent of gross 
domestic product (nominal ratio) 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑡𝑎𝑠_𝑡𝑎𝑡 
Treasury and agency securities at all commercial banks, percent 
of total assets of all commercial banks 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑙𝑡𝑑_𝑑𝑡 
Large time deposits at all commercial banks, percent of deposits 
of all commercial banks 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑛𝑓𝑏_𝑐𝑏𝑡 
Total assets of nonfinancial corporate business, percent of total 
assets of all commercial banks 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
Other measures 
𝑚𝑓_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 
Money market mutual funds: total financial assets, percent of 
gross domestic product (nominal ratio) 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑡 Net interest margin for all U.S. banks 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑡 Return on average assets for all U.S. banks 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑘_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 
Wilshire 5000 Full Cap Price Index©, percent of gross 
domestic product (nominal ratio) 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
 
Table 6.19 P-values of diagnostic tests when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of financial 
development of the economy 
Eq. 
 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
 
Functional 
form 
 
𝐻0: no 
autocorrelation 
 𝐻0: correct functional form  
𝐻0: normal 
distribution 
    
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Jarque-Bera 
   𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  
𝑥𝑡  
 𝑚𝑧𝑚_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅  0.220 0.144  0.018 0.012  0.021 0.014  0.947 
 𝑚𝑓_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.845 0.748  0.087 0.067  0.140 0.108  0.398 
𝑖𝑡  𝑚𝑓_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.065 0.052  0.995 0.995  0.766 0.731  0.176 
 
6.5.9 State-dependency with respect to variables related to the ‘Greenspan conundrum’ 
According to the adopted model selection procedure and the hypothesis of the ‘Greenspan 
conundrum’, none of the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models is preferred over the linear baseline for neither of the 
equations nor the two proposed transition variables. Therefore we claim that, even if the 
Federal Reserve truly lost its leverage over long-term rates in the Greenspan era, there is little 
evidence that such a situation substantially affected the monetary transmission mechanism. 
Alternatively, the STAR framework is not potent to depict the analysed relation properly. 
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Table 6.20 Final model selection when modelling state-dependency with respect to variables related to 
‘Greenspan conundrum’ 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
  short data description 
inflation 
equation 
output gap 
equation 
interest rate 
equation 
𝑡10𝑦_3𝑚𝑡  
10-year treasury constant maturity rate minus 3-month treasury 
constant maturity rate 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑡10𝑦_𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑡  10-year treasury constant maturity rate minus federal funds rate 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
 
6.5.10 State-dependency with respect to variables related to some aspects of the 
Greenspan standard 
The algorithm of model selection employed here finds none of the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models to be 
preferred over the linear inflation equation. On the other hand, we detect 3 and 2 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 
models to be more parsimonious than the linear output gap and interest rate equations, 
respectively. Interestingly, although we have selected 6 variables related to the dynamics of 
the stock market (i.e. from the economic perspective this is the same fundamental variable), 
the results are far from being robust. 
 
Table 6.21 Final model selection when modelling state-dependency with respect to variables related to some 
aspects of Greenspan standard 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
  Short data description 
 inflation 
equation 
output gap 
equation 
interest rate 
equation 
Stock prices 
𝑠𝑝500𝑡  S&P 500©, annualised percent change from quarter ago  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑑𝑡  
NASDAQ Composite Index©, annualised percent change 
from quarter ago 
 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑡  
Wilshire 5000 Full Cap Price Index©, annualised percent 
change from quarter ago 
 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑑𝑗𝑐𝑡  
Dow Jones Composite©, annualised percent change from 
quarter ago 
 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑎𝑡  
Dow Jones Industrial Average©, annualised percent 
change from quarter ago 
 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑑100𝑡  
NASDAQ 100©, index, annualised percent change from 
quarter ago 
 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
Real estate prices 
𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑡  
S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index©, 
annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
ℎ𝑝𝑖𝑡  
All-transactions house price index by US FHFA, 
annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
Commodity prices 
𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑡  
Spot oil price: West Texas Intermediate©, dollars per 
barrel, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
𝑐𝑝𝑒𝑡  
World Bank commodity price data: energy, annualised 
percent change from quarter ago 
 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
𝑐𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑡  
World Bank commodity price data: nonenergy, annualised 
percent change from quarter ago 
 
𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
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Table 6.22 P-values of diagnostic tests when modelling when modelling state-dependency with respect to 
variables related to some aspects of Greenspan standard 
Eq. 
 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
 
Functional 
form 
 
𝐻0: no 
autocorrelation 
 𝐻0: correct functional form  
𝐻0: normal 
distribution 
    
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Jarque-Bera 
   𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  
𝑥𝑡  
 𝑠𝑝500𝑡  𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅  0.207 0.135  0.081 0.060  0.171 0.130  0.508 
 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2  0.621 0.477  0.113 0.086  0.013 0.009  0.893 
 𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑎𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2  0.612 0.484  0.823 0.800  0.031 0.023  0.870 
𝑖𝑡 
 𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.467 0.364  0.138 0.114  0.158 0.129  0.200 
 𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  0.333 0.213  0.558 0.503  0.440 0.367  0.124 
 
The diagnostic tests show that at a 1% significance level one output gap equation (with 
respect to the Wilshire 5000 Full Cap Price Index©) may suffer from an incorrect functional 
form. Such a result suggests that state-dependency in the analysed relationship may deviate 
from the estimated state-dependency of the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅-type. 
 
6.6 Summary 
In this subsection we specified, estimated and evaluated 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models which take into 
account explicit and implicit nonlinearity, and the state-dependency of the monetary 
transmission mechanism. The adopted procedure of model selection picked out a smaller 
number of 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models than was suggested by the linearity and state-independency tests 
performed in section 5, which means that in some cases the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 framework was incapable 
of delivering a more parsimonious nonlinear or state-dependent model than the linear baseline 
(despite the existence of nonlinearity and state-dependency at a 5% significance level). We 
argue that such results should not be interpreted as a weakness of the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 framework since 
criterions of statistical significance and parsimoniousness are not equivalent. As we argued in 
paragraph 6.2.4, the adopted approach ensures that the finally 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 selected models are 
‘better’ that the linear baseline not only from a statistical perspective but also a practice of 
econometric modelling. 
Similarly as in section 5 we found (see Table 6.23) that the departure from the linear baseline 
was particularly strong for the output gap equation (especially in the case of state-dependency 
with respect to measures of business cycle and climate, uncertainty, and composition of the 
economy). On the other hand the results were very weak in the case of the inflation equation 
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which suggests that time-dependent mechanisms of setting prices (e.g. Calvo 1983) provide a 
good enough modelling approximation of the real price-setting mechanisms. It also seems that 
the catalogue of relevant sources of state-dependency of the Taylor rule is relatively short and 
concentrates mainly on measures of business cycle and climate, monetary aggregates, some 
international aspects of globalisation, and real estate prices. Again it is worth recalling that 
our results contrast with the distribution of attention paid in the literature to the problem of 
nonlinearity and state-dependency of the Phillips curve, the IS curve, and the Taylor rule. 
 
Table 6.23 Percentage of cases in which a 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model was found more parsimonious than the linear baseline 
  inflation 
equation 
 
output gap 
equation 
 
interest rate 
equation 
 overall 
nonlinearity*  11%  22%  9%  14% 
state dependency  4%  33%  19%  19% 
business cycle and climate  0%  100%  75%  58% 
labour market conditions  0%  50%  25%  25% 
financial conditions  6%  33%  17%  19% 
 - indices of financial conditions  14%  43%  14%  24% 
 - monetary aggregates  0%  25%  50%  25% 
 - interest rate quality spreads  0%  0%  0%  0% 
 - quality of credit portfolio  0%  40%  0%  13% 
uncertainty  0%  100%  0%  33% 
globalisation  0%  20%  30%  17% 
 - world data  0%  25%  50%  25% 
 - U.S. data  0%  17%  17%  11% 
composition of the economy  0%  100%  0%  33% 
potential growth and development  40%  20%  20%  27% 
financial development  0%  14%  7%  7% 
 - money supply to GDP ratios  0%  50%  0%  17% 
 - bank assets ratios  0%  0%  0%  0% 
 - other measures  0%  25%  25%  17% 
Greenspan conundrum  0%  0%  0%  0% 
Greenspan standard  0%  27%  18%  15% 
 - stock prices  0%  50%  0%  17% 
 - real estate prices  0%  0%  50%  17% 
 - commodity prices  0%  0%  33%  11% 
* including indirect nonlinearity 
 
linear baseline 0% (0%, 20%] (20%, 40%] (40%, 60%] (60%, 80%] (80%, 100%] 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model 
 
As far as diagnostic tests are concerned, in the case of some of the estimated models, 
problems with an incorrect functional form were detected at a 1% significance level. Then, 
although the estimated 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models are more parsimonious than the linear baseline, the 
adopted functional form should be treated as the second-best choice, which does not 
approximate nonlinearity or state-dependency with enough detail. On the other hand, it is 
worth emphasising that the diagnostic tests do not reveal problems with autocorrelation in any 
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of the estimated 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models (at a 1% significance level). Such a result serves as evidence 
of properly specified system dynamics and is crucial from the perspective of the following 
section, in which an analysis of generalised impulse response functions is performed. 
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7. Asymmetry of monetary transmission  
7.1 Introduction 
In this section we analyse generalised impulse response functions in the context of asymmetry 
of monetary transmission. Bearing in mind the scope of the thesis, we are interested in the 
responses of model variables to interest rate shocks. As was defined in subsection 1.6, we 
distinguish three types of asymmetry: sign, size and state asymmetries. The sign and size 
asymmetries are discussed in subsection 7.2, while state asymmetry is discussed in subsection 
7.3. In each case, before proceeding to a discussion of the results, we shortly present the 
applied method of deriving generalised impulse response functions.  
 
7.2 Sign and size asymmetry 
7.2.1 The method 
The analysis of sign and size asymmetries of monetary transmission is based on the 
generalised impulse response functions derived from the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model as was presented in 
subsections 6.3 (modelling nonlinearity) and the 3 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models as were presented in 
subsection 6.4 (modelling indirect forms of nonlinearity).
69
 For each transition variable which 
is mathematically potent to deliver sign and size asymmetries and was found to be an 
important source of explicit or implicit nonlinearity in subsections 6.3 and 6.4 (i.e. via the 
presented model selection procedure), we construct a system of three equations constituting a 
small model of the monetary transmission mechanism. As a result, we obtain a set of 
monetary transmission models in which at least one of the three equations is 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅. There are 
4 such models, the list of which is presented in Table 7.1. 
 
Table 7.1 Models of the monetary transmission mechanism employed for analysis of sign a size asymmetry 
No.  𝑧𝑡 / 𝑠𝑡  inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
1  𝑥𝑡−1  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
2  𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀   𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
3  𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀   𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
4  𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉   𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
                                                          
69
 We choose only models which are mathematically potent to deliver sign and size asymmetries, i.e. for which 
there is a link between the value of the switching variable and the interest rate shock. In the case of all models 
from subsection 6.5, the values of the switching variables are unaffected by the values of endogenous variables 
and, in consequence, those models are not useful in the context of an analysis of sign and size asymmetries. 
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The rationale for using 4 models of monetary transmission is to check whether eventual sign 
and size asymmetries are prevalent features of the estimated (explicitly or implicitly) 
nonlinear models of monetary transmission or, perhaps, such a feature crucially depends on 
the choice of transition variable. Such a robustness check is important because the reviewed 
studies on asymmetries in monetary transmission for the U.S. economy (see Table A1.5 in 
Appendix A.1) show that empirical evidence regarding sign and size asymmetries is mixed. 
Conceivably, different results may come from different frameworks and different choices of 
threshold or transition variables.  This problem is all the more important because the sign and 
size asymmetries are the by-products (mathematical consequences) of the adopted model 
functional forms rather than the intrinsic features of the impulse response functions. Since the 
impulse response functions are directly unobservable and must be derived conditionally on 
the estimated model, the adopted functional form of the model necessarily imposes strong 
restrictions on the functional form of the impulse responses. Therefore the properties of the 
impulse response functions cannot be precisely separated from the properties of the functional 
form of the model. Robustness checks help to alleviate this problem. 
Bearing in mind that we are dealing with a nonlinear dynamic system and under such a setting 
a deterministic solution yields biased results, the generalised impulse response functions are 
calculated with the use of stochastic simulations with 10000 repetitions and bootstrap 
techniques. More precisely, innovations are drawn (in triplets) randomly with replacement  
from the model residuals assuming an empirical covariance matrix. 
For each observation in a sample, we define 101 monetary shocks, which corresponds to 
percentiles (from 𝑝0 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 to 𝑝100 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥) of the empirical distribution of residuals from the 
relevant interest rate equation, while the actual values of the models’ variables serve as a data 
environment for impulse propagation. In other words, the method of deriving generalised 
impulse response functions is designed to employ only the estimation sample and data which 
could have been ‘seen’ by the model – the aim of such a procedure is to avoid problems that 
were raised by the Lucas critique (1976). 
As a result of the exercises which were described above, for each model, model variable, 
percentile of empirical distribution of interest shocks and point in time when the shock is 
initialised, we obtain a density of 10000 generalised impulse response functions: 
 
𝑮𝑰𝑹𝑭𝑡+ℎ,𝑝(𝑦, ?̂?𝑖,𝑡,𝑝, Ω𝑡) = 𝐸{𝑦𝑡+ℎ|?̂?𝑖,𝑡,𝑝, Ω𝑡} −  𝐸{𝑦𝑡+ℎ|Ω𝑡}, 𝑝 = 0,… , 100, ℎ ∈ ℕ
+ 
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In such a notation, 𝑦 ∈ {𝜋, 𝑥, 𝑖} designates a variable whose impulse response we are 
interested in; Ω𝑡 = {𝜋𝑡, 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑖𝑡} represents the data environment in which impulse propagation 
takes place, while ?̂?𝑖,𝑡,𝑝 is an interest rate shock defined on the basis of residuals from the 
relevant interest rate equation. 
It is convenient to divide the obtained generalised impulse response functions by the initial 
shock so as to standardise the measure: 
 
𝑺𝑮𝑰𝑹𝑭𝑡+ℎ,𝑝(𝑦, ?̂?𝑖,𝑡,𝑝, Ω𝑡) =
𝑮𝑰𝑹𝑭𝑡+ℎ,𝑝(𝑦,?̂?𝑖,𝑡,𝑝,Ω𝑡)
?̂?𝑖,𝑡,𝑝
,  𝑝 = 0,… , 100, ℎ ∈ ℕ+ 
 
In order to reduce the dimension of the analysed problem, we sum the values of each of the 
generalised impulse response functions over 16 periods after the shock is initialised and we 
receive distributions of 10000 scalars which stand for cumulative standardised responses of 
the chosen model variable to a particular percentile of the interest rate shock in a particular 
point in time: 
 
𝑪𝑺𝑮𝑰𝑹𝑭𝑡,𝑝(𝑦, ?̂?𝑖,𝑡,𝑝, Ω𝑡) = ∑ 𝑺𝑮𝑰𝑹𝑭𝑡+ℎ,𝑝(𝑦, ?̂?𝑖,𝑡,𝑝, Ω𝑡)
16
ℎ=0    𝑝 = 0,… , 100 
 
Instead of mapping every single value out of 10000 repetitions, for each percentile of interest 
rate shock we track three measures which characterise the obtained distributions, i.e. the 
median, 5𝑡ℎ and 95𝑡ℎ percentiles: 
 
𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡,𝑝
𝑀 (𝑦, Ω𝑡) = 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 (𝑪𝑺𝑮𝑰𝑹𝑭𝑡,𝑝(𝑦, ?̂?𝑖,𝑡,𝑝, Ω𝑡))    𝑝 = 0,… , 100 
𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡,𝑝
𝑃5(𝑦, Ω𝑡) = 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒5 (𝑪𝑺𝑮𝑰𝑹𝑭𝑡(𝑦, ?̂?𝑖,𝑡,𝑝, Ω𝑡))  𝑝 = 0,… , 100 
𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡,𝑝
𝑃95(𝑦, Ω𝑡) = 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒95 (𝑪𝑺𝑮𝑰𝑹𝑭𝑡(𝑦, ?̂?𝑖,𝑡,𝑝, Ω𝑡))  𝑝 = 0,… , 100 
 
Since the proposed measures are calculated for each point in time, we keep the sample 
average of the proposed measures and eliminate the influence of a particular data environment 
in which impulse propagation takes place
70
: 
                                                          
70
 In other words, for now we focus our attention on sign and size asymmetry and put aside state asymmetry for 
later analysis in subsection 7.3. 
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𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝑦) =
∑ 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡,𝑝
𝑀 (𝑦,Ω𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
, 
𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑃5(𝑦) =
∑ 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡,𝑝
𝑃5(𝑦,Ω𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
, 
𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑃95(𝑦) =
∑ 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡,𝑝
𝑃95(𝑦,Ω𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑇
,  𝑇 = 71 (from 1988Q2 to 2005Q4)  
 
In the end, for each model and each model variable we have 101 observations of four 
variables: percentiles of empirical distribution of interest rate shock and corresponding 
measures of the median, 5𝑡ℎ and 95𝑡ℎ percentiles of the empirical distribution of a 
(cumulative standardised) generalised impulse response. 
The idea behind the analysis which will be performed in the subsequent paragraphs is to 
check whether relations between the percentiles of the empirical distribution of interest rate 
shock and the proposed measures (or the ratios defined on their basis) are existent. In 
particular, we are interested what the roles of sign and size of the interest rate shock are. It is 
worth noting that the proposed measures should be constant for any linear model, while the 
model’s nonlinearity implies their nonzero variance but not necessarily sign or size 
asymmetry.  
In the following paragraphs we analyse and discuss three aspects of potential sign and size 
asymmetries of monetary transmission. In paragraph 7.2.2, where we look at 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝑦), 
we are dealing with the asymmetric effects of monetary policy shocks on model variables. In 
paragraph 7.2.3, on the basis of 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝑦), we define additional measures of effectiveness 
and efficiency of monetary policy shocks and we investigate the asymmetric behaviour of the 
proposed ratios. Paragraph 7.2.4, where we analyse the skew of the distribution, discusses 
asymmetric risk and structural uncertainty of monetary transmission. At the end of this 
subsection we present general conclusions from the performed analysis of sign and size 
asymmetries. 
 
7.2.2 Asymmetric effects of monetary policy shocks on model variables 
Being aware of the sign and size asymmetries of the effects of interest rate shocks lies at the 
heart of conducting a successful monetary policy. If restrictive actions are more powerful at 
influencing inflation or economic activity than positive actions, the monetary authorities have 
strong incentives to avoid continuous fine-tuning of the economy. Similarly, if large shocks 
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have different unitary effects than small shocks, central bankers would probably not be 
indifferent to ‘serving a cold turkey’ and moving gradually when conducting the disinflation 
policy. In other words, sign and size asymmetries are closely related to fundamental dilemmas 
of the monetary policy strategy.  
Taking into account the presented considerations, we estimate simple regressions: 
 
𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝑦) = 𝛼−𝟙𝑝
− + 𝛼+𝟙𝑝
+ + 𝛽−?̂?𝑖,𝑝
− + 𝛽+𝑣𝑖,𝑝
+ + 𝜀𝑝   𝑝 = 0,… , 100 (7.1) 
where: 
𝟙𝑝
− = {
1   𝑖𝑓   𝑣𝑖,𝑝 < 0 
0   𝑖𝑓   𝑣𝑖,𝑝 ≥ 0
  𝑣𝑖,𝑝
− = {
𝑣𝑖,𝑝   𝑖𝑓   𝑣𝑖,𝑝 < 0 
0      𝑖𝑓   𝑣𝑖,𝑝 ≥ 0
   
𝟙𝑝
+ = {
1   𝑖𝑓   𝑣𝑖,𝑝 ≥ 0 
0   𝑖𝑓   𝑣𝑖,𝑝 < 0
  𝑣𝑖,𝑝
+ = {
𝑣𝑖,𝑝   𝑖𝑓   𝑣𝑖,𝑝 ≥ 0 
0      𝑖𝑓   𝑣𝑖,𝑝 < 0
 
 
Using the Wald test, we test two main and two auxiliary null hypotheses: 
1. 𝐻0
1: 𝛼− = 𝛼+ 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝛽− = 𝛽+ 
a. 𝐻0
1𝑎: 𝛼− = 𝛼+ 
b. 𝐻0
1𝑏: 𝛽− = 𝛽+ 
2. 𝐻0
2:  𝛽− = 𝛽+ = 0 
 
Under 𝐻0
1 there is no sign asymmetry – 𝐻0
1𝑎 assumes there is no difference in average effects 
of negative and positive interest rate shocks, while 𝐻0
1𝑏is specific that size asymmetry, if it 
exists, works in a similar manner for both negative and positive shocks. Similarly, 𝐻0
2 
assumes that there is no size asymmetry (expressed as a piecewise linear function between the 
size of a shock and the impulse response). 
Table 7.2 presents the summary findings based on regressions (7.1) for 𝑦 ∈ {𝜋, 𝑥, 𝑖}. The 
subsequent columns contain information on the detected relations between 𝛼− and 𝛼+, 𝛽− 
and  𝛽+, and 𝛽∓ and 0 for 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝜋), 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝑥) and 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝑖) at a 5% 
significance level. More detailed regression outputs are available in Appendix A.8 in Tables 
A8.1 – A8.3. 
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Table 7.2 Summary results of estimation of equation (7.1) and subsequent tests for 𝑦 ∈ {𝜋, 𝑥, 𝑖}  
No. 𝑧𝑡 / 𝑠𝑡 
 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝜋)  𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝑥)  𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝑖) 
 𝛼− v. 𝛼+ 𝛽− v. 𝛽+ 𝛽∓ v. 0  𝛼− v. 𝛼+ 𝛽− v. 𝛽+ 𝛽∓ v. 0  𝛼− v. 𝛼+ 𝛽− v. 𝛽+ 𝛽∓ v. 0 
1 𝑥𝑡−1  - - 𝛽
∓ < 0  - - 𝛽∓ < 0  - - 𝛽∓ < 0 
2 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀   - - 𝛽∓ > 0  - - 𝛽∓ > 0  - - 𝛽+ > 0 
3 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀   - 𝛽− > 𝛽+ 𝛽∓ > 0  - 𝛽− < 𝛽+ 𝛽∓ < 0  - 𝛽− > 𝛽+ 𝛽+ > 0 
4 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉   - - 𝛽∓ > 0  - - 𝛽∓ > 0  - - 𝛽∓ < 0 
 
The exercise performed here reveals that no model implies significant sign asymmetries with 
respect to average effects of positive and negative monetary shocks (𝛼− v. 𝛼+), and only one 
model (no. 3) delivers a different linear reaction of 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝑦) to positive and negative 
interest rate shocks.  
As far as size asymmetry is concerned, the detected patterns of inequalities between 𝛽∓ and 0 
are also very mixed: 
 for 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝜋) all models predict size asymmetry – in 3 cases the detected relation 
is positive, while in 1 case it is negative 
 for 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝑥) all models predict size asymmetry – in 2 cases the detected relation 
is positive, while in 2 cases it is negative 
 for 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝑖) all models predict size asymmetry – in 2 cases the detected relation 
is positive, while in 2 cases it is negative.  
The results obtained here do not allow us to come to a final conclusion that sign and size 
asymmetries are prevalent features of monetary transmission, as only one model detects 
significant sign asymmetry. On the contrary, all of the models pointed to significant size 
asymmetries, but there was no consensus whether the relation was positive or negative. We 
claim, therefore, that the existence of sign and size asymmetries of the effects of interest rate 
shocks on model variables is dubious. Before drawing final conclusions, however, we also 
analyse the behaviour of ratios of effectiveness and efficiency of monetary policy shocks for 
which patterns of asymmetry could be potentially more robust. 
 
7.2.3 Effectiveness and efficiency of the discretionary monetary policy 
From the monetary policy perspective an analysis of sign and size asymmetry should take into 
account that the interest rate is a policy variable which remains under the control of a central 
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bank. Therefore, the monetary authorities might be interested in relative measures of response 
of inflation and the output gap as compared to response of the interest rate to monetary policy 
shock. We propose two such measures (one with respect to inflation and one with respect to 
the output gap), which we call measures of effectiveness of the discretionary monetary policy: 
 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝜋) = 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝜋)/𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝑖)  
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑥) = 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝑥)/𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝑖)  
 
Because the proposed measures are in fact ratios which standardise the response of inflation 
and the output gap with respect to the response of interest rate shock, one may expect that the 
patterns of sign and size asymmetries could be different (e.g. more robust) than the ones 
presented in the previous paragraph.   
Since the monetary authorities are usually interested in either lowering inflation at a possibly 
low output cost or boosting the economy at a possibly low inflation cost, we also propose a 
simple ratio of efficiency of the discretionary monetary policy
71
. 
 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 = 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝑥)/𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝜋) 
 
Intuitively, central bankers would usually like to maximise the proposed ratio when loosening 
the monetary conditions and to minimise it when tightening the monetary conditions. 
Just as in the case of measures of effectiveness of the discretionary monetary policy, 
standardisation of the response of output with respect to the response of inflation to interest 
rate shock is theoretically potent to deliver qualitatively different patterns of sign and size 
asymmetries from those observed in the previous paragraph. 
Similarly as before, we perform the analysis of sign and size asymmetries on the basis of 
regressions in the spirit of (7.1) and subsequent tests, where 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝑦) is substituted with 
the proposed measures of effectiveness and efficiency of the discretionary monetary policy.  
Table 7.3 presents the summary findings, while more detailed regression outputs are available 
in Tables A8.4 – A8.6 in Appendix A8. 
                                                          
71
 If someone is a proponent of the monetarists’ view that ‘inflation is always and everywhere a monetary 
phenomenon’ or treats inflation as a policy variable, the proposed ratio might be seen as another measure of 
effectiveness of the monetary policy. 
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Table 7.3 Summary results of estimation of equation (7.1) and subsequent tests for the proposed measures of 
effectiveness and efficiency of discretionary monetary policy.  
No. 𝑧𝑡 / 𝑠𝑡 
 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝜋)  𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑥)  𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 
 𝛼− v. 𝛼+ 𝛽− v. 𝛽+ 𝛽∓ v. 0  𝛼− v. 𝛼+ 𝛽− v. 𝛽+ 𝛽∓ v. 0  𝛼− v. 𝛼+ 𝛽− v. 𝛽+ 𝛽∓ v. 0 
1 𝑥𝑡−1  - - 𝛽
∓ < 0  - - 𝛽∓ < 0  - - 𝛽∓ < 0 
2 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀   - - 𝛽∓ > 0  - - 𝛽∓ > 0  - - 𝛽∓ > 0 
3 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀   - 𝛽− > 𝛽+ -  - 𝛽− < 𝛽+ 𝛽∓ < 0  - 𝛽− < 𝛽+ 𝛽∓ < 0 
4 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉   - - 𝛽∓ > 0  - - 𝛽∓ > 0  - - 𝛽∓ > 0 
 
The patterns we observe in Table 7.3 are qualitatively very similar to those in Table 7.2. 
Despite the standardisation, the results of sign and size asymmetries for the proposed ratios 
are still far from being robust. As previously, we interpret such an outcome as a lack of 
empirical support for the existence of strong sign and asymmetries of monetary transmission. 
 
7.2.4 Asymmetric risk and structural uncertainty 
Official FOMC statements and minutes reveal that the monetary authorities’ decisions are 
based not only on expected paths of the economy under considered scenarios, but also on a 
balance of risks or uncertainties regarding possible policy actions. As was already discussed 
in subsections 1.7, nonlinearity of the model implies an inherent uncertainty of monetary 
transmission, even if the true model and its parameters are known; this is a feature which is 
not shared by linear models. Therefore, nonlinear models of the monetary transmission 
mechanism serve as natural workhorses for analysing the risks and uncertainties of monetary 
impulse propagation. Bearing in mind the scope of this thesis, we are particularly interested in 
investigating the asymmetry of monetary transmission risk, which is the reason for which we 
define 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑆𝑘(𝑦): 
 
𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡,𝑝
𝑆𝑘(𝑦) =
{
 
 
𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡,𝑝
𝑃95(𝑦)−𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡,𝑝
𝑀 (𝑦)
𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡,𝑝
𝑀 (𝑦)−𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡,𝑝
𝑃5(𝑦)
− 1        𝑖𝑓   
𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡,𝑝
𝑃95(𝑦)−𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡,𝑝
𝑀 (𝑦)
𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡,𝑝
𝑀 (𝑦)−𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡,𝑝
𝑃5(𝑦)
≥ 1
−
𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡,𝑝
𝑀 (𝑦)−𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡,𝑝
𝑃5(𝑦)
𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡,𝑝
𝑃95(𝑦)−𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡,𝑝
𝑀 (𝑦)
+ 1    𝑖𝑓   
𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡,𝑝
𝑃95(𝑦)−𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡,𝑝
𝑀 (𝑦)
𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡,𝑝
𝑀 (𝑦)−𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡,𝑝
𝑃5(𝑦)
< 1
   
 
The proposed measure captures the relative asymmetry between the 95𝑡ℎ and 5𝑡ℎ percentile 
and it is standardised as to be symmetric with respect to 0. If the measure is above 0, the 
distribution of (cumulative standardised) impulse responses has a positive skew, which might 
be perceived as an upward risk for the path of the impulse response. Although the median 
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implies that both positive and negative deviations are equally probable – the positive 
deviations are expected to be larger than the negative ones once they happen. 
Analogously as in the previous paragraph, we perform an analysis of the sign and size 
asymmetry of 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑆𝑘(𝑦) on the basis of equation (7.1), in which we substitute 
𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝑦) with 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑆𝑘(𝑦). In this case, however, we slightly modify the set of verified 
hypotheses in order to take into account that 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑆𝑘(𝑦) is a measure of the asymmetry 
itself – by using the Wald test we test two main and four auxiliary null hypotheses: 
1. 𝐻0
1: 𝛼− = 𝛼+ = 0 
a. 𝐻0
1𝑎: 𝛼− = 𝛼+ 
b. 𝐻0
1𝑏: 𝛼− = −𝛼+ 
2. 𝐻0
2:  𝛽− = 𝛽+ = 0 
a. 𝐻0
2𝑎: 𝛽− = 𝛽+ 
b. 𝐻0
2𝑏: 𝛽− = −𝛽+ 
In 𝐻0
1 we test whether the distribution of (cumulative standardised) impulse responses has a 
non-zero skew, while in 𝐻0
1𝑎 and 𝐻0
1𝑏 we check if the skew has the same absolute value for 
positive and negative interest rate shocks (sign asymmetry). Analogously, in 𝐻0
2, 𝐻0
2𝑎 and 𝐻0
2𝑏 
we test whether the skew depends on the size of the shock (size asymmetry) and, if yes, 
whether the linear function is odd or even with respect to monetary shocks (size and sign 
asymmetries). 
Tables 7.4 – 7.6 present the summary findings based on the presented method of analysis. 
More detailed results are available in Tables A8.7 – A8.10 in Appendix 8. 
 
Table 7.4 Summary results of estimation of equation (7.1) and corresponding tests for 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑆𝑘(𝜋) 
No. 𝑧𝑡 / 𝑠𝑡  |𝛼
−| v. |𝛼+| 𝛼∓ v. 0 |𝛽−| v. |𝛽+| 𝛽∓ v. 0  𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛  𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 
1 𝑥𝑡−1  𝛼
− = −𝛼+ 𝛼− > 0, 𝛼+ < 0 𝛽− = 𝛽+ 𝛽∓ < 0  0.017  -1.381 
2 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀   |𝛼−| > |𝛼+| 𝛼− > 0, 𝛼+ < 0 |𝛽−| < |𝛽+| 𝛽− > 0, 𝛽+ < 0  -0.177  -3.219 
3 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀   𝛼− = −𝛼+ 𝛼− < 0, 𝛼+ > 0 𝛽− = 𝛽+ 𝛽∓ > 0  0.139  1.180 
4 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉   𝛼− = −𝛼+ 𝛼− < 0, 𝛼+ > 0 𝛽− = −𝛽+ 𝛽− < 0, 𝛽+ > 0  0.085  2.496 
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Table 7.5 Summary results of estimation of equation (7.1) and corresponding tests for 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑆𝑘(𝑥) 
No. 𝑧𝑡 / 𝑠𝑡  |𝛼
−| v. |𝛼+| 𝛼∓ v. 0 |𝛽−| v. |𝛽+| 𝛽∓ v. 0  𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛  𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 
1 𝑥𝑡−1  |𝛼
−| > |𝛼+| 𝛼− > 0, 𝛼+ < 0 |𝛽−| = |𝛽+| 𝛽∓ = 0  0.188  -1.209 
2 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀   |𝛼−| > |𝛼+| 𝛼− > 0, 𝛼+ < 0 |𝛽−| < |𝛽+| 𝛽+ < 0  -0.209  -3.701 
3 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀   |𝛼−| > |𝛼+| 𝛼− > 0, 𝛼+ < 0 |𝛽−| < |𝛽+| 𝛽∓ < 0  -0.374  -2.681 
4 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉   𝛼− = 𝛼+ 𝛼− < 0, 𝛼+ > 0 𝛽− = −𝛽+ 𝛽− < 0, 𝛽+ > 0  0.078  2.241 
 
Table 7.6 Summary results of estimation of equation (7.1) and corresponding tests for 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑆𝑘(𝑖) 
No. 𝑧𝑡 / 𝑠𝑡  |𝛼
−| v. |𝛼+| 𝛼∓ v. 0 |𝛽−| v. |𝛽+| 𝛽∓ v. 0  𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛  𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 
1 𝑥𝑡−1  𝛼
− = −𝛼+ 𝛼− > 0 |𝛽−| = |𝛽+| 𝛽∓ = 0  0.445  -1.189 
2 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀   |𝛼−| > |𝛼+| 𝛼− > 0, 𝛼+ < 0 |𝛽−| < |𝛽+| 𝛽− > 0, 𝛽+ < 0  -0.191  -3.453 
3 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀   |𝛼−| < |𝛼+| 𝛼− < 0, 𝛼+ > 0 |𝛽−| < |𝛽+| 𝛽∓ > 0  0.112  0.429 
4 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉   |𝛼−| > |𝛼+| 𝛼− > 0, 𝛼+ < 0 𝛽− = −𝛽+ 𝛽− > 0, 𝛽+ < 0  -0.072  -2.315 
 
Similarly as before, a very profound lack of robustness does not allow to point to any 
distinctive patterns of sign and size asymmetries. What is more, the obtained results are 
ambiguous even if the sign of the skew of distribution of (cumulative standardised) impulse 
responses is concerned. Some models suggest that the average or median risk for the impulse 
responses of a particular model variable is positive, while other models contradict this 
statement and induce the opposite view. In our opinion, such a strong discrepancy should be 
perceived as a lack of empirical support for the existence of sign and size asymmetries. In the 
following paragraph, in which we present general conclusions from the analysis of sign and 
size asymmetries, we elaborate on this issue in greater detail.  
 
7.2.5 General conclusions from the analysis of sign and size asymmetries 
We believe that the most important conclusion which can be drawn from the analysis of sign 
and size asymmetries of the (cumulative standardised) impulse responses presented here is 
that the results are highly dependent on the employed transition variable. As we have already 
mentioned, size and sign asymmetries are to a great extent the by-products of the nonlinear 
function being used and, manifestly, the adopted framework is not potent to solve, in this 
context, the problem of identification. 
Taking the above into consideration, it comes as no surprise that empirical evidence for sign 
and size asymmetries is mixed (see Table A1.5 in Appendix A.1) in the literature. Of the 6 
analysed studies which discussed the problem of sign or size asymmetries, 3 were based on 
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threshold 𝑉𝐴𝑅 models; 2 were based on smooth transition 𝑉𝐸𝐶𝑀 or 𝑉𝐴𝑅 models and 1 on 
nonparametric propensity score weighting. Since any threshold model may be perceived as a 
restricted smooth transition model, at least 5 of the 6 analysed studies may be flawed with a 
profound lack of robustness with respect to the choice of threshold/transition variable. The 
problem is even more serious if we acknowledge that some inconclusive or frail results or 
studies may not have been published due to research and publications biases. 
As was already stated in the previous paragraphs, we claim that the observed lack of 
robustness does not allow one to support the view that distinctive sign and size asymmetries 
are prevalent features of monetary transmission. Nevertheless, a statement that the sign and 
size asymmetries are, according to our research, non-existent would be abusive, since 
obviously the ‘absence of evidence is not evidence of absence’. 
The analysis conducted here reveals that a successful investigation of the problem of sign and 
size asymmetries of monetary transmission should probably be based on a framework that 
allows for precise identification of the impulse propagation mechanism itself rather than on 
identification of a model (treated as a system of structural equations linking the endogenous 
variables) which later gives rise to impulse responses. Estimation based on propensity score 
weighting which was proposed by Angrist, Jordà, and Kuersteiner (2013) seems to be a very 
promising tool in that context. 
 
7.3 State asymmetry 
7.3.1 The method 
The analysis of state asymmetry of monetary transmission is based on the generalised impulse 
response functions derived from the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models as presented in subsections 6.3 (modelling 
nonlinearity), 6.4 (modelling indirect forms of nonlinearity) and 6.5 (modelling state-
dependency). 
In the case of the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model from subsection 6.3 (modelling nonlinearity) and 3 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 
models from subsection 6.4 (modelling indirect forms of nonlinearity), generalised impulse 
response functions are calculated by using stochastic simulations with 100000 repetitions and 
the bootstrap technique, according to which the innovations are drawn (in triplets) randomly, 
with replacement from the model residuals assuming the empirical covariance matrix. 
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For each observation in a sample, a model is treated with an interest rate shock equal to the 
mean squared residual from a relevant interest rate equation, while the actual values of the 
models’ variables serve as a data environment for impulse propagation. Again, the method of 
deriving generalised impulse response functions is designed to employ only the estimation 
sample and data which could have been ‘seen’ by the model – the aim of such a procedure is 
to avoid problems as were raised by the Lucas critique (1976). 
As a result of the exercises described here, for each model, model variable and point in time 
when the shock is initialised, we obtain a density of 100000 generalised impulse response 
functions:  
 
𝑮𝑰𝑹𝑭𝑡+ℎ(𝑦, ?̂?𝑖,𝑡, Ω𝑡) = 𝐸{𝑦𝑡+ℎ|?̂?𝑖,𝑡, Ω𝑡} −  𝐸{𝑦𝑡+ℎ|Ω𝑡},     ℎ ∈ ℕ
+ 
 
After standardisation and summing over 16 periods, we track the median of the obtained 
distribution only: 
𝑺𝑮𝑰𝑹𝑭𝑡+ℎ(𝑦, Ω𝑡) =
𝑮𝑰𝑹𝑭𝑡+ℎ(𝑦,?̂?𝑖,𝑡,Ω𝑡)
?̂?𝑖,𝑡
,      ℎ ∈ ℕ+ 
 
𝑪𝑺𝑮𝑰𝑹𝑭𝑡(𝑦, Ω𝑡) = ∑ 𝑺𝑮𝑰𝑹𝑭𝑡+ℎ(𝑦, Ω𝑡)
16
ℎ=0     
 
𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑦, Ω𝑡) = 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛(𝑪𝑺𝑮𝑰𝑹𝑭𝑡(𝑦, Ω𝑡)) 
     
In the case of all 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models from subsection 6.5 (modelling state-dependency), the values 
of transition variables are unaffected by the values of endogenous variables. Therefore, we 
use a deterministic solution to calculate the impulse response functions to unitary shock
72
 for 
each observation in a sample. Similarly as before, the actual values of the models’ variables 
serve as a data environment for impulse propagation. We obtain a standardised impulse 
response function, which after summing over 16 periods gives rise to a cumulative 
standardised impulse response function: 
 
𝑆𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡+ℎ(𝑦, Ω𝑡) = 𝐸{𝑦𝑡+ℎ|?̂?𝑖,𝑡 = 1, Ω𝑡} −  𝐸{𝑦𝑡+ℎ|?̂?𝑖,𝑡 = 0,Ω𝑡},   ℎ ∈ ℕ
+ 
 
                                                          
72
 In the analysed models the impulse response functions are always proportional to the size of the initial shock. 
Therefore, setting the size of a shock to 1 is equivalent to standardisation of the impulse response function. 
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𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡(𝑦, Ω𝑡) = ∑ 𝑆𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡+ℎ(𝑦, Ω𝑡)
16
ℎ=0   
 
The two measures, 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑦, Ω𝑡) and 𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡(𝑦, Ω𝑡), are equivalent – for any model 
which is solved deterministically we can also calculate 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑦, Ω𝑡) by solving the model 
stochastically, and then 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑦, Ω𝑡) approaches 𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡(𝑦, Ω𝑡) as the number of 
repetitions goes to infinity. Therefore, in order to unify and simplify the notation we use 
𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑦, Ω𝑡) to also denote 𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡(𝑦, Ω𝑡). 
Analogously as in the previous subsection, we are interested in the following 6 measures 
describing monetary transmission
73
: 
 
 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 
 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 
 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑖, Ω𝑡) 
 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡(𝜋, Ω𝑡) = 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝜋, Ω𝑡)/𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑖, Ω𝑡)  
 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡(𝑥, Ω𝑡) = 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑥, Ω𝑡)/𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑖, Ω𝑡)  
 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑡(Ω𝑡) = 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑥, Ω𝑡)/𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 
 
The idea behind the analysis performed in the subsequent paragraphs is to check what the 
relation is between the proposed 6 measures and the relevant ‘nonlinear’ or ‘state’ transition 
variable with respect to which a particular 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model was estimated. Bearing in mind that 
such a relation might be very complex, we are interested in whether it is generally positive or 
negative. Therefore, we estimate a sequence of the following simple equations
74
: 
 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽
∑ 𝑠𝑡+ℎ
16
ℎ=0
16
+ 𝜀       (7.2) 
 
𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡 denotes any of the above-mentioned 6 measures characterising monetary 
transmission, while 𝑠𝑡 is the relevant ‘nonlinear’ or ‘state’ transition variable (we are 
interested in the mean value of 𝑠𝑡 over 16 quarters which corresponds to the time horizon 
over which we cumulate the impulse responses). 
                                                          
73
 Here we do not analyse asymmetric risk because the measure 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑆𝑘(𝑦, Ω𝑡) is not applicable for models 
which do not require a stochastic solution. 
74
 In each case we have 55 observations – the total size of a sample is 71 observations, but 16 observations are 
‘consumed’ for calculating cumulative impulse responses. 
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In the subsequent paragraphs we present the estimates of 𝛽 and the p-value of a simple t-test 
for statistical significance and we discuss the obtained results. We start from state asymmetry 
with respect to model variables (7.3.2), while later the sequence is the same as when we were 
testing and modelling state-dependency of the monetary transmission mechanism. 
 
7.3.2 State asymmetry with respect to model variables 
In this paragraph we check whether values of model variables during monetary impulse 
propagation have an influence on what monetary transmission looks like. Table 7.7 presents 
models which were used for the analysis of state asymmetry with respect to model variables, 
while Table 7.8 shows the relevant results of estimation of equations (7.2). Figure A9.1 in 
Appendix A.9 allows for a simple eyeball test. 
 
Table 7.7 Models of the monetary transmission mechanism employed for the analysis of state asymmetry with 
respect to the selected model variables 
No.  𝑧𝑡 / 𝑠𝑡  inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
1  𝑥𝑡−1  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
2  𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀   𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
3  𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀   𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
4  𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉   𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
 
Table 7.8 The results of estimation of equations (7.2) for the selected model variables 
No. 𝑧𝑡 / 𝑠𝑡  𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑖, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛(Ω𝑡) 
1 𝑥𝑡−1  
-0.037 -0.176 -0.153 -0.044 -0.109 0.126 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
2 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀   
-0.017 -0.092 -0.072 -0.027 -0.074 0.057 
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.005] 
3 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀   
0.851 -0.376 0.911 0.077 -0.020 0.155 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.647] 
4 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉   
-0.015 -0.009 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.001 
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.006] [0.003] 
 
The estimates for nos. 1 and 2 supply robust evidence that the response of all model variables 
to the monetary policy shock is smaller when the average value of the output gap is high, i.e. 
when the economy is in a boom period. A similar pattern is observed after standardisation 
against the interest rate – effectiveness of the monetary policy with respect to inflation and the 
output gap is significantly smaller when the economy is overheated. At the same time, 
efficiency of the monetary policy is higher when the output gap is positive than when it is 
negative. Such results are consistent with the findings presented in paragraph 2.3.3 and 
subsection 2.5. 
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If we look at variance of the output gap (no. 4) instead of at its average level, there is evidence 
that the response of the output gap and inflation is smaller, while the efficiency of the 
monetary policy is larger when the output gap is more volatile. 
As far as state asymmetry with respect to the interest rate is concerned, the results for no. 3 
suggest that monetary shocks have bigger effects on inflation and the interest rate when the 
level of the latter variable is high. The opposite is true for the output gap. The patterns of 
effectiveness of the monetary policy are similar – there exists a positive relation between the 
level of the interest rate and the effectiveness of the monetary policy with respect to inflation, 
while the opposite relation holds for the effectiveness of the monetary policy with respect to 
the output gap. Model no. 3 implies no such relation for the efficiency of the monetary policy. 
 
The results obtained here, taken together, suggest that the monetary policy may find it 
difficult to conduct disinflation when the economy is overheated since the sacrifice ratio is 
positively related to the level of the output gap.Therefore, the monetary authorities may have 
some incentives not to fight the boom but rather to wait until it is over and to drag the 
inflation down opportunistically when the economy is on the slide. By the same token, when 
the economy is in the doldrums, inflation remains relatively irresponsive to changes in the 
output gap.  
 
7.3.3 State asymmetry with respect to measures of business cycle and climate 
Here we verify and discuss the relations between the six measures describing monetary 
transmission and the selected measures of business cycle and climate which were found to 
yield 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models that are preferred over the linear baselines. Analogously as in the previous 
paragraph, Table 7.9 presents the models employed here, Table 7.10 reveals the results of 
estimation of equations (7.2), while Figure A9.2 in Appendix A.9 plots the investigated 
relations. 
According to the obtained estimates, the higher the capacity utilisation (no. 1), the higher the 
inflation response to monetary shock and the smaller the response of the interest rate. 
Capacity utilisation is positively related to the effectiveness of the monetary policy with 
respect to the output gap but negatively related with the efficiency of the monetary policy. 
Such results may strike as being somewhat ambiguous when compared with those from the 
previous paragraph because both capacity utilisation and the output gap may be perceived as 
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measures of slack in the economy. It is, however, important to recall that all ‘state’ transition 
variables were orthogonalised with respect to the model variables. Therefore, a high level of 
(orthogonalised) capacity utilisation may signal low supply rather than high demand. 
Moreover, the diagnostic tests revealed that the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model of the output gap, in which 
capacity utilisation is a transition variable, suffers from the problem of an incorrect functional 
form at a 1% significance level. Therefore, the obtained patterns of impulse responses should 
be treated with caution. 
 
Table 7.9 Models of the monetary transmission mechanism employed for the analysis of state asymmetry with 
respect to the selected measures of business cycle and climate 
No. 𝑠𝑡  Short data description  
inflation 
equation 
output gap 
equation 
interest rate 
equation 
1 𝑐𝑢𝑡  Capacity utilization  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
2 𝑎𝑖_𝑚𝑎𝑡  
Chicago Fed National Activity Index: three 
month moving average 
 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
3 𝑎𝑖_𝑑𝑖𝑡  
Chicago Fed National Activity Index: 
diffusion index 
 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
4 𝑐𝑠𝑡  
University of Michigan: Consumer 
Sentiment Index© 
 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
 
Table 7.10 The results of estimation of equations (7.2) for the selected measures of business cycle and climate 
No. 𝑠𝑡  𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑖, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝜋,Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛(Ω𝑡) 
1 𝑐𝑢𝑡  
0.035 0.004 -0.369 0.000 0.006 -0.061 
[0.000] [0.811] [0.000] [0.512] [0.000] [0.000] 
2 𝑎𝑖_𝑚𝑎𝑡  
-0.252 -1.607 -0.868 -0.033 -0.131 1.107 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
3 𝑎𝑖_𝑑𝑖𝑡  
-0.269 -3.093 -3.641 -0.082 -0.267 2.493 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
4 𝑐𝑠𝑡  
-0.016 -0.047 0.030 -0.002 -0.009 0.038 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
 
Although nos. 2, 3 and 4 give contradictory results when the response of the interest rate is 
concerned, they very robustly show that inflation and output gap responses and effectiveness 
of the monetary policy with respect to those variables are negatively related to the business 
climate. At the same time, corresponding relations for the efficiency of the monetary policy 
are positive. Such findings are consistent with those obtained in the previous paragraph when 
the output gap or its average level was treated as a transition variable. 
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7.3.4 State asymmetry with respect to measures of labour market conditions 
In this paragraph we test for state asymmetry of monetary transmission with respect to 
selected measures of labour market conditions. Table 7.11 reveals the models employed for 
the analysis and Table 7.12 shows the results of estimation of equations (7.2). The plots are 
available in Appendix A.9 (Figure A9.3). 
According to the test performed here, all measures describing the monetary transmission 
mechanism, apart from the efficiency of the monetary policy (statistically insignificant 
relation), are positively related to the dynamics of wages and salaries. In other words, the 
monetary policy is more effective at influencing inflation and the output gap when 
compensation growth is high. Such a result is observed due to state-dependency of the output 
gap equation and might be justified in the spirit of cumulative prospect theory – when growth 
of wages and salaries is low, any negative monetary shock may force consumers to reach their 
downward reference point. For a short period of time this constraint is binding because 
consumers have a strong aversion against consuming less than their reference point and, 
therefore, a restrictive monetary policy is temporarily ineffective at lowering consumption. In 
contrast, when growth of compensation is high, both positive and negative monetary shocks 
are effective because consumption is far above the temporarily binding constraint. 
Surprisingly, the patterns presented here are not shared by the model of monetary 
transmission in which the Labour Market Conditions Index is a transition variable. In this 
case, relations for the response of the interest rate and both measures of effectiveness of the 
monetary policy have an opposite sign. It is, however, important to recall that the 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
output gap equation was diagnosed (see Table 6.7) as suffering from an incorrect functional 
form, which should induce us to look at the obtained results with the utmost caution. 
Moreover, construction of the index
75
 reveals that it mainly correlates with measures of 
employment and unemployment, not compensation. Then, lower effectiveness of the 
monetary policy with respect to inflation and the output gap may result from difficulties in 
boosting the economy when it is close to full employment, i.e. when unemployment has a 
structural or frictional nature.  
 
 
                                                          
75
 see http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes/2014/assessing-the-change-in-labor-market-
conditions-20140522.html  
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Table 7.11 Models of the monetary transmission mechanism employed for the analysis of state asymmetry with 
respect to the selected measures of labour market conditions 
No. 𝑠𝑡  short data description  
inflation 
equation 
output gap 
equation 
interest rate 
equation 
1 𝑤&𝑠𝑡  
Compensation of employees: wages and salaries, 
annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
2 𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡  Labour Market Conditions Index  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
 
Table 7.12 The results of estimation of equations (7.2) for the selected measures of labour market conditions  
No. 𝑠𝑡  𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑖, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛(Ω𝑡) 
1 𝑤&𝑠𝑡  
0.085 0.173 0.140 0.028 0.068 3.097 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.674] 
2 𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡  
0.191 0.077 -1.378 -0.007 -0.003 0.001 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
 
7.3.5 State asymmetry with respect to measures of financial conditions 
The current paragraph deals with the problem of state asymmetry of monetary transmission 
with respect to selected measures of financial conditions. Analogously as in the previous 
paragraphs, the models, estimation results and corresponding graphs employed here are 
presented in Table 7.13, Table 7.14, and Figure A9.4 (Appendix A.9), respectively. 
Indices of financial conditions 
The detected patterns of state asymmetry of monetary transmission vary for different indices 
of financial conditions. The most distinctive result is obtained when the Chicago Fed National 
Financial Conditions Leverage Subindex serves as a transition variable (no. 2) – the responses 
of all model variables are negatively related to the level of this subindex (but estimates for 
both measures of effectiveness and efficiency of the monetary policy are statistically 
insignificant). At the same time, the other three indices predict the opposite relation for 
responses of the output gap and the interest rate, while there is no consensus among them if 
the response of inflation and effectiveness of the monetary policy with respect to inflation is 
concerned. 
We believe that the main source of discrepancy between the CFNFC Leverage Subindex and 
the other indices is due to the fact that the CFNFC Leverage Subindex is a proxy of financial 
conditions on debt and the stock market, i.e. markets which are partially substitutive for the 
money and credit market. Bearing in mind that all transition variables were orthogonalised 
against the model variables, the high value of the Leverage Subindex may reflect relatively 
easy access to funds from debt and stock markets. Then, enterprises or financial institutions 
160 
 
would be relatively less interested in funds from money and credit markets, i.e. a main 
channel through which changes in interest rates are transmitted into the real economy. 
Therefore, the response of all model variables would be lower than when the value of the 
Leverage Subindex is small. It is also worth noting that the obtained estimates of both 
measures of effectiveness of the monetary policy are negative, which is consistent with the 
proposed explanation and credit channel theory, while the lack of statistical significance is 
due to one large outlier (see no. 2 in Figure A7.4) 
On the other hand, the CredAbility Consumer Distress Index (no. 1) and the Chicago Fed 
National Financial Conditions Credit Subindex (no. 3) measure relative access to credit 
markets – the bigger the values of the indices, the better the access and, in consequence, the 
more enterprises, consumers or financial institutions could be affected by changes in the 
interest rates. Therefore, responses of model variables and effectiveness of the monetary 
policy are positively related to the values of the indices, which is in line with the findings of 
credit channel theory. Model no. 1 additionally suggests a negative relation between the 
efficiency of the monetary policy and the index value (no such finding for model no. 3), 
which means that easy access to credit markets facilitates relatively ‘painless’ disinflation and 
should dishearten the monetary authorities from conducting an expansionary policy due to 
high costs in terms of raising inflation. In the end, it is, however, important to remember that 
the 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 interest rate equation where the CredAbility Consumer Distress Index is a 
transition variable was diagnosed as suffering from an incorrect functional form, thus the 
results obtained for that variable should be treated very carefully.  
The Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Risk Subindex is the only transition variable 
among the selected measures of financial conditions which was found to be important for the 
inflation equation. Therefore, the estimated relations between the six measures characterising 
monetary transmission and the index should be interpreted in the spirit of the theories 
presented in paragraph 2.2.2 – we find rational inattention models to be particularly useful in 
this context. The CFNFC Risk Subindex is designed to capture ‘volatility and funding risk in 
the financial sector‘. Thus it may be perceived as a variable influencing volatility of the 
output gap shocks. According to rational inattention models, increasing relative volatility of 
output gap shocks should result in raising the relative responsiveness of the output gap to 
nominal shocks, which is exactly the pattern we observe in the data. The response of the 
output gap and the effectiveness of the monetary policy with respect to the output gap are 
positively related to the CFNFC Risk Subindex, while the opposite is true for inflation.   
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Monetary aggregates 
The analysis performed here shows that monetary base growth (no. 5) has a different impact 
on the considered measures characterising monetary transmission than MZM (no. 6) and M2 
(no. 7). In particular, we find that high dynamics of the monetary base leads to lowering the 
effectiveness of the monetary policy with respect to both inflation and the output gap, while 
the opposite relation holds for MZM and M2. 
A justification for this may be straightforward – the larger the monetary base, the larger the 
amount of money over which the central bank may use its leverage in the form of parameters 
regarding reserve requirements and the larger the money supply that can be potentially created 
(if there is enough demand for money funds), given the money multiplier. Therefore, the 
interest rate shock may operate effectively through the money demand channel while – in the 
case of some disturbances – the monetary authorities may adjust the parameters regarding 
reserve requirements as to achieve a desired level of money supply.  
At the same time, the high dynamics of MZM or M2 may reflect a situation in which the 
money supply exceeds the level for which money demand is satisfied at a given level of the 
central bank’s interest rate. Since not all financial institutions which are involved in money 
creation are eligible to borrow from or deposit in the central bank, some wedge between the 
market and the central bank’s interest rate may emerge (at least in the case of financial 
institutions which are not the central bank’s counterparties). Then interest rate shocks may be 
less effective in influencing inflation and the output gap due to an incomplete or sluggish 
interest rate pass-through in some market segments (see e.g. Cottarelli and Kourelis 1994). 
Despite the aforementioned differences, it is worth emphasising that all of the three models 
predict a negative relation between growth of money aggregates and the efficiency of the 
expansionary monetary policy, and a positive relation between growth of money aggregates 
and the efficiency of the restrictionary monetary policy. Such a result gives additional 
incentives to stimulate the economy when it is constrained by low levels of the monetary base 
or money supply and conduct disinflation when money aggregates grow at high rate. 
Quality of the credit portfolio 
According to the estimates performed here, there is no clear relation between the 
characteristics of monetary transmission and the quality of the credit portfolio. On the one 
hand, such a result might be treated literally (as a lack of influence of credit portfolio quality 
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on the shape of monetary transmission), while on the other hand it may be partially a 
consequence of the adopted conservative approach of modelling which included 
orthogonalisation of the transition variables. Once variation of credit portfolio quality due to 
changes in inflation, economic activity and interest rate is excluded, the variable may reflect 
the average conditions and selection procedure under which the credits were granted in the 
past. But since the transition variables were also detrended, only a small portion of variance 
remains unexplained. In consequence, even if the quality of the credit portfolio influences the 
shape of monetary transmission, the remnant part of a variable is not ‘strong’ enough to 
deliver statistically significant patterns of impulse responses. 
 
Table 7.13 Models of the monetary transmission mechanism employed for the analysis of state asymmetry with 
respect to the selected measures of financial conditions 
No. 𝑠𝑡  short data description  
inflation 
equation 
output gap 
equation 
interest rate 
equation 
Indices of financial conditions 
1 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑖𝑡  CredAbility Consumer Distress Index  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
2 𝑓𝑐𝑙𝑠𝑡  
Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions 
Leverage Subindex 
 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
3 𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑡  
Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions 
Credit Subindex 
 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
4 𝑓𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑡  
Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions 
Risk Subindex 
 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
Monetary aggregates 
5 𝑚𝑏𝑡  
Board of governors monetary base, 
annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
6 𝑚𝑧𝑚𝑡  
MZM (money zero maturity) stock, 
annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
7 𝑚2𝑡  
M2 money stock, annualised percent change 
from quarter ago 
 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
Quality of credit portfolio 
8 𝑛𝑙_𝑡𝑙𝑡  
Nonperforming loans to total loans for all 
U.S. banks 
 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
9 𝑑𝑟𝑡  Delinquency rate on all loans  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
 
Table 7.14 The results of estimation of equations (7.2) for the selected measures of financial conditions 
No. 𝑠𝑡  𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑖, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛(Ω𝑡) 
Indices of financial conditions 
1 𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑖𝑡  
0.126 0.347 0.287 0.030 0.064 -0.309 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
2 𝑓𝑐𝑙𝑠𝑡  
-2.941 -13.477 -11.834 -7.483 -17.558 -100.783 
[0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.312] [0.312] [0.442] 
3 𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑡  
0.438 9.023 6.651 0.133 1.300 24.558 
[0.075] [0.000] [0.000] [0.004] [0.000] [0.220] 
4 𝑓𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑡  
-1.955 0.671 0.035 -0.619 0.215 -5.683 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.007] [0.000] [0.000] [0.398] 
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Monetary aggregates 
5 𝑚𝑏𝑡  
0.031 0.407 0.292 0.024 0.116 -0.628 
[0.364] [0.000] [0.000] [0.019] [0.000] [0.000] 
6 𝑚𝑧𝑚𝑡  
0.048 0.032 -0.343 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
7 𝑚2𝑡  
0.054 0.032 -0.260 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Quality of credit portfolio 
8 𝑛𝑙_𝑡𝑙𝑡  
0.483 0.036 -0.124 0.025 0.266 -1.998 
[0.401] [0.941] [0.626] [0.925] [0.507] [0.037] 
9 𝑑𝑟𝑡  
0.404 -0.101 -0.171 0.134 -0.977 -0.811 
[0.350] [0.844] [0.589] [0.697] [0.725] [0.630] 
 
7.3.6 State asymmetry with respect to measures of uncertainty 
Here we verify and discuss state asymmetry of monetary transmission with respect to the two 
selected measures of uncertainty as were developed by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2013). Table 
7.15 and Table 7.16 present the models employed here and the estimation results for 
equations (7.2) respectively, while Figure A9.5 (Appendix A.9) presents the analysed 
relationships. 
We find that the empirical patterns of relationships between the six measures characterising 
monetary transmission and measures of uncertainty vary for different types of uncertainty, but 
in both cases state asymmetry of monetary transmission is caused by state-dependency of the 
output gap equation. 
On the one hand, we find that responses of both inflation and the output gap as well as 
effectiveness of the monetary policy with respect to those variables are positively related with 
the level of economic policy uncertainty (no. 1). Such a result contrasts with Bloom’s (2009) 
prediction that uncertainty shocks temporarily freeze propagation of the monetary (and fiscal) 
policy. Nevertheless, the observed pattern is explicable if we apply the rational inattention 
models framework (e.g. Maćkowiak and Wiederholt 2009, 2011) for the consumption-saving 
or investment-saving problems of economic agents. Optimising behaviour in the environment 
of the limited information-processing abilities of economic agents implies that they pay 
relatively more attention (and therefore are more reactive) to more volatile shocks. Since the 
interest rate is a monetary policy variable, the economic agents should be more reactive to 
changes in the interest rate if the monetary policy uncertainty is high. This is exactly the 
pattern we observe when the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, which includes monetary 
policy uncertainty, is a transition variable.  
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On the other hand, Bloom’s concept on the role of uncertainty shocks (Bloom 2009) is 
empirically consistent with our results if the Equity Market-Related Economic Uncertainty 
Index is treated as a transition variable in the monetary transmission model. Foremost, 
effectiveness of the monetary policy with respect to both inflation and the output gap is 
negatively related with the level of equity market-related uncertainty as was predicted by 
Bloom (2009). It is also worth emphasising that the obtained pattern may also be explained in 
the spirit of the rational inattention models framework similarly as above – if the equity 
market uncertainty goes up, the economic agents pay relatively more attention to equity 
market variables than to the monetary policy instrument. In consequence, the economic agents 
may become relatively less responsive to the latter. 
 
Table 7.15 Models of the monetary transmission mechanism employed for the analysis of state asymmetry with 
respect to the selected measures of uncertainty 
No. 𝑠𝑡  short data description  
inflation 
equation 
output gap 
equation 
interest rate 
equation 
1 𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑖𝑡  
Economic Policy Uncertainty Index for United 
States by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2013) 
 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
2 𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑡  
Equity Market-related Economic Uncertainty 
Index by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2013) 
 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
 
Table 7.16 The results of estimation of equations (7.2) for the selected measures of uncertainty  
No. 𝑠𝑡  𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑖, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛(Ω𝑡) 
1 𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑖𝑡  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[0.001] [0.046] [0.600] [0.001] [0.024] [0.253] 
2 𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑡  
0.003 -0.000 -0.013 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
[0.000] [0.034] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
 
7.3.7 State asymmetry with respect to measures of globalisation 
In this paragraph we deal with state asymmetry of monetary transmission with respect to 
selected measure of globalisation. Table 7.17, Table 7.18 and Figure A9.6 (Appendix A.9) 
present the models exploited here, the results of estimation of equations (7.2) and the relevant 
graphs, respectively. 
World data 
According to the obtained estimates, higher world economic growth (model no. 1) 
corresponds with lower responses of inflation and the output gap and lower effectiveness of 
the monetary policy with respect to those variables. At the same time, the opposite is true if 
the world export to world GDP ratio is a transition variable (model no. 3). It is, however, 
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worth noting that state asymmetry of monetary transmission with respect to the two variables 
results purely from state-dependency of the interest rate equation (Table 7.17). In other words, 
although we find no support for state-dependency of either inflation or the output gap 
equation with respect to world GDP or world export to world GDP ratios, both variables seem 
to have been important information variables for the monetary policy which influenced the 
shape of monetary transmission in the Greenspan era. 
In contrast to the two aforementioned variables, the world gross savings to world GDP ratio is 
a significant source of state-dependency of the output gap equation. We find that a larger 
value of this transition variable leads to higher responses of all model variables to interest rate 
shock, and in such a situation the effectiveness of the monetary policy with respect to 
inflation and the output gap is higher than for low values of world savings to world GDP 
ratio. Moreover, there exists a significant negative relation between the efficiency of the 
monetary policy and the level of world savings to world GDP ratio. The outcomes are at odds 
with fears that global liquidity may lower the Fed’s leverage over the U.S. economy – the 
results are just the opposite. The larger the amount of global savings, the larger the amount of 
capital which reacts to changes in the federal funds rate, i.e. may be attracted (or repelled) to 
flow to the U.S. economy. Thus the effectiveness of the monetary policy gains from a larger 
amount of world savings. At the same time, the negative relation between the efficiency of the 
monetary policy and the level of the investigated ratio suggests that a high level of global 
savings should facilitate the disinflation policy and make it less costly. On the other hand, 
however, boosting the economy in such an environment may create additional inflationary 
pressure. 
U.S. data 
As far as data on the U.S. economy is concerned, we find that U.S. exports to U.S. GDP (real 
ratio) treated as a transition variable (no. 4) does not yield any significant relations with the 
six measures characterising monetary transmission. In contrast, we detect such relations if the 
U.S. balance on current account to U.S. GDP (nominal ratio) is a transition variable instead. 
In particular, we find that the response of inflation and the effectiveness of the monetary 
policy with respect to that variable are both lower for the current account surplus than for the 
current account deficit. Again we discover that globalisation, which is one of the factors 
blamed for the pre-crisis expansion of the U.S current account deficit, despite all the fears, 
leads to higher rather than lower effectiveness of the monetary policy, at least with respect to 
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inflation (the estimates for the output gap are statistically insignificant). It is worth 
remembering that the current account deficit is accompanied by a financial and capital 
account surplus – therefore, the results presented here are consistent with results obtained 
when the world savings to world GDP ratio is a transition variable. Analogously as before, we 
find that a large current account deficit lowers the costs of disinflation but raises inflationary 
pressure when the monetary policy is expansionary. 
 
Table 7.17 Models of the monetary transmission mechanism employed for the analysis of state asymmetry with 
respect to the selected measures of globalisation 
No. 𝑠𝑡  short data description  
inflation 
equation 
output gap 
equation 
interest rate 
equation 
World data 
1 𝑤𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
World gross domestic product, constant 2005 dollar, 
annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
2 𝑤𝑠_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
World gross savings, percent of world gross 
domestic product (nominal ratio) 
 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
3 𝑤𝑒_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
World exports of goods and services, percent of 
world gross domestic product, (nominal ratio) 
 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
U.S. data 
4 𝑒_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
Real exports of goods and services, percent of real 
gross domestic product (real ratio) 
 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 
5 𝑐𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
Balance on current account, percent of gross 
domestic product (nominal ratio) 
 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
 
Table 7.18 The results of estimation of equations (7.2) for the selected measures of globalisation 
No. 𝑠𝑡  𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑖, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛(Ω𝑡) 
World data 
1 𝑤𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
-0.844 -9.961 -13.436 -0.212 -0.599 48.378 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.096] 
2 𝑤𝑠_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
0.643 2.753 2.469 0.432 0.986 -2.830 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
3 𝑤𝑒_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
3.988 15.448 0.904 0.652 2.456 16.032 
[0.006] [0.004] [0.759] [0.036] [0.007] [0.335] 
US data 
4 𝑒_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
0.019 0.009 -0.063 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
[0.417] [0.403] [0.415] [0.557] [0.875] [0.368] 
5 𝑐𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
-18.339 0.581 -3.776 -5.296 0.248 19.543 
[0.000] [0.717] [0.002] [0.000] [0.516] [0.005] 
 
7.3.8 State asymmetry with respect to measures of composition of the economy 
The current paragraph is devoted to the problem of state asymmetry of monetary transmission 
with respect to the two selected measures of composition of the economy. Table 7.19 reveals 
the models employed here for the analysis, Table 7.20 presents the results of estimation of 
equations (7.2), while Figure A9.7 (Appendix A.9) plots the analysed relationships. 
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The two selected measures of the composition of the economy yield somewhat different 
conclusions as to the shape of monetary transmission, but in both cases state asymmetry is 
caused by state-dependency of the output gap equation. 
We find that the level of labour share (model no. 1) is negatively related with the response of 
inflation but positively related with responses of the output gap and the interest rate to 
monetary shock. Most importantly, the effectiveness of the monetary policy with respect to 
the output gap is negatively related with labour share (an analogous relation for effectiveness 
with respect to inflation is statistically insignificant), which might be perceived as a natural 
consequence of the fact that capital is more responsive to interest rate than labour. The 
positive relation between labour share and efficiency implies that in an environment of high 
labour share the costs of disinflation are relatively high, while inflationary pressure caused by 
the expansionary policy is relatively low. 
Different patterns emerge if the share of services in GDP (nominal ratio) is a transition 
variable (model no 2.) instead of labour share. Specifically, a larger share of services in GDP 
leads to higher responses of all model variables to interest rate shock and higher effectiveness 
of the monetary policy with respect to both inflation and the output gap. Although such a 
result may strike as being surprising because the share of services in GDP and the labour 
share are highly correlated (Pearson’s coefficient equal to 77%), we believe that the obtained 
patterns may reflect the role of the financial sector (a part of the service sector), which is 
highly sensitive to changes in the interest rate. As far as the sacrifice/gain ratio is concerned, 
suggestions for the monetary policy are that lowering inflation is less costly when the share of 
services in GDP is high, while the expansionary monetary policy is more efficient when the 
share of services in GDP is low.  
 
Table 7.19 Final model selection when modelling state-dependency with respect to the selected measures of 
composition of the economy 
No. 𝑠𝑡  short data description  
inflation 
equation 
output gap 
equation 
interest rate 
equation 
1 𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡  Labour share in nonfarm business sector  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
2 𝑠𝑣𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
Services: value added: percent of gross 
domestic product (nominal ratio) 
 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
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Table 7.20 The results of estimation of equations (7.2) for the selected measures of composition of the economy 
No. 𝑠𝑡  𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑖, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛(Ω𝑡) 
1 𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡  
-0.815 0.474 7.343 -0.001 -0.047 0.457 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.728] [0.000] [0.000] 
2 𝑠𝑣𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
0.176 1.237 0.847 0.121 0.394 -1.403 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
 
7.3.9 State asymmetry with respect to measures of potential growth and development 
In this paragraph we analyse state asymmetry of monetary transmission with respect to 
selected measures of potential growth and development. Analogously as in the previous 
paragraphs, the models, estimation results and corresponding graphs employed here are 
presented in Table 7.21, Table 7.22, and Figure A9.8 (Appendix A.9) respectively. 
As was already mentioned in paragraph 6.5.7, growth of potential GDP (model no. 1) is the 
only variable which was found to be a relevant transition variable for all three equations 
constituting the model of the monetary transmission mechanism. We find that high potential 
growth corresponds with lower effectiveness of the monetary policy with respect to both 
inflation and the output gap – a pattern which results from a lower response of the interest rate 
to interest rate shock during periods of high potential growth. At the same time, potential 
growth has no significant impact on the efficiency of the monetary policy. Since potential 
growth is a significant transition variable for all three equations, it is difficult to point to the 
specific theoretical concepts which stand behind these results. Apart from some of the 
concepts that were presented in subsection 3.4 (structural changes in the U.S. economy), one 
may expect that the Greenspan standard played an important role in shaping state asymmetry 
of monetary transmission with respect to potential growth. We argue, however, that the 
obtained results may signal a positive relation between the natural interest rate and the 
marginal productivity of capital
76
 – in periods of high potential growth the profitability of new 
investments may be large enough to make investment decisions relatively irresponsive to 
moderate changes in the level of interest rates as long as the actual interest rate is significantly 
lower than the natural one. 
Although the research and development outlays to the GDP (real) ratio were found to be a 
statistically significant transition variable for the inflation equation, we find no statistically 
                                                          
76
 We are not particular about any specific notion of the natural interest rate. 
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significant relation between the ratio and the six measures characterising monetary 
transmission.  
 
Table 7.21 Final model selection when modelling state-dependency with respect to the selected measures of 
potential growth and development 
No. 𝑠𝑡  Short data description  
inflation 
equation 
output gap 
equation 
interest rate 
equation 
1 𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡  
Real potential gross domestic product, annualised 
percent change from quarter ago 
 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
2 𝑟𝑑_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
Real gross domestic product: research and 
development, percent of real gross domestic 
product, (real ratio) 
 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
 
Table 7.22 The results of estimation of equations (7.2) for the selected measures of potential growth and 
development 
No. 𝑠𝑡  𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑖, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛(Ω𝑡) 
1 𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡  
-0.574 4.393 -13.063 -0.091 -2.027 169.899 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.234] 
2 𝑟𝑑_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[0.794] [0.978] [0.565] [0.872] [0.597] [0.793] 
 
7.3.10 State asymmetry with respect to measures of financial development 
Here we deal with state asymmetry of monetary transmission with respect to selected 
measures of financial development of the economy. Table 7.23, Table 7.24 and Figure A9.9 
(Appendix A.9) present the models exploited here, the results of estimation of equations (7.2) 
and the relevant graphs, respectively. 
We find that higher values of MZM stock to GDP (nominal) ratio (model no. 1) result in 
higher responses of all model variables to interest rate shock and higher effectiveness of the 
monetary policy with respect to inflation and the output gap. Table 7.23 shows that state 
asymmetry of monetary transmission is due to state-dependency of the output gap equation. 
Bearing in mind that the analysed measure may serve as a proxy of development of the 
banking system and that the banking sector is sensitive to changes in interest rates, the 
obtained results are quite intuitive – the larger or more developed the banking system, the 
larger its share in GDP and the more effective the monetary policy is. A negative estimate on 
the measure of efficiency means that the higher the value of MZM to GDP ratio, the lower the 
costs of disinflation and the larger the inflation costs of the expansionary monetary policy are. 
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A very similar pattern to the one described above is shared when the assets of money market 
mutual funds to the GDP (nominal) ratio is a transition variable (model no. 3). The main 
important difference is that in such a framework the response of the interest rate to the interest 
rate shock is smaller for higher values of the ratio, which may reflect a subsidiary role of 
money market funds in passing through monetary policy shocks into the real economy. Since 
in that case the interest rate equation is also state-dependent, one may expect that the relative 
size of money market funds is an important information variable for the monetary authorities. 
 
Table 7.23 Final model selection when modelling state-dependency with respect to the selected measures of 
financial development of the economy 
No. 𝑠𝑡  Short data description  
inflation 
equation 
output gap 
equation 
interest rate 
equation 
Money supply to GDP ratios 
1 𝑚𝑧𝑚_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
MZM (money zero maturity) stock to gross 
domestic product (nominal ratio) 
 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
Other measures 
2 𝑚𝑓_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
Money market mutual funds: total financial assets, 
percent of gross domestic product (nominal ratio) 
 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
 
Table 7.24  The results of estimation of equations (7.2) for the selected measures of financial development of the 
economy 
No. 𝑠𝑡  𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑖, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛(Ω𝑡) 
Money supply to GDP ratios 
1 𝑚𝑧𝑚_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
0.230 0.668 0.628 0.141 0.220 -0.944 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Other measures 
2 𝑚𝑓_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
0.304 0.849 -0.794 0.019 0.121 -0.542 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
 
7.3.11 State asymmetry with respect to variables related to some aspects of the 
Greenspan standard 
In this paragraph (the last one in this subsection) we discuss state asymmetry of monetary 
transmission with respect to selected variables related to some aspects of the Greenspan 
standard. Table 7.25 presents the models employed here, while Table 7.26 reveals the 
estimations of equations (7.2). The relevant graphs are available in Appendix A.9 (Figure 
A9.10). 
According to the analysis performed here, monetary transmission reveals significant state 
asymmetry when the growth rates of the S&P 500© (model no. 1) and Wilshire 5000 Full Cap 
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Price Index© (model no. 2) are transition variables. Such a result is interesting if we recall 
that out of the 6 different measures of stock market dynamics, only those two variables 
yielded significant state asymmetry of monetary transmission. The dynamics of the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average© was also found to be an important transition variable but it did not 
result in significant patterns of state asymmetry, while the other three measures of dynamics 
of the stock market (NASDAQ Composite Index©, Dow Jones Composite©, NASDAQ 
100©) were not selected as transition variables, which lead to 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models being preferred 
over the linear baseline. Moreover, in each case it is the output gap equation (not the interest 
rate equation) which is responsible for state asymmetry of monetary transmission. The results 
obtained here mean that we have discovered no special role for the dynamics of the stock 
market as a variable influencing the monetary policy rule. In contrast, we have found an 
important role for the dynamics of the stock market as a factor shaping the output gap 
equation. 
 
Table 7.25 Final model selection when modelling state-dependency with respect to the selected variables related 
to some aspects of Greenspan standard 
No. 𝑠𝑡  Short data description  
inflation 
equation 
output gap 
equation 
interest rate 
equation 
Stock prices 
1 𝑠𝑝500𝑡  S&P 500©, annualised percent change from quarter ago  𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
2 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑡  
Wilshire 5000 Full Cap Price Index©, annualised 
percent change from quarter ago 
 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
3 𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑎𝑡  
Dow Jones Industrial Average©, annualised percent 
change from quarter ago 
 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 
Real estate prices 
4 𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑡  
S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index©, 
annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
Commodity prices 
5 𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑡  
Spot oil price: West Texas Intermediate©, dollars per 
barrel, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
 
The patterns of state asymmetry of monetary transmission (model nos. 1 and 2) obtained here 
show that the responses of all model variables as well as the effectiveness of the monetary 
policy with respect to inflation and the output gap are smaller when the dynamics of the stock 
market is high. Such relations are easily understandable in the perspective of credit channel 
theory (rather than the Greenspan standard) – high dynamics of the stock market may be 
related to relatively easy access to capital markets, which become more attractive as an 
alternative to traditional money and credit markets. Model no. 2 (insignificant estimates for 
172 
 
model no. 1) implies that in such a situation the costs of the disinflation policy are relatively 
high but the inflation costs of the expansionary monetary policy are relatively small. 
Surprisingly, although the dynamics of real estate prices and commodity prices were found to 
be important transition variables for the interest rate equation (consistency with the Greenspan 
standard), we detected no robust patterns of monetary transmission asymmetry with respect to 
those variables. 
 
Table 7.26 The results of estimation of equations (7.2) for the selected variables related to some aspects of 
Greenspan standard  
No. 𝑠𝑡  𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑖, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛(Ω𝑡) 
Stock prices 
1 𝑠𝑝500𝑡  
-0.029 -0.161 -0.125 -0.010 -0.028 0.281 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.655] 
2 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑡  
-0.008 -0.045 -0.035 -0.004 -0.011 0.071 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
3 𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑎𝑡  
0.001 0.008 0.005 0.000 0.002 -0.014 
[0.606] [0.371] [0.490] [0.612] [0.425] [0.318] 
Real estate prices 
4 𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑡  
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[0.678] [0.093] [0.894] [0.698] [0.313] [0.441] 
Commodity prices 
5 𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑡  
0.001 0.000 -0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 
[0.757] [0.644] [0.432] [0.100] [0.090] [0.172] 
 
7.3.12 General conclusions from the analysis of state asymmetries 
The analysis performed here shows that the adopted framework is successful at identifying 
statistically significant state asymmetries of monetary transmission. Despite a conservative 
approach to testing state-dependency and comparing 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models to linear baselines, 
variables from all but one of the main groups were found to deliver significant patterns of 
state asymmetry of monetary transmission (see Table 7.27). Moreover, the obtained patterns 
of state asymmetries, which were particularly strong in the case of measures of business cycle 
and climate, uncertainty, and composition of the economy, are explicable in the spirit of the 
theories and concepts which were described in sections 2 and 3. 
Although the analysis is based on historical (pre-crisis) data, we believe that the obtained 
results might be useful in conducting a better monetary policy. Having knowledge of state 
asymmetries of monetary transmission may not only help to track structural changes in the 
propagation of monetary shocks but may also facilitate in optimising the schedule of 
monetary policy actions (e.g. as to conduct disinflation when the sacrifice ratio is low). Thus 
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the obtained results might be beneficial in both a long- and short-term perspective of the 
monetary policy. As a warning, the obtained results should be confirmed by other studies 
whose focus point should be broadly defined robustness of the patterns of state asymmetry 
(e.g. robustness with respect to the econometric framework, estimation sample, selection of 
transition variables, etc.). Finally, it is always worth recalling that the usefulness of any 
empirical results may be seriously limited by the Lucas critique. 
 
Table 7.27 Percentage of cases in which significant patterns of state asymmetry of monetary transmission were 
found 
 inflation 
 output 
gap 
 interest 
rate 
 effectiveness  
efficiency 
inflation  output gap 
business cycle and climate 100%  75%  100%  75%  100%  100% 
labour market conditions 50%  50%  50%  50%  50%  25% 
financial conditions 28%  39%  39%  33%  33%  28% 
- indices of financial conditions 43%  57%  57%  43%  43%  14% 
- monetary aggregates 50%  75%  75%  75%  75%  75% 
- interest rate quality spreads 0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
- quality of credit portfolio 0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  20% 
uncertainty 100%  100%  50%  100%  100%  50% 
globalisation 40%  30%  30%  40%  30%  20% 
- world data 75%  75%  50%  75%  75%  25% 
- U.S. data 17%  0%  17%  17%  0%  17% 
composition of the economy 100%  100%  100%  50%  100%  100% 
potential growth and development 20%  20%  20%  20%  20%  0% 
financial development 14%  14%  14%  14%  14%  14% 
- money supply to GDP ratios 50%  50%  50%  50%  50%  50% 
- bank assets ratios 0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
- other measures 25%  25%  25%  25%  25%  25% 
Greenspan conundrum 0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
Greenspan standard 18%  18%  18%  18%  18%  9% 
- stock prices 33%  33%  33%  33%  33%  17% 
- real estate prices 0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
- commodity prices 0%  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
overall 33%  33%  33%  32%  33%  25% 
 
no state asymmetry  0% (0%, 20%] (20%, 40%] (40%, 60%] (60%, 80%] (80%, 100%] state asymmetry 
 
7.4 Summary 
In this section we have analysed and discussed various types of asymmetry of monetary 
transmission. The analysis, which was based on 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models estimated in section 6 and on 
generalised impulse response functions, led us to both methodological and empirical findings. 
Although the adopted framework pointed to the existence of sign and size asymmetries, the 
obtained patterns of asymmetries were very sensitive to the choice of background model. 
Therefore, as an idea for further research, we suggested employment of a different framework 
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which should be designed to focus on identification of monetary policy shocks and the 
impulse propagation mechanism themselves rather than on identification of a model which 
only later gives rise to (generalised) impulse response functions. In our opinion, the 
propensity score weighting in the form which was proposed by Angrist, Jordà, and 
Kuersteiner (2013) seems to be a very interesting alternative to the standard approach which 
is based on the estimation of the data generating process. 
On the contrary, the adopted framework was very successful at identifying state asymmetry of 
monetary transmission. In a nutshell, the existence of theoretically explicable patterns of state 
asymmetries were detected with respect to variables from all but one of the groups of 
proposed variables (see Table 7.28 for a full list). The strongest patterns of state asymmetry 
were observed in the case of measures of business cycle and climate, uncertainty, and 
composition of the economy. 
 
Table 7.28 List of variables with respect to which significant patterns of state asymmetry of monetary 
transmission were found 
business cycle and climate 
1 Capacity utilization 
2 Chicago Fed National Activity Index: three month moving average 
3 Chicago Fed National Activity Index: diffusion index 
4 University of Michigan: Consumer Sentiment Index© 
labour market conditions 
5 Compensation of employees: wages and salaries, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
6 Labour Market Conditions Index 
financial conditions 
7 CredAbility Consumer Distress Index 
8 Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Leverage Subindex 
9 Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Credit Subindex 
10 Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Risk Subindex 
11 Board of governors monetary base, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
12 MZM (money zero maturity) stock, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
13 M2 money stock, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
14 Nonperforming loans to total loans for all U.S. banks 
15 Delinquency rate on all loans 
uncertainty 
16 Economic Policy Uncertainty Index for United States by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2013) 
17 Equity Market-related Economic Uncertainty Index by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2013) 
globalisation 
18 World gross domestic product, constant 2005 dollar, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
19 World gross savings, percent of world gross domestic product (nominal ratio) 
20 World exports of goods and services, percent of world gross domestic product, (nominal ratio) 
21 Real exports of goods and services, percent of real gross domestic product (real ratio) 
22 Balance on current account, percent of gross domestic product (nominal ratio) 
composition of the economy 
23 Labour share in nonfarm business sector 
24 Services: value added: percent of gross domestic product (nominal ratio) 
potential growth and development 
25 Real potential gross domestic product, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
26 Real gross domestic product: research and development, percent of real gross domestic product, (real ratio) 
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financial development of the economy 
27 MZM (money zero maturity) stock to gross domestic product (nominal ratio) 
28 Money market mutual funds: total financial assets, percent of gross domestic product (nominal ratio) 
Greenspan standard 
29 S&P 500©, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
30 Wilshire 5000 Full Cap Price Index©, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
31 Dow Jones Industrial Average©, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
32 S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index©, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
33 Spot oil price: West Texas Intermediate©, dollars per barrel, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 
We argue that the results are potentially very useful from the perspective of conducting a 
successful monetary policy. They may be particularly helpful in optimising the schedule of 
interest rate hikes and cuts as to minimise sacrifice ratio or maximise gain ratio, respectively. 
Moreover the detected patterns of state asymmetry suggest non-negligible structural changes 
in the monetary transmission mechanism which could be taken into account by the central 
bankers, e.g. in order to adjust their projection models. As we emphasised, our findings are 
not specific to extremely turbulent periods when departure from the standard paradigm would 
not be surprising, but refer to the economic commonness. Then one may expect that gains 
from incorporating state asymmetries in the decision process of conducting monetary policy 
are even larger if e.g. the recent Great Recession is also concerned. Inherently, the Lucas 
critique should always be treated as an admonition against abusing the empirical results. 
 
  
176 
 
8. Conclusions 
The thesis dealt with the problems of nonlinearity and state-dependency of the monetary 
transmission model and asymmetric impulse responses in the Greenspan era. At the very 
beginning (section 1) we precisely defined all of the concepts and explained why we find the 
issue of nonlinearity and state-dependency of monetary transmission as being of utmost 
importance. In particular, we focused on the central bankers’ perspective to show that the 
results are potentially very useful in the context of conducting a successful monetary policy 
and in solving some strategic dilemmas regarding scheduling monetary policy actions. 
Moreover, we justified the selection of the Greenspan era as our estimation sample on both 
economic and econometric grounds. 
In the following section (section 2) we presented the general premises behind nonlinearity and 
state-dependency of the monetary transmission mechanism. Both the theoretical and empirical 
aspects were discussed not only at the level of every single equation constituting the monetary 
transmission mechanism (i.e. the Phillips curve, the IS curve and the Taylor rule), but also 
from the perspective of the monetary transmission mechanism as an econometric system 
which is potent to generate impulse response functions. The analysed literature provided 
strong evidence that the monetary transmission mechanism exhibits significant nonlinearity 
and state-dependency at individual equation levels, and asymmetries in impulse responses at 
the system level. 
Bearing in mind that the Greenspan era was quite a specific period in the economic history of 
the U.S., in section 3 we explored the literature so as to find the premises behind the 
nonlinearity and state-dependency of the monetary transmission mechanism which were 
specific to the Greenspan era. Interestingly, we investigated the phenomenon of the Great 
Moderation so as to organise our considerations and we found that globalisation, structural 
changes in the U.S. economy, crises and market distresses and the Greenspan standard were 
potentially important (and possibly endemic to the Greenspan era) sources of nonlinearities 
and state-dependency of the monetary transmission mechanism. 
After the literature overview, we turned to the empirical part of the thesis. In section 4 we 
introduced and estimated the baseline model of the monetary transmission mechanism. The 
diagnostic tests and impulse response analysis performed here proved that the model has 
desirable properties from both an econometric and economic perspective and could serve as a 
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reference model for later modelling of nonlinearities and state-dependency of the monetary 
transmission mechanism. 
In section 5 we demonstrated that the baseline model of the monetary transmission 
mechanism hides some peculiarities which are not usually detected when a typical procedure 
of econometric modelling is applied. Specifically, the proposed tests broadly rejected the null 
hypotheses of linearity and state-independency of the baseline model of the monetary 
transmission mechanism despite a conservative approach to testing. From a practical point of 
view such a finding means that there is still room for improvement in how the empirical 
regularities are exploited in the process of conducting the monetary policy. What is important 
such a quality is not specific to extremely turbulent periods like the Great Depression or the 
Great Recession but characterises an environment in which monetary decisions are made on a 
regular basis. 
The above-mentioned results justify why section 6 was devoted to econometric modelling of 
nonlinearity and state-dependency of the monetary transmission mechanism. In accordance 
with the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 modelling framework, the concept and details of which were also presented, 
we specified, estimated and evaluated a battery of nonlinear or state-dependent (𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅) 
models of the monetary transmission mechanism. Each of these was then compared with the 
linear baseline, and only more parsimonious 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 models were selected for the stage of 
calculating generalised impulse response functions. 
Finally, in section 7 we analysed generalised impulse response functions in the context of 
asymmetry of monetary transmission, which allowed us to come to the final conclusions of 
the thesis. 
On the one hand, the adopted framework points at the existence of statistically significant sign 
and size asymmetries, but on the other hand the obtained patterns of sign and size 
asymmetries were not robust among the estimated models. Therefore, in that respect the 
general conclusion is rather methodological than empirical – we believe that a trustworthy 
analysis of sign and size asymmetries requires a framework which very precisely identifies 
monetary policy shocks and explicitly controls the existence and patterns of sign and size 
asymmetries in the impulse propagation mechanism. In other words, sign and size 
asymmetries should be directly identifiable at the stage of estimation rather than identifiable 
only afterwards as a mathematical consequence of the functional form of the monetary 
transmission model combined with the empirical data. An example idea would be to estimate 
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monetary policy shocks at the first stage of estimation and to plug them into the second stage 
of estimation where they may also serve as, e.g. a transition variable in the 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 modelling 
framework. The problem to solve, however, is how to consistently estimate such a two-stage 
regression in the presence of the specific nonlinear simultaneity problem, i.e. identification of 
monetary policy shocks and the nonlinear impulse propagation mechanism at the same time. 
Alternatively, a semiparametric approach based on propensity score weighting instead of 
estimation of the macroeconometric model (Angrist, Jordà, and Kuersteiner 2013) seems to be 
an inspiring idea as how to avoid the abovementioned problems by changing the paradigm of 
empirical modelling the monetary transmission mechanism. 
As far as the analysis of state asymmetries is concerned, we believe that the adopted 
framework did very well in identifying the sources of state-dependency of the estimated 
equations and state asymmetry of monetary transmission. The variables from all but one main 
group were found to deliver significant patterns of state asymmetry and, what is also 
important, the obtained patterns of state asymmetries were explicable in the spirit of the 
theories and concepts which were described in sections 2 and 3. In our opinion, knowledge of 
state asymmetries of monetary transmission may not only help to track structural changes in 
the propagation of monetary shocks but may also facilitate in optimisation of the schedule of 
monetary policy moves. Thus the obtained results might be beneficial in both a long- and 
short-term perspective of the monetary policy, although the Lucas critique should always be 
taken into consideration. 
As a warning, all of the results obtained in this thesis should be treated with a natural dose of 
caution. Since the scope is quite general and we dealt with many sources of asymmetry of 
monetary transmission, it would be desirable to conduct research focused on selected issues 
(e.g. labour market conditions or globalisation). Then the variety of possible robustness 
checks and nuances that could be investigated and discussed would be larger. The author of 
this thesis plans to explore such a research agenda in subsequent studies. 
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Appendix A.1 
Table A1.1 Overview of micro-based concepts behind nonlinearity and state-dependency of the Phillips curve 
 Concept / model References Implications for the shape of the Phillips curve 
(1) capacity constraint Clark et al. (2001); Dupasquier and Ricketts (1998); Hansen and 
Prescott (2005); Mackleem (1997) 
convex 
(2) misperception or signal 
extraction 
Dupasquier and Ricketts (1998); Lucas (1972, 1973); Maćkowiak 
and Wiederholt (2009, 2011) 
the slope depends positively on the variance of inflation 
(3) costly adjustments Ball and Mankiw (1994); Ball et al. (1988); Burstein (2006); 
Dupasquier and Ricketts (1998) 
the slope depends positively on the level of inflation; possibly convex 
(4a) downward nominal wage rigidity Akerlof et al. (1996); Dupasquier and Ricketts (1998); Lindbeck 
and Snower (1986, 1988); Shafir et al. (1997); Snowdon and 
Vane (2005, Ch. 7.7.2); Stiglitz (1984b) 
the slope depends positively on the output gap or inflation expectations; 
possibly convex 
(4b) downward real wage rigidity Lindbeck and Snower (1986, 1988); Snowdon and Vane (2005, 
Ch. 7.7.2); Stiglitz (1984b) 
steeper upward than downward; the difference between the two might be a 
decreasing function of the inflation level 
(5a) monopolistic competition Dupasquier and Ricketts (1998) concave 
(5b) limit pricing as an entry deterrent Stiglitz (1984a) concave 
(5c) collusive behaviour Stiglitz (1984a) steeper upward than downward; the difference between the two might be a 
decreasing function of the inflation level 
(5d) procyclical competitiveness Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) steeper during expansions than during recessions; possibly convex 
(6) imperfect credibility Alichi et al. (2009), Isard et al. (2001) 
the slope depends negatively on the central bank’s credibility; possibly convex 
upward and concave downward 
(7a) customer markets Snowdon and Vane (2005, Ch. 7.7.1) concave 
(7b) costly search Stiglitz (1984a) possibly convex 
(7c) judging quality by price Allen (1988); Stiglitz (1984a, 1987) convex 
(7d) pricing points Kashyap (1995); Snir et al. (2012) steeper downward than upward and possibly concave for low levels of inflation 
(7e) asymmetric price adjustment in 
the small 
Chen et al. (2008) steeper upward than downward and possibly convex for low levels of inflation 
(7f) customers’ anger Rotemberg (2002) concave; possibly state-dependent with respect to some macroeconomic 
variables 
(7g) implicit contracts Kahneman et al. (1986); Okun, (1981) steeper downward than upward when inflation is stable at a low level 
(7h) procyclical elasticity of demand Bils (1989); Blinder (1994) steeper during expansions than during recessions; possibly convexi 
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(8) macroeconomic externalities and 
coordination failures 
Akerlof and Yellen (1985a, 1985b); Ball and Romer (1991); 
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987); Cooper and John (1988); 
Diamond (1982); Kaplan and Menzio (2013); Romer (2012, Ch. 
6.8) Rotemberg (1987); Shleifer and Vishny (1988); Snowdon 
and Vane (2005, Ch. 7.7); Summers (1988) 
state- and ‘sunspot-dependent’ with respect to variables which influence the 
agents’ expectations; possible non-existence of the Phillips curve 
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Table A1.2 Overview of studies on nonlinearity and state-dependency of the Phillips curve for the U.S. economy 
 Period Econometric method Measure of the output gap 
Measure of inflation 
expectations 
Conclusions 
Clark, Laxton and 
Rose (1995) 
1964q1-
1990q4 
Kinked piecewise linear 
function (one kink) 
two-sided moving average, Harvey 
and Jaeger (1993) model, HP filter, 
quadratic time trend 
Michigan Survey significant nonlinearity towards convexity 
Clements and 
Sensier (2003) 
1960q2-
2001q1 
Threshold piecewise linear 
function (one threshold) 
HP filter lagged inflation significant nonlinearity towards convexity for CPI 
inflation, no significant nonlinearity for GDP deflator 
Filardo (1998) 1959q2-
1997q3 
Kinked piecewise linear 
function (two kinks) 
HP filter auxiliary regression on 
Michigan Survey 
expectations 
significant nonlinearity towards both convexity and 
concavity for positive and negative output gap, 
respectively  
Saglio and López-
Villavicencio 
(2012) 
1985q1-
2011q4 
Kinked piecewise linear 
function (one kink), smooth 
transition regression (one 
threshold)  and combination 
of both 
HP filter lagged inflation significant nonlinearity towards concavity; state-
dependency with respect to trend inflation and its 
volatility (flatness for low and stable inflation) and 
capacity utilisation (steepness for high level of 
capacity utilisation) 
Turner (1995) 1962-
1993 
Kinked piecewise linear 
function (one kink) 
HP filter lagged inflation significant nonlinearity towards convexity 
Yates (1998) 1800-
1938 
Kinked piecewise linear 
function (one two-
dimensional kink) 
HP filter lagged inflation no significant nonlinearity nor state-dependency with 
respect to the sign of inflation (inflation vs deflation) 
and its first difference (raising inflation vs 
disinflation) 
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Table A1.3 Overview of studies on nonlinearity and state-dependency of the IS curve for the U.S. economy 
 Period Econometric method 
Endogenous 
variable(s) 
Explanatory variables Conclusions 
Cover (1992) 1951q1-
1987q4 
Linear regressions with separate 
variables for positive and 
negative monetary policy 
shocks 
quarterly growth 
rate of gross 
national product 
lagged endogenous variable, the first difference 
of the rate on 90-day treasury bills, positive and 
negative monetary policy shocks derived from 
auxiliary regression of money supply (M1) 
stronger effects of restrictive than 
expansionary monetary policy shocks 
(insignificant effect in the latter case) 
DeLong and 
Summers (1988) 
1889-1929, 
1947-1987 
Linear regressions with an 
additional variable for negative 
monetary policy shocks 
annual average 
gross national 
product 
lagged endogenous variable, time trend, 
monetary policy shocks derived from auxiliary 
regression of money supply (M2), additional 
variable for negative monetary policy shocks 
stronger effects of restrictive than 
expansionary monetary policy shocks 
(insignificant effect in the latter case) 
Garcia and 
Shaller (2002) 
1955q2-
1993q1 
Markov switching model quarterly growth 
rate of industrial 
production 
baseline: lagged endogenous variable, federal 
funds rate; robustness checks: VAR-based 
monetary policy shocks instead of federal funds 
rate  
stronger effects of monetary policy in a 
recession than in an expansion 
Kakes (1998) 1971q1-
1999q4 
Markov switching model annual growth rate 
of industrial 
production 
baseline: lagged endogenous variable, federal 
funds rate; robustness checks: VAR-based 
monetary policy shocks instead of federal funds 
rate 
stronger effects of the monetary policy in a 
recession than in an expansion 
Karras and Stokes 
(1999) 
1960q4-
1993q4 
Nonlinear regressions with 
separate variables for positive 
and negative monetary policy 
shocks and endogenised 
breakpoint of asymmetry 
quarterly growth 
rates of: gross 
domestic product, 
private 
consumption, fixed 
investments 
lagged endogenous variable, change in the 
three-month Treasury bill rate, positive and 
negative monetary policy shocks derived from 
auxiliary regression of money supply (M1)  
stronger effects of restrictive than 
expansionary monetary policy shocks 
(insignificant effect in the latter case) for 
output and fixed investments (no such 
evidence for private consumption) 
Lo and Piger 
(2005) 
1955q3-
2002q4 
Unobserved-components model 
with regime switching 
logarithm of 
industrial 
production 
equation of transitory component: interest rate-
based monetary policy shocks derived from an 
identified VAR; state dummy variables: sign 
and size of a monetary shock, and phase of 
business cycle (recession periods identified by 
NBER) 
stronger effects of the monetary policy in a 
recession than in an expansion, ‘much less 
evidence for any asymmetry related to the 
direction or size of the policy action’ 
Morgan (1993) 1963q2-
1992q1 and 
excluding 
1979q4-
1982q4 
Linear regressions with separate 
variables for positive and 
negative monetary policy 
shocks 
quarterly growth 
rate of gross 
domestic product 
(supposition – no 
explicit 
information) 
two regressions: (1) interest rate and (2) 
Boshen-Mills-based monetary policy shocks 
derived from auxiliary regressions  
stronger effects of restrictive than 
expansionary monetary policy shocks 
(usually insignificant effect in the latter 
case) 
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Ravn and Sola 
(2004) 
1948q1-
1987q4 
Linear regression with separate 
variables for positive, negative, 
big and small monetary policy 
shocks 
quarterly growth 
rate of gross 
national product 
lagged endogenous variable, changes in the T-
bill rate; positive, negative, big and small 
monetary policy shocks derived from auxiliary 
Markov switching regression of money supply 
(M1) 
no difference between various types of 
monetary policy shocks 
Ravn and Sola 
(2004) 
1960q1-
1995q4 
Linear regression with separate 
variables for positive, negative, 
big and small monetary policy 
shocks 
quarterly growth 
rate of gross 
national product 
lagged endogenous variable, changes in the T-
bill rate; positive, negative, big and small 
monetary policy shocks derived from auxiliary 
Markov switching regression of federal funds 
rate 
neutrality of all but small negative monetary 
policy shocks 
Senda (2001) 1873-1913, 
1954-1994 
Linear regression with separate 
variables for positive, negative, 
big and small monetary policy 
shocks 
logarithm of gross 
domestic product 
lagged endogenous variable, time trend, 
positive, negative, big and small monetary 
policy shocks derived from auxiliary 
regressions of money stock (two versions) 
no difference between positive and negative 
monetary policy shocks 
Sim (2009) 1970m1-
2009m1 
Quantile regression growth rate of the 
industrial 
production index 
lagged endogenous variable, change in the 
three-month Treasury yield, monetary policy 
shocks derived from auxiliary regressions of 
money supply (M1 and M2) 
stronger effects of restrictive than 
expansionary monetary policy shocks; 
stronger effects of monetary policy shocks 
when the output growth is in its tails 
(recession or expansion), especially in the 
right tail (expansion) 
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Table A1.4 Overview of studies on nonlinearity and state-dependency of the Taylor rule for the U.S. economy 
 Period 
Econometric 
method 
Explanatory variables Additional remarks Conclusions 
Assenmacher-
Wesche (2006) 
1973q1-
2004q4 
Markov switching 
model 
lagged federal funds rate, annualised quarterly 
changes in the log of the gross domestic product 
deflator, percentage deviation of gross domestic 
product from its trend value calculated with the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter 
‘error term is allowed to switch 
between a high variance and a low 
variance state’ independently of 
coefficient regimes, no forward-
looking expectations in the model 
stronger interest-rate smoothing and 
reaction to the output gap but smaller 
to inflation in a high-inflation regime 
than in a low-inflation regime 
Bec, Salem and 
Collard (2002) 
1982m10-
1998m8 
Threshold model lagged federal funds rate, annual rate of change of 
the consumer price index, log differences between 
the industrial production index and its Hodrick-
Prescott filtered trend 
threshold variable: output gap stronger reaction to inflationary than 
deflationary pressures 
Castro (2011) 1982m10-
2007m12 
Logistic Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
lagged federal funds rate, annual rate of change of 
the consumer price index, log differences between 
the industrial production index and its Hodrick-
Prescott filtered trend 
transition variables: inflation rate; 
both forward- and backward-
looking versions estimated  
no evidence of nonlinearity if the 
forward-looking version of the Taylor 
rule with interest-rate smoothing is 
estimated 
Cukierman and 
Muscatelli (2008) 
1960q1-
2005q4 
Hyperbolic Tangent 
Smooth Transition 
Regression 
lagged federal funds rate, annualised rate of 
quarterly change of the consumer price index, 
percentage deviation of gross domestic product 
from the trend estimated by the Congressional 
Budget Office 
transition variables: inflation gap 
for coefficient on inflation, output 
gap for coefficient on output gap, 
no forward-looking expectations in 
the model but estimation via 
generalised method of moments 
reaction function under: Martin – 
convex with respect to inflation and 
output gaps, Burns/Miller – concave 
with respect to output gap; Volcker – 
no evidence of nonlinearities; 
Greenspan – concave with respect to 
output gap;  
Dolado, Maria-
Dolores and 
Naveira (2005) 
1984m1-
2011m9 
Linear regression 
with an additional 
term 𝑥𝑡𝜋𝑡 
lagged federal funds rate, quarterly rate of change 
of the consumer price index, log differences 
between industrial production index and its 
Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend 
no forward-looking expectations in 
the model but estimation via 
generalised method of moments 
no evidence of nonlinearities 
Dolado, Maria-
Dolores and 
Ruge-Murcia 
(2004) 
1970m1-
1979m6, 
1983m1-
2002m12; 
1960q1-
1979q2, 
1970q1-
2002q4  
Linear regression 
with an additional 
term 𝑠𝜋𝑡
2  
(conditional 
variance of 
inflation) 
lagged federal funds rate, conditional variance of 
inflation estimated from the aggregate supply 
relation (𝑠𝜋𝑡
2 ); monthly: annual percentage change in 
the consumer price index, log differences between 
industrial production index and its Hodrick-Prescott 
filtered trend; quarterly: annualised quarterly 
percentage change in the implicit gross domestic 
product deflator 
both forward- and backward-
looking versions estimated  
no evidence of nonlinearities before 
1979 (pre-Volcker era); after 1983 
(Volcker-Greenspan era) ‘positive 
deviations of inflation from its target 
appear to be weighted more severely 
than negative ones, even if they are of 
the same magnitude’ 
Florio (2006) 1979q3-
2004q3 
Hyperbolic Tangent 
Smooth Transition 
lagged federal funds rate, annualised quarterly 
changes in the log of the gross domestic product 
deflator, percentage deviation of gross domestic 
transition variable: first difference 
of federal funds rate; no forward-
looking expectations in the model 
Volcker-Greenspan era – stronger 
reaction to an increase than to a 
decrease in inflation, more interest-rate 
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Regression product from the trend estimated by the 
Congressional Budget Office 
but estimation via generalised 
method of moments 
smoothing in periods of restrictive 
monetary policy; more cautious 
behaviour in lowering and rising 
interest rates in the Volcker and 
Greenspan eras, respectively  
Hayat and Mishra 
(2010) 
1949q1-
2008q2, 
1965q4-
2008q2 
Semi-parametric 
Generalised 
Additive Model 
lagged federal funds rate, annualised quarterly 
changes in the log of the gross domestic product 
deflator, percentage deviation of gross domestic 
product from the trend estimated by the 
Congressional Budget Office 
both forward- and backward-
looking versions estimated 
monetary authorities tend to react only 
when inflation or inflation expectations 
are in a particular range  
Kim and Nelson 
(2006) 
1960q1-
2001q2 
Two-step 
regression model 
with time-varying 
coefficients 
lagged federal funds rate, percentage of the gross 
domestic product deflator, percentage deviation of 
gross domestic product from the trend estimated by 
the Congressional Budget Office, standardised 
prediction errors for inflation and output gap 
prediction errors serve as correction 
biases for changing degree of 
uncertainty 
the sample could be divided into three 
periods: 1970s (stabilisation of 
economic activity), 1980s (stabilisation 
of inflation), 1990s (stabilisation of 
economic activity) 
Kim, Osborn and 
Sensier (2005) 
1960q1-
2000q4 
(efficiently: 
1970q1-
2000q4 )  
Hamilton (2001) 
nonlinear 
regression model  
lagged federal funds rate, annualised quarterly 
changes in the log of the gross domestic product 
deflator, percentage deviation of gross domestic 
product from the trend estimated by the 
Congressional Budget Office or with the Hodrick-
Prescott filter  
forward-looking expectations based 
on constructed inflation and output 
gap forecasted values, for inflation 
forecasts robustness check based on 
Survey of Professional Forecasters, 
backward-looking version 
estimated as a robustness check 
significant nonlinearity before 1979 
(pre-Volcker era); weak evidence of 
nonlinearity after 1979 (Volcker-
Greenspan era) 
Koo, Paya and 
Peel (2010) 
1960q1-
1979q2; 
1982q4-
2008q4 
Non-parametric 
regression and 
Hyperbolic Tangent 
Smooth Transition 
Regression  
lagged federal funds rate, annualised quarterly 
changes in the log of the gross domestic product 
deflator, percentage deviation of gross domestic 
product from the trend estimated by the 
Congressional Budget Office 
forward-looking expectations based 
on constructed inflation and output 
gap forecasted values 
significant nonlinearity before 1979 
(pre-Volcker era) – relatively stronger 
reaction to inflations when it is high, 
stronger reaction to a recession than to 
an expansion; weak evidence of 
nonlinearity after 1982 (Volcker-
Greenspan era) 
Lee and Son 
(2013) 
1979q1-
2008q2 
Nonlinear 
regression with 
coefficients being 
polynomial 
functions of other 
variables (‘series 
method’) and 
structural breaks 
lagged federal funds rate, annualised quarterly 
changes in the log of the gross domestic product 
deflator, percentage deviation of gross domestic 
product from the trend estimated by the 
Congressional Budget Office or with the Hodrick-
Prescott filter, two-year growth rate of the S&P 500 
price earnings ratio 
potential candidates for explanatory 
variables in coefficient functions: 
level value of inflation, deviation of 
inflation from its target level, level 
value of the interest rate, and 
various combinations of these 
candidates 
structural breaks in the estimated 
Taylor rule around 1991 and probably 
around 1982 and 1987; nonlinearity in 
the inflation coefficient – stronger 
reaction to inflationary than 
deflationary pressures 
Pardo, Rautureau 
and Vallée (2011) 
1960q1-
2008q4 
Markov switching 
model 
lagged federal funds rate, percentage of the gross 
domestic product deflator, percentage deviation of 
federal funds rate measured as four-
quarter average 
stronger reaction to economic activity 
and weaker to inflation in periods of 
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gross domestic product from the trend estimated by 
the Congressional Budget Office 
high than low volatility 
Petersen (2007) 1960q1-
2005q4 
Logistic Smooth 
Transition 
Regression 
3-month average growth rate of core personal 
consumption expenditure index or core consumer 
price index, percentage deviation of gross domestic 
product from the trend estimated with the Hodrick-
Prescott filter 
transition variable: inflation; no 
smoothing of interest rates (no 
lagged federal funds rate among 
explanatory variables) 
no evidence of nonlinearity for the 
1960-1979 period, significant 
nonlinearities for the 1985-2005 period 
– stronger reaction to inflation and 
output gap when inflation reaches a 
certain threshold 
Surico (2007) 1960q1-
2003q2 
Linex function 
reparameterised as 
a linear regression 
with additional 
terms 𝜋𝑡
2 and 𝑥𝑡
2 
lagged federal funds rate, changes in the log of: the 
personal consumption deflator or the gross domestic 
product deflator (𝜋𝑡), percentage deviation of gross 
domestic product from the trend estimated by the 
Congressional Budget Office (𝑥𝑡), terms 𝜋𝑡
2 and 𝑥𝑡
2   
no forward-looking expectations in 
the model but estimation via 
generalised method of moments 
reaction function in pre-Volcker 
concave with respect to output gap; no 
nonlinearities for the Volcker-
Greenspan era 
Tillmann (2011) 1982q3-
2006q4 
Linear regression 
with an additional 
term 𝑥𝑡𝜋𝑡
2  
lagged federal funds rate, annualised rate of change 
of the personal consumption expenditure deflator 
(𝜋𝑡), percentage deviation of real gross domestic 
product from the trend estimated by the 
Congressional Budget Office (𝑥𝑡), term 𝑥𝑡𝜋𝑡
2 
no forward-looking expectations in 
the model but estimation via 
generalised method of moments  
the coefficient on term 𝑥𝑡𝜋𝑡
2 is 
significant and positive, but the 
coefficient on the output gap is no 
longer significant 
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Table A1.5 Overview of studies on asymmetries in the monetary transmission mechanism for the U.S. economy 
 Period 
Econometric 
method 
Endogenous variables Additional remarks Conclusions 
Angrist, Jordà, 
and Kuersteiner 
(2013) 
1989m7-
2005m7, 
1989m7-
2008m12  
Nonparametric 
estimator based 
on propensity 
score weighting 
federal funds rate, T-bill rates (3-month, 2- 
and 10-year), federal funds futures, 
unemployment rate, monthly growth rate of: 
industrial production, consumer price index 
the econometric method is based 
on propensity score weighting 
(not on the estimated model of 
the monetary transmission 
mechanism) 
stronger effects of restrictive than expansionary 
monetary policy shocks on industrial production, 
unemployment and inflation 
Alessandrini 
(2003) 
1959m1-
2000m12 
Threshold VAR industrial production, consumer prices 
inflation, commodity prices inflation, federal 
funds rate, percentage ratio of non-borrowed 
reserves to total reserves, percentage ratio of 
total reserves to total reserves in the previous 
period, credit spread between bonds with Baa 
rating and bonds with Aaa rating, spread 
between 3-month prime rate and 3-month T-
Bills  
threshold variables: annual 
change in industrial production, 
annual changes in the S&P 500, 
annual changes in cash-flows 
(NIPA), annual changes in 
dividends (NIPA), Boschen-Mills 
index 
monetary tightening more severe when financial 
situation is already stretched, especially if cash-flows 
and dividends are used as proxies of the financial 
constraint of the economy (consistency with the 
existence of a credit channel of the monetary policy) 
Balke (2002) 1960q1-
1997q3,  
1960q1-
1991q4, 
Threshold VAR quarterly growth rate of gross domestic 
product, gross domestic product deflator 
inflation, federal funds rate, threshold 
variable (three models) 
threshold variables: commercial 
paper (four-to-six month)/T-Bill 
(six-month) spread, mix of bank 
loans and commercial paper in 
total firm external finance, 
difference between growth rates 
in the short-term debt of small 
and large manufacturing firms 
stronger effects of monetary policy shocks when 
credit conditions are ‘tight’, stronger effects of 
restrictive than expansionary monetary policy shocks 
Chang and Jansen 
(2005) 
1976q1-
1999q3 
Logistic Smooth 
Transition 
VECM 
real: big-bank loans, small-bank loans, gross 
domestic product, federal funds rate 
Transition variables: change in 
federal funds rate, change in 
federal gross domestic product  
significant but very temporary asymmetries for large 
negative monetary shocks, no evidence supporting 
asymmetries due to bank lending channel 
Hoppner, Melzer 
and Neumann 
(2005) 
1962q1-
2002q2 
Time-Varying 
Coefficient 
VAR 
gross domestic product, consumer price 
index, federal funds rate 
recession periods identified by 
NBER 
responsiveness of the economy (especially economic 
activity) to monetary policy shocks steadily 
decreasing in time, stronger effects of monetary 
policy when the economy is in a recession 
Mandler (2010) 1965q3-
2007q2 
Threshold VAR quarterly growth rates of: gross domestic 
product, gross domestic product deflator, M1 
money supply, indicator of commodity prices 
(oil, agricultural commodities, metals); 
federal funds rate  
threshold variable: inflation ‘qualitative differences (asymmetries) in generalised 
impulse responses depending on the economy being 
initially in the high or low inflation regime’; 
negligible asymmetry due to size of the shocks; 
stronger reaction of output growth to federal funds 
rate shock and inflation shock in the high inflation 
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regime; stronger reaction of inflation and federal 
funds rate to federal funds rate and output growth 
shocks in the low inflation regime  
Weise (1999) 1960q2-
1995q2 
Logistic Smooth 
Transition VAR 
quarterly growth rates of: industrial 
production index, consumer price index, and 
M1 money supply 
transition variables: lagged 
endogenous variables, change in 
consumer price index inflation  
stronger but negative effects of monetary policy 
shock on output and stronger on price level when 
output growth is high and inflation is rising, larger 
monetary policy shocks tend to have larger unit 
impact than smaller ones, at best mild evidence of 
asymmetry with respect to the sign of monetary 
policy shocks for large shocks 
Zheng (2013) 1973q1-
2008q4 
Threshold VAR log deviations from deterministic trend: gross 
domestic product, commodity price index, 
real trade weighted US dollar index against 
major currencies; consumer price index 
inflation, federal funds rate, adjusted national 
financial conditions index 
threshold variable: adjusted 
national financial conditions 
index 
stronger effects of monetary policy shocks and 
worsening of output-inflation trade-off when 
financial stress is high, larger monetary policy shocks 
have larger unit impact than smaller ones 
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Table A1.6 Number of results of searching keywords on google.scholar.com 
‘IS curve’ 18 000 
‘Phillips curve’ 38 400 
‘Aggregate demand curve’ 4 600 
‘Aggregate supply curve’ 5 200 
‘Effects’ and ‘output’ and ‘monetary’ and ‘policy’ 1 180 00 
‘Effects’ and ‘inflation’ and ‘monetary’ and ‘policy’ 682 000 
‘Effects’ and ‘output’ and ‘monetary’ and ‘policy’ 1 260 00 
‘Effects’ and ‘inflation’ and ‘monetary’ and ‘policy’ 706 000 
‘Effects’ and ‘output’ and ‘monetary’ and ‘interest’ and ‘rates’ 2 670 000 
‘Effects’ and ‘inflation’ and ‘monetary’ and ‘interest’ and ‘rates’ 1 090 000 
Source: google.scholar.com [04.07.2014]  
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Appendix A.2 
Table A2.1 Overview of channels through which structural changes in the U.S. economy may influence the 
shape of the Phillips curve 
 Channel References 
Implications for the shape of the Phillips 
curve 
(1) lower menu and managerial 
costs related to price changes 
Willis (2003) steepening 
(2) easier comparing prices Willis (2003) steepening 
(3) production more responsive to 
changes in product demand and 
reduced level of inventories 
Cecchetti (2006) flattening 
(4) increased share of temporary 
workers 
Cecchetti (2006); Willis 
(2003) 
flattening 
(5) increased returns to scale and 
network effects 
Berk (2002) changing the curvature into a more concave 
shape 
(6) changes in signal extraction 
problem 
Berk (2002); Campbell (2007) ambiguous net effect – steepening or flattening  
(7) changes in the formulation of 
inflation expectations 
by analogy with: Berk (2002); 
Campbell (2007) 
possible state-dependency (balance between the 
backward- and forward-looking components of 
inflation expectations) with respect to the 
development of information technology 
(8) composition effect Alcala and Sancho (2004), 
Moro (2012); Nakamura and 
Steinsson (2008) 
flattening 
 
Table A2.2 Overview of channels through which structural changes in the U.S. economy may influence the 
shape of the IS curve 
 Channel References Implications for the shape of the IS curve 
(1) erosion of a central bank’s 
monopoly position as a supplier 
of means of payment 
Berk (2002); Cecchetti 
(2006); Woodford (2000) 
possible flattening and/or more lagged impact of 
the short-term interest rate 
(2) dampening the credit channel of 
the monetary policy 
Berk (2002), Cecchetti 
(2006); Willis (2003) 
weakening of the inverse relation between the 
slope of the IS curve and credit conditions in the 
economy 
(3) development of hedging 
instruments and broader access 
to financing 
Berk (2002) ambiguous net effect – steepening or flattening; 
more forward-looking characteristic  
(4) better access to information and 
forecasts 
by analogy with: Berk (2002); 
Campbell (2007) 
possible state-dependency (balance between the 
backward- and forward-looking components of 
inflation expectations) with respect to the 
development of information technology 
(5) influencing the income effect of 
the monetary policy 
Berk (2002); Jerman and 
Quadrini (2006); Vrolijk 
(1997) 
ambiguous net effect – steepening or flattening; 
we find the steepening effect to be more probable 
(6) influencing the wealth effects of 
the monetary policy 
Berk (2002); Grydaki and 
Bezemer (2013); Temple 
(2002) 
ambiguous net effect – steepening or flattening; 
we find the steepening effect to be more probable 
(7) composition effect Alcala and Sancho (2004); 
Moro (2012) 
steepening  
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Appendix A.3 
Plugging (4.2) into (4.1) yields: 
𝜋𝑡 = [𝛼0 + (1 − 𝛼1)𝛽0] + [𝛼1 + (1 − 𝛼1)𝛽1]𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝑥𝑡 + (1 − 𝛼1)𝛽2𝑥𝑡−1 + 
          +(1 − 𝛼1)𝛽3𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜋,𝑡        (A3.1) 
The equation (A3.1) is equivalent to equation (4.7) under the assumption that: 
𝜙11 = [𝛼0 + (1 − 𝛼1)𝛽0] 
𝜙12 = [𝛼1 + (1 − 𝛼1)𝛽1] 
𝜙13 = 𝛼2 
𝜙14 = (1 − 𝛼1)𝛽2 
𝜙15 = (1 − 𝛼1)𝛽3 
𝜀𝜋,𝑡 = 𝜙16𝜖𝜋,𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝜋,𝑡 
 
Similarly, plugging (4.4) and (4.5) into (4.3) yields: 
𝑥𝑡 = [𝛾0 + (1 − 𝛾1)𝛿0 − 𝛾2𝜁0] + [(1 − 𝛾1)𝛿1 − 𝛾2𝜁1]𝜋𝑡−1 + 
         +[𝛾1 + (1 − 𝛾1)𝛿2 − 𝛾2𝜁2]𝑥𝑡−1 + [(1 − 𝛾1)𝛿3 + 𝛾2 − 𝛾2𝜁3]𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑥,𝑡  
Analogously: 
𝜙21 = [𝛾0 + (1 − 𝛾1)𝛿0 − 𝛾2𝜁0] 
𝜙22 = [(1 − 𝛾1)𝛿1 − 𝛾2𝜁1] 
𝜙23 = [𝛾1 + (1 − 𝛾1)𝛿2 − 𝛾2𝜁2] 
𝜙24 = [(1 − 𝛾1)𝛿3 + 𝛾2 − 𝛾2𝜁3] 
𝜀𝑥,𝑡 = 𝜙25𝜖𝑥,𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑥,𝑡 
 
In the case of equations (4.6) and (4.8), mapping is more direct: 
𝜙31 = 𝜃0 
𝜙32 = 𝜃2 
𝜙33 = 𝜃3 
𝜙34 = 𝜃1 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜙35𝜖𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜈𝑖,𝑡 
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Appendix A.4 
We perform a simple experiment to back up our intuition that nonlinear models estimated via 
GMM may need longer time series than those estimated via NLS or similar linear models 
estimated via OLS: 
1. We draw 1024 i.i.d. observations of 𝑥~𝑈(0; 1); 
2. We draw 100 independent sets of 1024 i.i.d. observations of 𝜀𝑗~𝑁(0; 1), 𝑗 =
1, … , 100; 
3. For every set 𝑗 = 1, … , 100, we create: 
a. 𝑦1,𝑗 = 1.14506 ∗ (3.616314 ∗ 𝑥)
0.5 + 𝜀𝑗 
b. 𝑦2,𝑗 = ln1.14506 + 0.5 ∗ ln(3.616314 ∗ 𝑥) + 𝜀𝑗 
c. 𝑦3,𝑗 = 1.14506 + 0.5 ∗ (3.616314 ∗ 𝑥) + 𝜀𝑗  
d. 𝑦4,𝑗 = 0.5448326 ∗ (3.616314 ∗ 𝑥)
2 + 𝜀𝑗 
e. 𝑦5,𝑗 = ln0.5448326 + 2 ∗ ln(3.616314 ∗ 𝑥) + 𝜀𝑗 
f. 𝑦6,𝑗 = 0.5448326 + 2 ∗ (3.616314 ∗ 𝑥) + 𝜀𝑗 
The parameters are calibrated so that 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦1,𝑗) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦2,𝑗) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦3,𝑗), 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦4,𝑗) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦5,𝑗) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑦6,𝑗) (equalising variances of the explained variables) 
and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(3.616314 ∗ 𝑥) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(ln(3.616314 ∗ 𝑥)) (equalising variances of the 
explanatory variables) with a precision up to 0.000001. It is worth noting, however, 
that models b. and e. are not log-linearised versions of models a. and d., respectively, 
since in all cases the error term is additive. 
4. For every set we estimate models: 
a. 𝑦1,𝑗 = 𝛼1 ∗ (3.616314 ∗ 𝑥)
𝛽1 + 𝜖1,𝑗 using Nonlinear Least Squares and the 
Generalised Method of Moments (instruments: constant and explanatory 
variable) 
b. 𝑦2,𝑗 = 𝛼2 + 𝛽2 ∗ ln(3.616314 ∗ 𝑥) + 𝜖2,𝑗 using Ordinary Least Squares 
c. 𝑦3,𝑗 = 𝛼3 + 𝛽3 ∗ (3.616314 ∗ 𝑥) + 𝜖3,𝑗 using Ordinary Least Squares 
d. 𝑦4,𝑗 = 𝛼4 ∗ (3.616314 ∗ 𝑥)
𝛽4 + 𝜖4,𝑗 using Nonlinear Least Squares and the 
Generalised Method of Moments (instruments: constant and explanatory 
variable) 
e. 𝑦5,𝑗 = 𝛼5 + 𝛽5 ∗ ln(3.616314 ∗ 𝑥) + 𝜖5,𝑗 using Ordinary Least Squares 
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f. 𝑦6,𝑗 = 𝛼6 + 𝛽6 ∗ (3.616314 ∗ 𝑥) + 𝜖6,𝑗 using Ordinary Least Squares 
for the first 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512 and 1024 observations of 1024 observations. 
5. For every set and every size of the sample, we calculate the root mean squared error: 
a. 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸(?̂?1
𝑁𝐿𝑆) and 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸(?̂?1
𝐺𝑀𝑀) 
b. 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸(?̂?2
𝑂𝐿𝑆) 
c. 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸(?̂?3
𝑂𝐿𝑆) 
d. 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸(?̂?4
𝑁𝐿𝑆) and 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸(?̂?4
𝐺𝑀𝑀) 
e. 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸(?̂?5
𝑂𝐿𝑆) 
f. 𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸(?̂?6
𝑂𝐿𝑆) 
Figure A4.1 presents the root mean squared errors of the estimators as functions of sample 
size for triplets of models a. – c. (left panel) and d. – f. (right panel). Although the experiment 
was quite straightforward and based on a relatively small number of replications and sample 
sizes, it shows that the: 
 NLS estimator is more efficient than the GMM one for small sample sizes. As the 
number of observations goes up, the difference between RMSE of the two estimators 
diminishes, while the pace of convergence seems to depend on parameterisation of 
the data-generating process. 
 RMSEs of nonlinear model estimators are larger than those of similar linear model 
estimators. Although the difference between the two decreases as the size of the 
sample grows, the difference seems to be non-negligible for the number of 
observations which is typical for macro data. 
 
Figure A4.1 The comparison of RMSEs of different estimators 
 
Source: own calculation
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Appendix A.5 
Table A5.1 Detailed data information 
Tag  Detailed description  Source 
Business cycle and climate 
𝑐𝑢𝑡  
Capacity utilization: total industry, percent of capacity, quarterly average monthly 
data, seasonally adjusted by data provider 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TCU 
𝑎𝑖_𝑚𝑎𝑡  
Chicago Fed National Activity Index: three month moving average, index, 
quarterly average monthly data, seasonally adjusted with X-12-ARIMA 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CFNAIMA3# 
𝑎𝑖_𝑑𝑖𝑡  
Chicago Fed National Activity Index: diffusion index, index, quarterly average 
monthly data, seasonally adjusted with X-12-ARIMA 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CFNAIDIFF# 
𝑐𝑠𝑡  
University of Michigan: Consumer Sentiment©, index, 1966q1=100, quarterly 
average monthly data, seasonally adjusted with X-12-ARIMA 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/UMCSENT 
Labour market 
𝑢𝑟𝑡  
Civilian unemployment rate, percent, quarterly average monthly data, seasonally 
adjusted by data provider 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/UNRATE 
𝑤&𝑠𝑡  
Compensation of employees: wages and salaries, billions of dollars, quarterly data, 
seasonally adjusted annual rate by data provider, annualised percent change from 
quarter ago 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/A576RC1Q027SBEA 
𝑙𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑡  
Civilian labour force participation rate, percent, quarterly average monthly data, 
seasonally adjusted by data provider 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CIVPART 
𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡  
Labour Market Conditions Index, index, quarterly average monthly data, 
seasonally adjusted by data provider 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/FRBLMCI 
Financial and monetary conditions 
𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑖𝑡  
CredAbility Consumer Distress Index, percent, quarterly data, seasonally adjusted 
with X-12-ARIMA 
 FRED®: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CCDIOAQ156N 
𝑓𝑐𝑛𝑙𝑠𝑡  
Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Nonfinancial Leverage Subindex, 
index, quarterly average weekly data, not seasonally adjusted (identifiable 
seasonality not present) 
 FRED®: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/NFCINONFINLEVERAGE# 
𝑓𝑐𝑙𝑠𝑡  
Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Leverage Subindex, index, quarterly 
average weekly data, not seasonally adjusted (identifiable seasonality not present) 
 FRED®: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/NFCILEVERAGE 
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𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑡  
Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Credit Subindex, index, quarterly 
average weekly data, not seasonally adjusted (identifiable seasonality not present) 
 FRED®: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/NFCICREDIT# 
𝑓𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑡  
Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Risk Subindex, index, quarterly 
average weekly data, not seasonally adjusted (identifiable seasonality not present) 
 FRED®: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/NFCIRISK 
𝑎𝑓𝑐𝑖𝑡  
Chicago Fed Adjusted National Financial Conditions Index, index, quarterly 
average weekly data, not seasonally adjusted (identifiable seasonality not present) 
 FRED®: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/ANFCI 
𝑓𝑐𝑖𝑡  
Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Index, index, quarterly average weekly 
data, not seasonally adjusted (identifiable seasonality not present) 
 FRED®: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/NFCI 
𝑚𝑏𝑡  
Board of governors monetary base, adjusted for changes in reserve requirements, 
billions of dollars, quarterly average monthly data, seasonally adjusted by data 
provider, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 FRED®: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/BOGAMBSL# 
𝑚𝑏_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
Board of governors monetary base, adjusted for changes in reserve requirements, 
billions of dollars, quarterly average monthly data, seasonally adjusted by data 
provider, percent of gross domestic product, billions of dollars, quarterly, 
seasonally adjusted annual rate by data provider 
 
FRED®: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/BOGAMBSL# and 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDP 
𝑚𝑧𝑚𝑡  
MZM (money zero maturity) stock, billions of dollars, quarterly average monthly 
data, seasonally adjusted by data provider, annualised percent change from quarter 
ago 
 FRED®: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/MZMSL 
𝑚2𝑡  
M2 money stock, billions of dollars, quarterly average monthly data, seasonally 
adjusted by data provider, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 FRED®: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/M2SL 
𝑏𝑎𝑎_𝑖𝑡  
Moody's seasoned Baa corporate bond minus federal funds rate, percent, quarterly 
average monthly data, not seasonally adjusted (identifiable seasonality not present) 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/BAAFFM 
𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑖𝑡  
Moody's seasoned Aaa corporate bond minus federal funds rate, percent, quarterly 
average monthly data, not seasonally adjusted (identifiable seasonality not present) 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/AAAFFM 
𝑙𝑙𝑟_𝑡𝑙𝑡  
Loan loss reserve to total loans for all U.S. banks, percent, quarterly data (end of 
period), not seasonally adjusted (identifiable seasonality not present) 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USLLRTL 
𝑓𝑎𝑡𝑡  
Failures and assistance transactions of all institutions for the United States and 
other areas, number of institutions, interpolated from annual data 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/BNKTTLA641N 
𝑛𝑙_𝑡𝑙𝑡  
Nonperforming loans (past due 90+ days plus nonaccrual) to total loans for all 
U.S. banks, percent, quarterly data (end of period), not seasonally adjusted 
(identifiable seasonality not present) 
 FRED®: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USNPTL# 
𝑑𝑟𝑡  
Delinquency rate on all loans, all commercial banks, percent, quarterly data (end 
of period), not seasonally adjusted (identifiable seasonality not present) 
 FRED®: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DRALACBN 
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑡  Charge-off rate on all loans, all commercial banks, percent, quarterly data, not  FRED®: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CORALACBS# 
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seasonally adjusted (identifiable seasonality not present) 
Uncertainty 
𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑖𝑡  
Economic Policy Uncertainty Index for United States, index by Baker, Bloom and 
Davis (2013), quarterly average monthly data, seasonally adjusted with X-12-
ARIMA 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USEPUINDXM 
𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑡  
Equity Market-related Economic Uncertainty, index by Baker, Bloom and Davis 
(2013), quarterly average daily data, seasonally adjusted with X-12-ARIMA 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/WLEMUINDXD 
Globalisation 
𝑤𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
World gross domestic product, constant 2005 US dollar, interpolated from annual 
data, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 World DataBank 
𝑤𝑠_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
World gross savings, percent of world gross domestic product, nominal ratio, 
interpolated from annual data 
 World DataBank 
𝑤𝑑𝑠_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
World gross domestic savings, percent of world gross domestic product, nominal 
ratio, interpolated from annual data 
 World DataBank 
𝑤𝑒_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
World exports of goods and services, percent of world gross domestic product, 
nominal ratio, interpolated from annual data 
 World DataBank 
𝑒_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
Real exports of goods and services, billions of chained 2009 dollars, quarterly 
data, seasonally adjusted annual rate by data provider, percent of  real gross 
domestic product, billions of chained 2009 dollars, quarterly data, seasonally 
adjusted annual rate by data provider 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/EXPGSC1# and 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPC1 
𝑖_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
Real imports exports of goods and services, billions of chained 2009 dollars, 
quarterly data, seasonally adjusted annual rate by data provider, percent of  real 
gross domestic product, billions of chained 2009 dollars, quarterly data, seasonally 
adjusted annual rate by data provider 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/IMPGSC1# and 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPC1 
𝑐𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
Balance on current account, billions of dollars, quarterly, seasonally adjusted by 
data provider, percent of gross domestic product, billions of dollars, quarterly, 
seasonally adjusted annual rate by data provider 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/BOPBCA and 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDP 
𝑎𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
U.S. assets abroad, net: outflow (-), billions of dollars, quarterly, seasonally 
adjusted by data provider, percent of gross domestic product, billions of dollars, 
quarterly data, seasonally adjusted annual rate by data provider 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/BOPO# and 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDP 
𝑓𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
Foreign assets in the U.S., net: capital inflow (+), billions of dollars, quarterly, 
seasonally adjusted by data provider, percent of gross domestic product, billions of 
dollars, quarterly, seasonally adjusted annual rate by data provider 
 FRED®: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/BOPI# and 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDP 
𝑢𝑠𝑑𝑡  
Trade weighted U.S. dollar index: major Currencies, index march 1973=100, 
quarterly average daily data, not seasonally adjusted (identifiable seasonality not 
 FRED®: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DTWEXM# 
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present), annualised percent change from quarter ago 
Structural changes – structure of the economy 
𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡  
Nonfarm business sector: labour share, index, 2009=100, quarterly data, 
seasonally adjusted by data provider 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/PRS85006173# 
𝑠𝑣𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
Services, etc., value added: percent of gross domestic product, nominal ratio, 
quarterly interpolated from annual data 
 World DataBank 
Structural changes – potential growth and development 
𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡  
Real potential gross domestic product, billions of chained 2009 dollars, not 
seasonally adjusted (identifiable seasonality not present), annualised percent 
change from quarter ago 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPPOT# 
𝑟𝑑_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
Gross domestic product: research and development, billions of chained 2009 
dollars, quarterly data, seasonally adjusted annual rate by data provider, percent of  
real gross domestic product, billions of chained 2009 dollars, quarterly data, 
seasonally adjusted annual rate by data provider 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/Y694RX1Q020SBEA and 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPC1 
𝑟𝑑𝑡  
Gross domestic product: research and development, billions of chained 2009 
dollars, quarterly data, seasonally adjusted annual rate by data provider, annualised 
percent change from quarter ago 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/Y694RX1Q020SBEA 
𝑝𝑎_𝑟𝑡  
Patent applications, residents, quarterly interpolated from annual data, annualised 
percent change from quarter ago 
 World DataBank 
𝑝𝑎_𝑟𝑛𝑡  
Patent applications, residents + nonresidents, quarterly interpolated from annual 
data, annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 World DataBank 
𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑎𝑡  
Scientific and technical journal articles, quarterly interpolated from annual data, 
annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 World DataBank 
Structural changes – financial development 
𝑚𝑧𝑚_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
MZM (money zero maturity) stock, billions of dollars, quarterly average monthly 
data, seasonally adjusted by data provider, percent of gross domestic product, 
billions of dollars, quarterly, seasonally adjusted annual rate by data provider 
 
FRED®: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/MZMSL and 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDP 
𝑚2_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
M2 money stock, billions of dollars, quarterly average monthly data, seasonally 
adjusted by data provider, percent of gross domestic product, billions of dollars, 
quarterly, seasonally adjusted annual rate by data provider 
 
FRED®: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/M2SL and 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDP 
𝑡𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
Total assets at all commercial banks, billions of dollars, quarterly average monthly 
data, seasonally adjusted by data provider, percent of gross domestic product, 
billions of dollars, quarterly data, seasonally adjusted annual rate by data provider 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TLAACBM027SBOG and 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDP 
𝑏𝑐_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  Bank credit at all commercial banks, billions of dollars, quarterly average weekly 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TOTBKCR# and 
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data, seasonally adjusted by data provider, percent of gross domestic product, 
billions of dollars, quarterly data, seasonally adjusted annual rate by data provider 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDP 
𝑏𝑐_𝑑𝑡  
Bank credit at all commercial banks, billions of dollars, quarterly average weekly 
data, seasonally adjusted by data provider, percent of deposits of all commercial 
banks, billions of dollars, quarterly average monthly data, seasonally adjusted by 
data provider 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TOTBKCR# and 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DPSACBM027SBOG 
𝑐𝑙_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
Consumer loans at all commercial banks, billions of dollars, quarterly average 
monthly data, seasonally adjusted by data provider, percent of gross domestic 
product, billions of dollars, quarterly data, seasonally adjusted annual rate by data 
provider 
 
FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CONSUMER# and 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDP 
𝑟𝑒𝑙_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
Real estate loans at all commercial banks, billions of dollars, quarterly average 
monthly data, seasonally adjusted by data provider, percent of gross domestic 
product, billions of dollars, quarterly data, seasonally adjusted annual rate by data 
provider 
 
FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/REALLN# and 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDP 
𝑚𝑓_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
Money market mutual funds: total financial assets, billions of dollars, quarterly 
data, seasonally adjusted with X-12-ARIMA, percent of gross domestic product, 
billions of dollars, quarterly data, seasonally adjusted annual rate by data provider 
 
FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/MMMFFAQ027S# and 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDP 
𝑡𝑎𝑠_𝑡𝑎𝑡  
Treasury and agency securities at all commercial banks, billions of dollars, 
quarterly average monthly data, seasonally adjusted by data provider, percent of 
total assets of all commercial banks, billions of dollars, quarterly average monthly 
data, seasonally adjusted by data provider 
 
FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USGSEC# and 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TLAACBM027SBOG 
𝑙𝑡𝑑_𝑑𝑡  
Large time deposits at all commercial banks, billions of dollars, quarterly average 
monthly data, seasonally adjusted by data provider, percent of deposits of all 
commercial banks, billions of dollars, quarterly average monthly data, seasonally 
adjusted by data provider 
 
FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/LTDACBM027SBOG and 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DPSACBM027SBOG 
𝑛𝑓𝑏_𝑐𝑏𝑡  
Total assets of nonfinancial corporate business, billions of dollars, quarterly data, 
not seasonally adjusted (identifiable seasonality not present), percent of total assets 
of all commercial banks, billions of dollars, quarterly average monthly data, 
seasonally adjusted by data provider 
 
FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TABSNNCB# and 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TLAACBM027SBOG 
𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑡  
Net interest margin for all U.S. banks, percent (ratio of tax-adjusted income to 
average earning assets), quarterly data, not seasonally adjusted (identifiable 
seasonality not present) 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USNIM 
𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑡  
Return on average assets for all U.S. banks, percent (net income call to quarterly 
average of total assets), quarterly data, not seasonally adjusted (identifiable 
seasonality not present) 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USROA 
𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑘_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡  
Wilshire 5000 Full Cap Price Index©, index, quarterly average daily data, not 
seasonally adjusted (identifiable seasonality not present), percent of gross domestic 
 
FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/WILL5000PRFC and 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDP 
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product, billions of dollars, quarterly data, seasonally adjusted annual rate by data 
provider 
Greenspan standard 
𝑠𝑝500𝑡  
S&P 500©, index, quarterly average daily data, not seasonally adjusted 
(identifiable seasonality not present), annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 Stooq: http://stooq.com/q/d/?s=^spx&d1=19790101&d2=20141205&c=0 
𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑑𝑡  
NASDAQ Composite Index©, index, 5 February 1971 = 100, quarterly average 
daily data, not seasonally adjusted (identifiable seasonality not present), 
annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 FRED®: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/NASDAQCOM 
𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑡  
Wilshire 5000 Full Cap Price Index©, index, quarterly average daily data, not 
seasonally adjusted (identifiable seasonality not present), annualised percent 
change from quarter ago 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/WILL5000PRFC 
𝑑𝑗𝑐𝑡  
Dow Jones Composite©, index, quarterly average daily data, not seasonally 
adjusted (identifiable seasonality not present), annualised percent change from 
quarter ago 
 Stooq: http://stooq.com/q/d/?s=^djc&c=0&d1=19810101&d2=20141205 
𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑎𝑡  
Dow Jones Industrial Average©, index, quarterly average daily data, not 
seasonally adjusted (identifiable seasonality not present), annualised percent 
change from quarter ago 
 Stooq: http://stooq.com/q/d/?s=^dji&c=0&d1=19790101&d2=20141205 
𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑑100𝑡  
NASDAQ 100©, index, quarterly average daily data, not seasonally adjusted 
(identifiable seasonality not present), annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 Stooq: http://stooq.com/q/d/?s=^ndx&i=d&d1=19790101&d2=20141205&l=184 
𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑡  
S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index©, index, 2010q1 = 100, 
quarterly data, not seasonally adjusted (identifiable seasonality not present), 
annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 FRED®: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USCSCOMHPISA 
ℎ𝑝𝑖𝑡  
All-transactions house price index (US. Federal Housing Finance Agency), index, 
1980q1 = 100, quarterly data, not seasonally adjusted (identifiable seasonality not 
present), annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 FRED®: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USSTHPI# 
𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑡  
Spot oil price: West Texas Intermediate©, dollars per barrel, quarterly average 
monthly data, not seasonally adjusted (identifiable seasonality not present), 
annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 FRED®: https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/OILPRICE# 
𝑐𝑝𝑒𝑡  
World Bank commodity price data: energy, index, 2010 = 100, quarterly average 
monthly data, not seasonally adjusted (identifiable seasonality not present), 
annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 
Worldbank Pink Data: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-
1304428586133/pink_data_m.xlsx 
𝑐𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑡  
World Bank commodity price data: nonenergy, index, 2010 = 100, quarterly 
average monthly data, not seasonally adjusted (identifiable seasonality not 
present), annualised percent change from quarter ago 
 
Worldbank Pink Data: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPROSPECTS/Resources/334934-
1304428586133/pink_data_m.xlsx 
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𝑡10𝑦_3𝑚𝑡  
10-year treasury constant maturity rate minus 3-month treasury constant maturity 
rate, percent, quarterly data 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/T10Y3M# 
𝑡10𝑦_𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑡  
10-year treasury constant maturity rate minus federal funds rate, percent, quarterly 
data 
 FRED®: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/T10YFF  
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Appendix A.6 
Table A6.1 Suggested functional forms when modelling nonlinearity 
𝑧𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
𝜋𝑡−1 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑥𝑡−1 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑖𝑡−1 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝜋𝑡 - -  - -  - -  - -  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑥𝑡 - -  - -  - -  - -  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
 
Table A6.2 Suggested functional forms when modelling indirect forms of nonlinearity 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
Sample mean of model variables 
𝜋𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L2/E L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  L1 L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  L2/E L2/E  L2/E L2/E  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  L2/E L2/E 
Sample variance of model variables 
𝜋𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L2/E L1  L2/E L2/E 
𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
 
Table A6.3 Suggested functional forms when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of business 
cycle and climate 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum power 
𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 
𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
𝑐𝑢𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  L1 L1  L1 L1  L2/E L2/E 
𝑎𝑖_𝑚𝑎𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  L2/E L2/E  L1 L1  L2/E L2/E 
𝑎𝑖_𝑑𝑖𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  L2/E L2/E  L1 L1  L1 L1 
𝑐𝑠𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  L1 L1  L1 L1  L1 L1 
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Table A6.4 Suggested functional forms when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of labour 
market conditions 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
𝑢𝑟𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑤&𝑠𝑡 L1 L1  L2/E L2/E  L1 L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑙𝑓𝑝𝑟𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  L1 L1  L1 L1  L1 L1 
 
Table A6.5 Suggested functional forms when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of financial 
conditions 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
Indices of financial conditions 
𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑖𝑡 L1 L1  LIN LIN  L1 L1  L2/E L2/E  L1 L1  L1 L1 
𝑓𝑐𝑛𝑙𝑠𝑡 LIN LIN  L2/E L2/E  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L2/E L2/E  L2/E L2/E 
𝑓𝑐𝑙𝑠𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  L2/E L2/E  L2/E L2/E  L2/E L2/E 
𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑡 L1 L1  L2/E L2/E  L1 L1  L1 L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑓𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑡 L2/E L2/E  L2/E L2/E  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑎𝑓𝑐𝑖𝑡 L1 L1  L1 L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L2/E L1  L2/E L2/E 
𝑓𝑐𝑖𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
Monetary aggregates 
𝑚𝑏𝑡 L1 L1  LIN LIN  L1 L1  L1 L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑚𝑏_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑚𝑧𝑚𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  L1 L1 
𝑚2𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  L2/E L2/E 
Interest rate quality spreads 
𝑏𝑎𝑎_𝑖𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑎𝑎𝑎_𝑖𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
Quality of credit portfolio 
𝑙𝑙𝑟_𝑡𝑙𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  LIN LIN 
𝑓𝑎𝑡𝑡 L1 L1  L1 L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑛𝑙_𝑡𝑙𝑡 L1 L1  L1 L1  L1 L1  L2/E L2/E  L1 L1  L1 L1 
𝑑𝑟𝑡 L1 L1  L1 L1  L1 L1  L1 L1  L1 L1  L1 L1 
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  L1 L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
 
Table A6.6 Suggested functional forms when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of 
uncertainty 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum power 
𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 
𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑖𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  L2/E L2/E  L1 L1  LIN LIN 
𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  L1 L1  L1 L1 
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Table A6.7 Suggested functional forms when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of 
globalisation 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
World data 
𝑤𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN L1  LIN LIN  L1 L1  LIN LIN 
𝑤𝑠_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 L1 L1  LIN LIN  L2/E L2/E  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑤𝑑𝑠_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑤𝑒_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN L1  L1 L1  L1 L1  LIN LIN 
U.S. data 
𝑒_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 LIN L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L2/E L2/E  LIN LIN 
𝑖_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑐𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 L1 L1  L1 L1  L1 L1  L2/E L2/E  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑎𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑓𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑢𝑠𝑑𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
 
Table A6.8 Suggested functional forms when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of 
composition of the economy 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
Maximum 
power 
 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 
 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum  
power 
 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  L1 L1  L1 L1  L1 L1 
𝑠𝑣𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  L1 L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
 
Table A6.9 Suggested functional forms when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of potential 
growth and development 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 L1 L1  L1 L1  L1 L1  L1 L1  L2/E L2/E  L2/E L2/E 
𝑟𝑑_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 L1 L1  L1 L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑟𝑑𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑝𝑎_𝑟𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑝𝑎_𝑟𝑛𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
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Table A6.10 Suggested functional forms when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of financial 
development 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
Money supply to GDP ratios 
𝑚𝑧𝑚_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 L1 L1  L1 L1  L1 L1  L2/E L2/E  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑚2_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 L1 L1  L1 L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
Bank assets ratios 
𝑡𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 L1 L1  L1 L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑏𝑐_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 L1 L1  L1 L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑏𝑐_𝑑𝑡 L1 L1  L1 L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑚𝑑_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 L1 L1  L1 L1  L1 L1  L2/E L2/E  L1 L1  L1 L1 
𝑐𝑙_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑟𝑒𝑙_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 L1 L1  L1 L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑡𝑎𝑠_𝑡𝑎𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑙𝑡𝑑_𝑑𝑡 L1 L1  L1 L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑛𝑓𝑏_𝑐𝑏𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1 
Other measures 
𝑚𝑓_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  L2/E L2/E  L1 L1  L1 L1 
𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑡 L2/E L2/E  L2/E L2/E  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑡 LIN LIN  L1 L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑘_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 L1 L1  L1 L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
 
Table A6.11 P-values of tests for state-dependency with respect to variables related to ‘Greenspan conundrum’ 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
𝑡10𝑦_3𝑚𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  L1 L1 
𝑡10𝑦_𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  L1 L1 
 
Table A6.12 P-values of tests for state-dependency with respect to variables related to ‘Greenspan standard’ 
𝑠𝑘𝑡
𝑗
 
inflation equation  output gap equation  interest rate equation 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 3 
 
Maximum 
power 𝐽 = 4 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
Stock prices 
𝑠𝑝500𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  L2/E L2/E  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑑𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  L2/E L2/E  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑑𝑗𝑐𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑎𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  L2/E L2/E  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑑100𝑡 LIN LIN  L2/E L2/E  L1 L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
Real estate prices 
𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L2/E L2/E  L2/E L2/E 
ℎ𝑝𝑖𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
Commodity prices 
𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  L1 L1 
𝑐𝑝𝑒𝑡 LIN L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  L1 L1  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
𝑐𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑡 LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN  LIN LIN 
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Appendix A.7 
Table A7.1 Final estimates of 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model when modelling nonlinearity (standard errors in square brackets) 
𝑦𝑡 𝑠𝑡 𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝒄) 𝜑21 𝜑22 𝜑23 𝜑24 𝜓21 𝜓22 𝜓23 𝜓24 𝛾 𝒄 𝜑25 
𝑥𝑡 𝑥𝑡−1 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
-0.311 -0.037 0.514 0.014 2.979 1.174 
- 
-0.781 
32 𝑝81 
0.814 
[0.618] [0.093] [0.197] [0.115] [1.132] [0.308] [0.202] [0.165] 
 
Table A7.2 Final estimates of 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model when modelling indirect forms of nonlinearity (standard errors in 
square brackets) 
𝑦𝑡 𝑠𝑡 𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝒄) 𝜑…1 𝜑…2 𝜑…3 𝜑…4 𝜓…1 𝜓…2 𝜓…3 𝜓…4 𝛾 𝒄 𝜑…5 
𝜋𝑡 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
0.945 0.766 0.070 -0.101 8.651 -0.668 0.572 -0.661 
32 𝑝82 
-0.329 
[0.282] [0.093] [0.034] [0.035] [2.078] [0.239] [0.169] [0.217] [0.137] 
𝑥𝑡 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
0.156 -0.269 0.176 -0.156 
- 
1.801 
- - 1.5 𝑝91 
0.911 
[0.807] [0.115] [0.132] [0.134] [0.422] [0.080] 
𝑖𝑡 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉  𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
0.694 0.110 0.189 0.813 
- - 
-1.125 -0.516 
10 𝑝94 
0.816 
[0.518] [0.056] [0.064] [0.106] [0.257] [0.106] [0.135] 
 
Table A7.3 Final estimates of 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of 
business cycle and climate (standard errors in square brackets) 
𝑦𝑡 𝑠𝑡 𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝒄) 𝜑…1 𝜑…2 𝜑…3 𝜑…4 𝜓…1 𝜓…2 𝜓…3 𝜓…4 𝛾 𝒄 𝜑…5 
𝑥𝑡 
𝑐𝑢𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
-0.031 -0.211 0.855 0.032 
- 
0.250 0.147 
- 32 𝑝35 
0.022 
[0.188] [0.068] [0.058] [0.031] [0.049] [0.069] [0.133] 
𝑎𝑖_𝑚𝑎𝑡 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 
0.184 -0.448 0.804 0.005 
- 
0.443 0.216 
- 0.7 𝑝7 
-0.150 
[0.141] [0.070] [0.109] [0.023] [0.060] [0.128] [0.126] 
𝑎𝑖_𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
0.160 -0.501 0.985 0.007 
- 
0.498 
- - 2.7 𝑝10 
-0.124 
[0.150] [0.084] [0.032] [0.025] [0.077] [0.127] 
𝑐𝑠𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
0.655 -0.160 0.690 -0.033 -1.082 0.211 -0.155 
- 32 𝑝55 
0.839 
[0.671] [0.110] [0.218] [0.128] [0.343] [0.126] [0.059] [0.170] 
𝑖𝑡 
𝑐𝑢𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
0.192 -0.990 -0.207 0.960 
- 
1.105 0.340 
- 1.9 𝑝5 
0.519 
[0.205] [0.179] [0.203] [0.034] [0.174] [0.221] [0.120] 
𝑎𝑖_𝑚𝑎𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
-2.249 0.084 0.105 0.950 2.725 
- - - 0.8 𝑝5 
0.425 
[0.370] [0.047] [0.034] [0.027] [0.368] [0.117] 
𝑎𝑖_𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
0.168 -0.401 0.132 0.918 
- 
0.536 
- - 14.5 𝑝6 
0.614 
[0.236] [0.097] [0.046] [0.042] [0.089] [0.112] 
 
Table A7.4 Final estimates of 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of labour 
market conditions (standard errors in square brackets) 
𝑦𝑡 𝑠𝑡 𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝒄) 𝜑…1 𝜑…2 𝜑…3 𝜑…4 𝜓…1 𝜓…2 𝜓…3 𝜓…4 𝛾 𝒄 𝜑…5 
𝑥𝑡 𝑤&𝑠𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
0.184 -0.049 1.978 -0.028 
- - 
-1.733 
- 0.3 𝑝5 
0.544 
[0.324] [0.086] [0.265] [0.055] [0.351] [0.165] 
𝑥𝑡 𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
-0.865 -0.016 0.996 -0.010 1.069 
- - - 17.3 𝑝11 
-0.077 
[0.238] [0.057] [0.033] [0.025] [0.165] [0.127] 
𝑖𝑡 𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
-1.589 -0.476 0.144 1.361 1.857 0.606 
- 
-0.463 
22.8 𝑝11 
0.632 
[0.628] [0.241] [0.053] [0.157] [0.548] [0.247] [0.150] [0.126] 
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Table A7.5 Final estimates of 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of 
financial conditions (standard errors in square brackets) 
𝑦𝑡 𝑠𝑡 𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝒄) 𝜑…1 𝜑…2 𝜑…3 𝜑…4 𝜓…1 𝜓…2 𝜓…3 𝜓…4 𝛾 𝒄 𝜑…5 
𝜋𝑡 𝑓𝑐𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 
0.667 0.809 0.055 -0.059 
- - 
0.154 0.122 
27.4 
𝑝20  
𝑝87 
-0.349 
[0.176] [0.067] [0.036] [0.026] [0.079] [0.027] [0.118] 
𝑥𝑡 
𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 
0.127 -0.037 0.948 -0.176 
- - - 
0.178 
32 𝑝14 
0.128 
[0.198] [0.069] [0.044] [0.048] [0.041] [0.134] 
𝑓𝑐𝑙𝑠𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
-6.658 -0.129 -0.052 1.283 8.801 
- 
1.217 -1.628 
0.8 𝑝5 
-0.193 
[1.038] [0.053] [0.210] [0.200] [1.309] [0.254] [0.248] [0.127] 
𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
0.072 0.047 0.942 -0.009 
- 
-1.224 
- 
0.361 
1.9 𝑝95 
-0.042 
[0.168] [0.065] [0.037] [0.031] [0.501] [0.246] [0.130] 
𝑚𝑏𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
-10.74 5.346 0.918 -0.008 23.68 -11.75 
- - 0.1 𝑝95 
0.209 
[2.813] [1.080] [0.047] [0.034] [6.086] [2.349] [0.130] 
𝑛𝑙_𝑡𝑙𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
0.091 -0.012 0.953 -0.003 
- - 
-0.368 -0.220 
32 𝑝86 
0.030 
[0.188] [0.066] [0.048] [0.031] [0.112] [0.046] [0.134] 
𝑑𝑟𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
0.170 -0.005 1.026 -0.001 
- 
-0.526 -0.514 
- 4.6 𝑝85 
-0.275 
[0.142] [0.053] [0.039] [0.024] [0.077] [0.105] [0.125] 
𝑖𝑡 
𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
0.108 0.065 0.165 0.868 0.472 
- - - 32 𝑝15 
0.724 
[0.429] [0.060] [0.062] [0.075] [0.125] [0.126] 
𝑚𝑧𝑚𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
0.426 0.141 0.108 1.013 -1.827 
- - 
-0.258 
0.6 𝑝95 
0.301 
[0.187] [0.035] [0.023] [0.037] [0.645] [0.126] [0.127] 
𝑚2𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
0.981 0.022 0.197 0.848 
- - - 
-0.243 
0.9 𝑝84 
0.872 
[0.438] [0.050] [0.059] [0.092] [0.037] [0.088] 
 
Table A7.6 Final estimates of 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of 
uncertainty (standard errors in square brackets) 
𝑦𝑡 𝑠𝑡 𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝒄) 𝜑…1 𝜑…2 𝜑…3 𝜑…4 𝜓…1 𝜓…2 𝜓…3 𝜓…4 𝛾 𝒄 𝜑…5 
𝑥𝑡 
𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑖𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
0.292 -0.021 1.004 -0.023 -1.110 
- - - 29.6 𝑝89 
-0.235 
[0.130] [0.050] [0.028] [0.022] [0.147] [0.125] 
𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
-0.318 0.025 0.354 0.001 
- - 
0.288 
- 20.1 𝑝75 
0.902 
[0.788] [0.090] [0.133] [0.123] [0.073] [0.072] 
 
Table A7.7 Final estimates of 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of 
globalisation (standard errors in square brackets) 
𝑦𝑡 𝑠𝑡 𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝒄) 𝜑…1 𝜑…2 𝜑…3 𝜑…4 𝜓…1 𝜓…2 𝜓…3 𝜓…4 𝛾 𝒄 𝜑…5 
𝑥𝑡 
𝑤𝑠_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
-0.480 1.066 0.370 -0.202 
- 
-1.0878 
- 
0.224 
4 𝑝14 
0.921 
[0.847] [0.283] [0.135] [0.175] [0.295] [0.138] [0.061] 
𝑐𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 
-0.007 -0.017 1.177 0.150 
- - 
-0.333 -0.169 
32 𝑝71 
0.423 
[0.280] [0.083] [0.113] [0.066] [0.111] [0.046] [0.146] 
𝑖𝑡 
𝑤𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
-2.064 -0.610 -0.256 1.525 2.661 0.700 0.482 -0.672 
32 𝑝9 
0.726 
[1.006] [0.249] [0.121] [0.235] [0.952] [0.255] [0.110] [0.226] [0.122] 
𝑤𝑒_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
-8.437 -0.044 -2.493 3.823 18.624 
- 
5.202 -5.894 
0.1 𝑝25 
0.831 
[3.904] [0.060] [0.766] [0.779] [7.372] [1.47] [1.456] [0.093] 
𝑒_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 
0.694 0.101 -0.524 0.814 
- - 
0.746 
- 32 𝑝5 
0.811 
[0.533] [0.063] [0.260] [0.106] [0.246] [0.122] 
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Table A7.8 Final estimates of 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of 
composition of the economy (standard errors in square brackets) 
𝑦𝑡 𝑠𝑡 𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝒄) 𝜑…1 𝜑…2 𝜑…3 𝜑…4 𝜓…1 𝜓…2 𝜓…3 𝜓…4 𝛾 𝒄 𝜑…5 
𝑥𝑡 
𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
-0.092 -0.043 0.457 0.157 -1.593 
- - 
-0.171 
1.1 𝑝81 
0.925 
[0.804] [0.078] [0.104] [0.117] [1.012] [0.180] [0.051] 
𝑠𝑣𝑎_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
0.362 -0.041 0.985 -0.024 
- 
-0.352 
- - 32 𝑝83 
-0.095 
[0.143] [0.054] [0.031] [0.024] [0.049] [0.126] 
 
Table A7.9 Final estimates of 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of 
potential growth and development (standard errors in square brackets) 
𝑦𝑡 𝑠𝑡 𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝒄) 𝜑…1 𝜑…2 𝜑…3 𝜑…4 𝜓…1 𝜓…2 𝜓…3 𝜓…4 𝛾 𝒄 𝜑…5 
𝜋𝑡 
𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
-5.537 -0.096 0.085 -0.125 9.232 0.105 0.036 0.348 0.3 𝑝5 
1.020 
[3.590] [0.375] [0.267] [0.200] [1.957] [0.599] [0.394] [0.308] [0.030] 
𝑟𝑑_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
0.474 0.895 0.020 -0.020 -0.821 
- - - 30.1 𝑝89 
-0.285 
[0.161] [0.064] [0.034] [0.026] [0.177] [0.129] 
𝑥𝑡 𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
0.574 -0.075 1.015 -0.040 -0.784 
- - - 32 𝑝76 
0.075 
[0.173] [0.060] [0.039] [0.028] [0.124] [0.129] 
𝑖𝑡 𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
0.223 0.151 0.127 0.901 
- 
1.106 0.717 -0.866 
3.1 𝑝94 
0.611 
[0.241] [0.063] [0.047] [0.044] [0.298] [0.186] [0.185] [0.115] 
 
Table A7.10 Final estimates of 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model when modelling state-dependency with respect to measures of 
financial development of the economy (standard errors in square brackets) 
𝑦𝑡 𝑠𝑡 𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝒄) 𝜑…1 𝜑…2 𝜑…3 𝜑…4 𝜓…1 𝜓…2 𝜓…3 𝜓…4 𝛾 𝒄 𝜑…5 
𝑥𝑡 
𝑚𝑧𝑚_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 
-2.551 -0.192 -0.102 0.500 3.514 
- 
1.116 -0.596 
2.3 𝑝90 
-0.083 
[0.529] [0.061] [0.232] [0.093] [0.581] [0.242] [0.099] [0.129] 
𝑚𝑓_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
0.362 -0.013 1.031 -0.022 
- 
-0.395 -0.185 
- 9.3 𝑝77 
-0.070 
[0.136] [0.051] [0.036] [0.023] [0.047] [0.070] [0.130] 
𝑖𝑡 𝑚𝑓_𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
0.091 0.159 0.126 0.970 
- - - 
-0.542 
1.3 𝑝95 
0.461 
[0.188] [0.052] [0.038] [0.033] [0.092] [0.118] 
 
Table A7.11 Final estimates of 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 model when modelling state-dependency with respect to variables related 
to Greenspan standard (standard errors in square brackets) 
𝑦𝑡 𝑠𝑡 𝐺(𝑠𝑡; 𝛾, 𝒄) 𝜑…1 𝜑…2 𝜑…3 𝜑…4 𝜓…1 𝜓…2 𝜓…3 𝜓…4 𝛾 𝒄 𝜑…5 
𝑥𝑡 
𝑠𝑝500𝑡 𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅 
0.402 0.0769 1.047 -0.0703 
- 
-1.499 -0.400 0.453 
0.2 𝑝70 
-0.383 
[0.120] [0.0596] [0.036] [0.0286] [0.346] [0.187] [0.176] [0.122] 
𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 
0.091 0.02 1.0116 -0.007 1.212 -0.741 -0.178 
- 32 
𝑝10 
𝑝91 
-0.082 
[0.176] [0.060] [0.036] [0.025] [0.357] [0.141] [0.071] [0.131] 
𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑎𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅2 
-0.018 0.048 0.951 -0.007 1.293 -0.802 
- - 2.6 
𝑝9  
𝑝90 
0.023 
[0.209] [0.073] [0.038] [0.029] [0.416] [0.172] [0.131] 
𝑖𝑡 
𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
0.657 0.165 0.268 0.741 0.330 
- - - 9.7 𝑝29 
0.874 
[0.524] [0.063] [0.069] [0.098] [0.079] [0.089] 
𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑅1 
-0.080 0.340 0.280 0.767 0.734 -0.305 -0.113 0.093 
32 𝑝13 
0.789 
[0.606] [0.088] [0.078] [0.111] [0.314] [0.089] [0.065] [0.059] [0.144] 
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Appendix A.8 
Table A8.1 Detailed results of estimation of equation (7.1) and p-values of subsequent tests for 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝜋) 
No. 
𝑧𝑡 / 
𝑠𝑡 
𝛼− 𝛼+ 𝛽− 𝛽+ 
 𝐻0
1  𝐻0
1𝑎  𝐻0
1𝑏   𝐻0
2 
 𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
1 𝑥𝑡−1 
-1.052 -1.051 -0.019 -0.018  
0.532 0.530 
 
0.307 0.304 
 
0.796 0.796 
 
0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
2 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  
-1.155 -1.155 0.007 0.007  
0.858 0.858 
 
0.693 0.692 
 
0.771 0.771 
 
0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
3 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  
-0.175 -0.179 0.338 0.119  
0.000 0.000 
 
0.395 0.393 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
4 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉  
-1.112 -1.112 0.001 0.001  
0.711 0.710 
 
0.410 0.408 
 
0.898 0.897 
 
0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
 
Table A8.2 Detailed results of estimation of equation (7.1) and p-values of subsequent tests for 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝑥) 
No. 
𝑧𝑡 / 
𝑠𝑡 
𝛼− 𝛼+ 𝛽− 𝛽+ 
 𝐻0
1  𝐻0
1𝑎  𝐻0
1𝑏   𝐻0
2 
 𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
1 𝑥𝑡−1 
-1.291 -1.282 -0.112 -0.108  
0.552 0.550 
 
0.301 0.298 
 
0.898 0.897 
 
0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
2 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  
-1.787 -1.787 0.044 0.041  
0.545 0.543 
 
0.470 0.468 
 
0.514 0.513 
 
0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
3 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  
-0.862 -0.862 -0.123 -0.030  
0.000 0.000 
 
0.850 0.849 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
4 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉  
-0.585 -0.585 0.001 0.001  
0.712 0.712 
 
0.412 0.410 
 
0.862 0.862 
 
0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
 
Table A8.3 Detailed results of estimation of equation (7.1) and p-values of subsequent tests for 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑀(𝑖) 
No. 
𝑧𝑡 / 
𝑠𝑡 
𝛼− 𝛼+ 𝛽− 𝛽+ 
 𝐻0
1  𝐻0
1𝑎  𝐻0
1𝑏   𝐻0
2 
 𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
1 𝑥𝑡−1 
2.386 2.392 -0.088 -0.084  
0.552 0.550 
 
0.311 0.308 
 
0.847 0.847 
 
0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
2 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  
2.097 2.096 0.032 0.031  
0.726 0.725 
 
0.593 0.592 
 
0.644 0.643 
 
0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
3 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  
5.275 5.278 0.212 0.090  
0.000 0.000 
 
0.593 0.592 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
4 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉  
4.021 4.021 -0.004 -0.004  
0.792 0.792 
 
0.498 0.496 
 
0.949 0.949 
 
0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
 
Table A8.4 Detailed results of estimation of equation (7.1) and p-values of subsequent tests for 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝜋) 
No. 
𝑧𝑡 / 
𝑠𝑡 
𝛼− 𝛼+ 𝛽− 𝛽+ 
 𝐻0
1  𝐻0
1𝑎  𝐻0
1𝑏   𝐻0
2 
 𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
1 𝑥𝑡−1 
-0.441 -0.439 -0.024 -0.023  
0.565 0.563 
 
0.312 0.309 
 
0.890 0.890 
 
0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
2 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  
-0.551 -0.551 0.012 0.011  
0.635 0.634 
 
0.617 0.616 
 
0.496 0.495 
 
0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
3 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  
-0.033 -0.034 0.068 0.023  
0.000 0.000 
 
0.306 0.304 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
4 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉  
-0.277 -0.277 0.000 0.000  
0.987 0.987 
 
0.993 0.993 
 
0.873 0.872 
 
0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
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Table A8.5 Detailed results of estimation of equation (7.1) and p-values of subsequent tests for 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑥) 
No. 
𝑧𝑡 / 
𝑠𝑡 
𝛼− 𝛼+ 𝛽− 𝛽+ 
 𝐻0
1  𝐻0
1𝑎  𝐻0
1𝑏   𝐻0
2 
 𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
1 𝑥𝑡−1 
-0.541 -0.536 -0.066 -0.064  
0.566 0.564 
 
0.305 0.303 
 
0.933 0.933 
 
0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
2 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  
-0.852 -0.853 0.034 0.032  
0.487 0.485 
 
0.510 0.508 
 
0.406 0.404 
 
0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
3 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  
-0.163 -0.163 -0.017 -0.003  
0.000 0.000 
 
0.272 0.269 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
4 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉  
-0.146 -0.146 0.000 0.000  
0.861 0.861 
 
0.747 0.747 
 
0.623 0.622 
 
0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002]     
 
Table A8.6 Detailed results of estimation of equation (7.1) and p-values of subsequent tests for 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 
No. 
𝑧𝑡 / 
𝑠𝑡 
𝛼− 𝛼+ 𝛽− 𝛽+ 
 𝐻0
1  𝐻0
1𝑎  𝐻0
1𝑏   𝐻0
2 
 𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
1 𝑥𝑡−1 
0.816 0.820 -0.058 -0.055  
0.522 0.520 
 
0.293 0.291 
 
0.820 0.820 
 
0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
2 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  
0.647 0.646 0.012 0.011  
0.611 0.610 
 
0.424 0.422 
 
0.692 0.691 
 
0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
3 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  
0.198 0.208 -0.476 -0.144  
0.000 0.000 
 
0.093 0.089 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
4 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉  
1.901 1.901 0.000 0.000  
0.733 0.732 
 
0.519 0.517 
 
0.574 0.573 
 
0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
 
Table A8.7 Detailed results of estimation of equation (7.1) for 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑆𝑘(𝜋), 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑆𝑘(𝑥), and 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑆𝑘(𝑖) 
No. 
𝑧𝑡 / 
𝑠𝑡 
𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑆𝑘(𝜋)  𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑆𝑘(𝑥)  𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑆𝑘(𝑖) 
𝛼− 𝛼+ 𝛽− 𝛽+  𝛼− 𝛼+ 𝛽− 𝛽+  𝛼− 𝛼+ 𝛽− 𝛽+ 
1 𝑥𝑡−1 
1.578 -1.320 -0.920 -0.829  1.912 -1.189 0.034 -0.265  3.370 -1.132 3.048 -0.857 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.025]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.776] [0.132]  [0.000] [0.186] [0.173] [0.791] 
2 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  
3.361 -3.231 0.042 -0.069  3.835 -3.712 -0.003 -0.077  3.597 -3.464 0.031 -0.073 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.686] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
3 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  
-1.027 1.042 2.453 2.583  2.651 -2.578 -1.165 -1.980  -0.324 0.392 0.598 0.959 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
4 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉  
-2.539 2.526 -0.079 0.093  -2.280 2.268 -0.075 0.091  2.373 -2.346 0.074 -0.080 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.005]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.003] 
 
Table A8.8 P-values of tests of sign and size asymmetries for 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑆𝑘(𝜋) 
No. 𝑧𝑡 / 𝑠𝑡 
𝐻0
1  𝐻0
1𝑎  𝐻0
1𝑏   𝐻0
2  𝐻0
2𝑎  𝐻0
2𝑏 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
1 𝑥𝑡−1 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.056 0.053  0.000 0.000  0.839 0.838  0.000 0.000 
2 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.027 0.025 
3 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.511 0.510  0.000 0.000  0.173 0.170  0.000 0.000 
4 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.192 0.189  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.739 0.738 
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Table A8.9 P-values of tests of sign and size asymmetries for 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑆𝑘(𝑥) 
No. 𝑧𝑡 / 𝑠𝑡 
𝐻0
1  𝐻0
1𝑎  𝐻0
1𝑏   𝐻0
2  𝐻0
2𝑎  𝐻0
2𝑏 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
1 𝑥𝑡−1 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.307 0.303  0.161 0.157  0.278 0.276 
2 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
3 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
4 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉  0.000 0.000  0.185 0.182  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.645 0.644 
 
Table A8.10 P-values of tests of sign and size asymmetries for 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑝
𝑆𝑘(𝑖) 
No. 𝑧𝑡 / 𝑠𝑡 
𝐻0
1  𝐻0
1𝑎  𝐻0
1𝑏   𝐻0
2  𝐻0
2𝑎  𝐻0
2𝑏 
𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2  𝐹 𝜒2 
1 𝑥𝑡−1 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.060 0.057  0.380 0.376  0.321 0.319  0.577 0.576 
2 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.001 0.001 
3 𝑖𝑡−1
𝑆𝑀  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
4 𝑥𝑡−1
𝑆𝑉  0.000 0.000  0.002 0.001  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.857 0.856 
 
  
242 
 
Appendix A.9 
Figure A9.1 Relations between the six measures describing the monetary transmission and the selected model variables 
No. 𝑧𝑡 / 𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑖, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛(Ω𝑡) 
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Figure A9.2 Relations between the six measures describing the monetary transmission and the selected measures of business cycle and climate 
No. 𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑖, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛(Ω𝑡) 
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Figure A9.3 Relations between the six measures describing the monetary transmission and the selected measures of labour market conditions 
No. 𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑖, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝜋,Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛(Ω𝑡) 
1 𝑤&𝑠𝑡 
      
2 𝑙𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡 
      
 
Figure A9.4 Relations between the six measures describing the monetary transmission and the selected measures of financial conditions 
No. 𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
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𝑀(𝑖, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛(Ω𝑡) 
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2 𝑓𝑐𝑙𝑠𝑡 
      
3 𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑡 
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6 𝑚𝑧𝑚𝑡 
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8 𝑛𝑙_𝑡𝑙𝑡 
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Figure A9.5 Relations between the six measures describing the monetary transmission and the selected measures of uncertainty 
No. 𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑖, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛(Ω𝑡) 
1 𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑖𝑡 
      
2 𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑢𝑖𝑡 
      
 
Figure A9.6 Relations between the six measures describing the monetary transmission and the selected measures of globalisation 
No. 𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑖, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛(Ω𝑡) 
1 𝑤𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 
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Figure A9.7 Relations between the six measures describing the monetary transmission and the selected measures of composition of the economy 
No. 𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
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Figure A9.8 Relations between the six measures describing the monetary transmission and the selected measures of potential growth and development 
No. 𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
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Figure A9.9 Relations between the six measures describing the monetary transmission and the selected measures of financial development of the economy 
No. 𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
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Figure A9.10 Relations between the six measures describing the monetary transmission and the selected variables related to some aspects of Greenspan standard 
No. 𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐶𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑀(𝑖, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝜋, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣(𝑥, Ω𝑡) 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛(Ω𝑡) 
1 𝑠𝑝500𝑡 
      
2 𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑠ℎ𝑡 
      
3 𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑎𝑡 
      
4 𝑠𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑡 
      
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
-20 -10 0 10 20
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
-20 -10 0 10 20
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
-20 -10 0 10 20
-.6
-.5
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
-20 -10 0 10 20
-.8
-.6
-.4
-.2
.0
.2
.4
.6
.8
-20 -10 0 10 20
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
-20 -10 0 10 20
-.88
-.84
-.80
-.76
-.72
-.68
-.64
-.60
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
3.0
3.2
3.4
3.6
3.8
4.0
4.2
4.4
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
-.28
-.26
-.24
-.22
-.20
-.18
-.16
-.14
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
.2
.3
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
-.88
-.84
-.80
-.76
-.72
-.68
-.64
-12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
-12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12
3.2
3.4
3.6
3.8
4.0
4.2
4.4
-12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12
-.26
-.24
-.22
-.20
-.18
-.16
-.14
-12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
.25
-12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12
-1.6
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
-12 -8 -4 0 4 8 12
-.878371
-.878370
-.878369
-.878368
-.878367
-.878366
-.878365
-.878364
-.878363
-2 -1 0 1 2
-.4469918
-.4469916
-.4469914
-.4469912
-.4469910
-.4469908
-2 -1 0 1 2
2.931368
2.931370
2.931372
2.931374
2.931376
2.931378
-2 -1 0 1 2
-.2996450
-.2996445
-.2996440
-.2996435
-.2996430
-.2996425
-.2996420
-2 -1 0 1 2
-.1524856
-.1524855
-.1524854
-.1524853
-.1524852
-.1524851
-2 -1 0 1 2
.508886
.508887
.508888
.508889
.508890
.508891
.508892
-2 -1 0 1 2
252 
 
5 𝑤𝑡𝑖𝑡 
      
 
 
 
-1.44
-1.40
-1.36
-1.32
-1.28
-1.24
-1.20
-1.16
-1.12
-20 -10 0 10 20
-.80
-.76
-.72
-.68
-.64
-.60
-20 -10 0 10 20
4.2
4.4
4.6
4.8
5.0
5.2
5.4
5.6
5.8
-20 -10 0 10 20
-.272
-.268
-.264
-.260
-.256
-.252
-.248
-20 -10 0 10 20
-.144
-.143
-.142
-.141
-.140
-.139
-.138
-.137
-.136
-.135
-20 -10 0 10 20
.528
.530
.532
.534
.536
.538
.540
.542
.544
.546
-20 -10 0 10 20
